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Abstract
The aim of CONNECT is to achieve universal interoperability between heterogeneous Networked Sys-
tems. For this, the non-functional properties required at each side of the connection going to be es-
tablished must be fulfilled. By the one inclusive term “ CONNECTability” we comprehend properties
belonging to all four non-functional concerns of interest for CONNECT, namely dependability, perfor-
mance, security and trust. We model such properties in conformance with a meta-model which estab-
lishes the relevant concepts and their relations. Then, building on the conceptual models proposed in
the first year in Deliverable D5.1, in this document we present the approaches developed for assuring
CONNECTability both at synthesis time and at runtime. The contributions include:
• the Dependability&Performance analysis Enabler, for which we release a modular architecture
supporting stochastic verification and state-based analysis;
• incremental verification and event-based monitoring for runtime analysis;
• a model-based approach to interoperable trust management;
• the Security-by-Contract-with-Trust framework, which guarantees and enforces the expected trust
levels and security policies.
Examples of the properties on which the above contributions are discussed are excerpted from the
Terrorist Alert scenario.
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This document reports the results achieved in the second year of CONNECT within Workpackage 5
(WP5) on “Dependability Assurance”. This is a broad WP encompassing dependability analysis and ver-
ification, as well as security, privacy and trust management within the CONNECTed world. In this chapter
we first recall briefly the WP objectives (Section 1.1) and the conceptual models developed in Deliverable
D5.1(Section 1.2). We then revisit the main comments received at the first year review and summarize
how we addressed them (Section 1.3). Hence (Section 1.4), we present the pragmatic directions under-
taken by the WP as a whole to make effective progress towards ensuring and assessing the dependability,
security, privacy and trust of the CONNECTed systems. Finally, we provide an overview of the different
complementary approaches and results produced in the second year (Section 1.5), which are then de-
tailed in the subsequent chapters, and give a roadmap of this deliverable (Section 1.6).
1.1 The Role of Workpackage WP5
The CONNECT project aims at overcoming the interoperability barriers among heterogenous communica-
tion technologies by synthesizing suitable ad hoc CONNECTors between NSs which have expressed the
intent to interact with each other. A synthesized CONNECTor should ensure that two NSs using different
application protocols and middleware can each seamlessly follow their own language and procedures in
the communication and yet be able to understand each other and successfully complete a collaborative
transaction.
The position of CONNECT is to set the minimal possible assumptions on the NSs and to have the
CONNECT Enablers automatically and autonomously derive all the required information for the synthesis
and deployment of CONNECTors. There are several outstanding challenges behind such a position. Lay-
ing down the foundations of a compositional modeling and reasoning framework in which CONNECTors
properties can be expressed and verified is the scope of WP2 [29]. Inferring via learning techniques the
interaction behaviour of the NSs for completing their a priori functional and non-functional description, to
be used in the CONNECTor synthesis, is the task of WP4 [31], whereas the synthesis of CONNECTors me-
diating the interactions between NSs at both application- and middleware-layers is pursued in WP3 [30].
The task of WP5 in such a context is to ensure that the interaction through the synthesized CONNECTors
fulfills possible non-functional requirements, including dependability, performance, security and privacy
properties, whilst also providing the involved NS at each end with the adequate trust level. Moreover,
as the aim of CONNECT is to ensure eternal interoperability, notwithstanding component replacements or
technology evolution, the assessment and assurance of such properties must continue at runtime beyond
the deployment of the CONNECTors.
As described in the DOW, WP5 activity is structured into the following four tasks:
Task 5.1. Dependability metrics for open dynamic systems: the aim is to revisit classical dependability
metrics to account for dynamic CONNECTions in open, evolutionary networks and elicit relevant properties
to be ensured.
Task 5.2. Dependability verification & validation (V&V) in evolving, adaptive contexts: this will
develop approaches for quantitative verification of dependability properties, and for lightweight adaptive
monitoring that is meant to detect potential problems and provide feedback to learning and synthesis
activities.
Task 5.3. Security and privacy: this will adapt and extend existing techniques for security-by-contract
checking and enforcement.
Task 5.4. Distributed trust management: this will develop a unifying theory for trust and a corresponding
reputation scheme.
1.2 Summary of D5.1 Achievements
As the objectives of this WP are quite broad, in the first year an intense activity has been carried out for
reciprocal acquaintance between the differing backgrounds, terminologies and methods behind each task,
involving the study of literature and exploration of how the various involved properties can fit together and
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within the dynamic on-the-fly project vision. One challenge for the WP is in fact the need to put together
several disparate approaches which address differing scientific challenges.
The Y1 achievements reported in Deliverable D5.1 [32] included:
• A conceptual framework for expressing CONNECT-relevant metrics for the properties of interest [16]:
this consisted of a structured framework, in which traditional generic metrics for dependability, per-
formance, security and trust were classified as CONNECT-specific and application-specific metrics,
and could be applied to each of the four types of elements of the CONNECT architecture: the Enabler,
the NS, the CONNECTor, the CONNECTed system.
• The evaluation and qualitative comparison of state-based stochastic methods and stochastic model
checking for verification of CONNECT elements: the two approaches have been applied to a common
case study, to better understand their respective synergies and differences. While formal verification
approaches demonstrated to be very accurate in determining best and worst case behavior but for
relatively small numbers of involved nodes, the state-based stochastic methods were able to provide
average values for large-scale networks.
• A security model adapting the Security-by-Contract (SxC) paradigm to the CONNECT architecture:
specifically, we investigated how SxC, originally developed for providing security assurances to mo-
bile applications, could be used and adapted for guaranteeing the security of communicating het-
erogeneous NSs.
• A distributed trust management model for assessment of CONNECTors and CONNECT Enablers: the
model allowed Enablers to estimate (also jointly with other Enablers) a measure of confidence on
CONNECTors so to select among an available set the one which is the highest recommended, and
to manage feedbacks to detect dysfunction and update stakeholders’ trust relations.
• An analysis of the requirements for a flexible and generic monitoring framework, needed to support
runtime analysis, and a preliminary discussion of how this should interact with Enablers for synthesis,
learning, dependability analysis and security enforcement.
1.3 Responses to Y1 Review Comments
While acknowledging the broad range of activities carried out by WP5 in Y1, and agreeing that overall de-
liverable D5.1 points into the right direction, the reviewers also found some aspects in the WP5 approach
to be confusing and consequently the Technical Review Report raised several questions to be addressed.
WP5 Scope and Focus As a first main point, it is said that the scope and focus need to be specified
more clearly. Indeed, until the end of the first year the architecture and the overall approach of the project
were still largely evolving and therefore it was not easy to grasp how dependability, security and trust
aspects could fit into the larger CONNECT picture. We missed in fact important notions which should be
fixed in the architecture to allow for building a dependability, security and trust infrastructure. We have
since followed closely, and been also directly involved into, the advances made in WPs 1-4, especially
concerning the refinement of the architecture, and hence at the end of the second year we are now able
to more clearly outline WP5 scope and focus.
The key point to understand is that when in CONNECT a NS1 expresses an intent to communicate with
another NS2, WP5 gets involved as far as such interaction involves some specified (be it given or learned)
non-functional property. In the (remote) case that no dependability or performance or security or trust
requirement is given, then evidently WP5 techniques become out of scope, as whatever the level of non-
functional properties exposed by the transaction, this will always be acceptable (banally, it does not break
any requirement). Such case seems quite strange, though. More realistically, considering the more or less
stringent non-functional properties that an interaction has to satisfy, at the time that the communication via
an on-the-fly CONNECTor has to be established, WP5 will analyse these properties for the CONNECTed
system and will: i) provide feedback to the synthesis Enabler about whether the specified reqs are fulfilled
and ii) possibly suggest mechanisms to be applied to the CONNECTor to improve the CONNECTed systems
NF characteristics.
CONNECT 231167 20/123
Specifically, focus of the WP will cover:
• Quantitative verification (e.g., mean time to repair) of properties expressed in temporal logic;
• Assessment of quantitative properties, like performance and dependability;
• Mechanisms/patterns to achieve such attributes;
• Formal assurance of security policies;
• Assessment of trust between NSs and of environment;
• Observation at runtime of complex events and of evolutions, relative to non-functional properties.
The approaches taken and the related tools which have been developed in the second year will be the
subject of this deliverable.
Properties vs. Metrics Another request for clarification involved the conceptual metrics framework, in
particular our use of terminology. It is noticed that not all non-functional properties which we considered
are metrics in the formal meaning of the word. This comment correctly highlighted an improper use in D5.1
of the term metrics, and more in general hints at a need for a more rigorous modeling of the non-functional
properties. We have addressed both aspects in Y2 activity via the derivation of a conceptual model for
properties, both qualitative an quantitative, and for the metrics associated to the quantitative ones. In
simple words, a non-functional property provides the general definition (not necessarily quantitative) of
an attribute of relevance: more precisely we distinguish between prescriptive properties (must be guar-
anteed) and descriptive properties (provided by the NS). Metrics specify how a considered quantitative
property is measured. To address such issue, and more in general to specify the conceptual framework,
which was outlined during Y1, in a more rigorous and formalized way, we have defined a meta-model of
CONNECTability properties (Chapter 3 of this deliverable) and derived from it as an example the model of
a set of properties for a demonstrative scenario (see next chapter).
Impact on Synthesis Reviewers would like to see how non-functional properties (desired for CON-
NECTors and provided by components) are taken into account in the synthesis algorithms. As noticed in
the review report, monitor-based property enforcement is the approach followed for security. Concerning
instead dependability and performance related properties, indeed, the approach is described in Chap-
ter 4: we describe the architecture of the Dependability&Performance Enabler and discuss the process of
interaction between synthesis and analysis (see in particular Figure 4.1).
Other more detailed comments included:
the term “dependability” is used with two different connotations. This was done on purpose: we had
adopted formerly “Dependability” (capitalised) for the general concept encompassing all the relevant non-
functional properties addressed in CONNECT, and “dependability” for the standard Laprie’s terminology.
Following the reviewers concern that this might lead to confusion, as shown in Figure 3.1 (to be considered
as replacing former Figure 2.1 in D5.1) we have now introduced a specific term in substitution of capitalised
“Dependability”, that is “CONNECTability”.
It is not clear where “security” relates to the infrastructure and where to the application itself : in order
to cope with this comment, we have re-investigated the threat models of CONNECT. We have identified
two main levels: the CONNECT infrastructure level, consisting of the complete architecture of the enablers,
and the Networked System level, consisting of the entities that ask for the communication. Hence, we
have to investigate security aspects among enablers of the CONNECT infrastructure, among the CONNECT
infrastructure itself and the NSs level, and security aspects of the CONNECTed system, i.e., the system
composed by the NSs and the CONNECTor (Chapter 7, Table 7.1).
It is not clear how the intended correctness-by-construction will be achieved. “Correctness-by-construction”
refers to functional interoperability, which is in the scopus of WP2 and WP3. Non-functional properties are
not achieved by construction, they are assessed at synthesis time and monitored at runtime.
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1.4 Y2 Tactic: a Concrete Bottom-up Approach
Following the key position in the project that minimal assumptions must be made, during the first year
we have tried to take the most generally possible approach. In retrospect, from the review comments we
have learned that this attitude is not successful as in the end we are left with a very abstract vision which
results at best confusing, at worst inconsistent.
In the second year, taking a start from the models and general concepts developed in Y1, therefore,
we decided to make progress by taking a concrete bottom-up approach. By this we mean that we select
a scenario and on this we apply our analysis, simulating the interaction with the other enablers. In this
way, we hope to provide a clearer understanding of the approaches, and at the same time to get concrete
feedback about their feasibility and suitability.
We hence proceed as follows. We first select one common scenario for demonstration of all WP5
approaches. On this, we proceed by selecting some non-functional properties, covering all the four main
components of WP5, namely: dependability, performance, security and trust.
For each property we implement the corresponding approach and demonstrate how it works. As D5.2
has double nature of report and prototype, this pragmatic approach suitably fits our needs, as we can thus
show how the developed prototypes work, even though the integration with the other CONNECT Enablers
is still ongoing. At the time of writing, in fact, the other enablers are themselves undergoing development.
It is our aim to proceed with real integration of WP5 Enablers with the other CONNECT Enablers in the
third year.
1.5 Y2 Challenges and Overview of Related Achievements
Building on the conceptual models we developed in the first year, the challenges addressed in Y2 can be
shortly summarized by the following questions:
C1: how can we abstract and express the non-functional properties we outlined in the Y1 CONNECT
framework so that they are: general enough to match exigencies from heterogenous NSs and to be
understood by CONNECT Enablers, but also precise enough for automated processing?
C2: how can we usefully employ within the CONNECT architecture the approaches for Dependability and
Performance analysis that we experimented in Y1, both when a CONNECTor has to be synthesized
and at runtime?
C3: how can we improve the CONNECT trust model, so to be able to handle and combine heterogenous
trust models by different NSs?
C4: how can we release some strict assumptions behind the Security-by-Contract framework experi-
mented in Y1, so to better capture the evolving CONNECT vision?
In this deliverable we report our achievements in addressing the above challenges.
Challenge C1 We have first introduced a new concept, that is CONNECTability, to better clarify and
express in comprehensive way the set of non-functional properties considered in CONNECT. We have
also defined a formal property meta-model that allows the specification of CONNECTability properties
in a machine processable way. This meta-model aims to be the exchange language used among all
CONNECT Enablers to communicate non-functional information (such as, the learned NS characteristics
or the required properties for a CONNECTed system). Hence, all the CONNECT infrastructure will be able
to understand and hence dynamically manage properties defined with this language. In Chapter 3, we
show examples of how specific CONNECTability properties of interest can be instantiated from the defined
meta-model.
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Challenge C2 From the dependability and performance analysis point of view, the major contributions
of Y2 consisted in: i) the definition of the architecture of a Dependability&Performance Analysis Enabler
to assess, before deployment, if the dependability and performance requirements requested by the NSs
can be satisfied by a CONNECTor being synthesised. It supports both stochastic model checking and
state-based stochastic methods evaluation approaches; ii) preliminary prototypes for the two approaches,
based on PRISM and Möbius assessment tools respectively; iii) application to the ”Terrorist Alert” sce-
nario, through which the complementarity of the two approaches has been shown. These achievements
are described in detail in Chapter 4.
Concerning Dependability&Performance analysis at runtime, as we present in Chapter 5, we have two
main achievements:
• an approach for quantitative incremental verification, which improves the performance of verifica-
tion at run time in case probabilistic values are changed as time elapses. The key idea is to use
a decomposition of the model into its strongly connected components (SCCs). Exploiting model
structure in this way has already been shown to be effective for an isolated instance of probabilistic
verification, but the benefits for reducing work across multiple verifications has not been considered.
We proposed novel additional optimizations that can be applied when using an SCC-based analysis
of a probabilistic model, incrementally or otherwise. This technique can be applied to both proba-
bilistic formulae and reward formulae for modeling dependability properties. We implemented this
technique for both explicit-state model checking and symbolic model checking in PRISM.
• the preliminary integration of the Dependability&Performance Enabler with the Monitoring Enabler,
to allow for automated refinement of the analysis through on-line collected data. Indeed, to cope with
potential evolutions of the NSs, the CONNECTor behaviour should be monitored routinely; during this
year, the CONNECT Monitoring Enabler has been defined and implemented, using most up-to-date
technologies (a prototype is now available for testing and is able to communicate with a minimum
set of requisites). Some preliminary tests of the interplay between the Dependability & Performance
Enabler and the monitor have been performed to evaluate the potential benefits of runtime analyses.
Challenge C3 Starting from the conceptual model for Trust introduced in the first year, in this second
year we assume that CONNECTors and Enablers are trusted (which is reasonable from the CONNECT
perspective) and specifically focus on trust management among heterogeneous NSs. We developed a
formal trust meta-model by which we can describe any given trust model and infer composite trust models
for heterogeneous NSs. There has been a proliferation of proprietary trust and reputation systems, which
implement custom trust models regarding the specific stakeholders and their trust relations. As a result,
the trustworthiness of a subject can be now easily determined under its associated proprietary model;
however, assessing the trustworthiness of one subject under another subject’s model requires overcoming
trust models heterogeneity (e.g., interpretation of trust relations). This is the target of the CONNECT Trust
Enabler introduced in Chapter 6.
Challenge C4 Taking advantage of the study of the threat models of the CONNECT scenario, during this
second year we have proposed the new Security-by-Contract-with-Trust (SxCxT) paradigm under new
assumptions with respect to those of Y1. In this way we showed that the approach can be used for
guaranteeing security in wider scenarios. Furthermore, during Y2 we have integrated a trust model into
the paradigm. Indeed, the Security-by-Contract was provided for guaranteeing the security of communi-
cating systems composed of several, heterogeneous components through run-time enforcement mech-
anisms and active monitoring on the contract of the CONNECTor. The integration of the Trust model in
the paradigm drives the application of the enforcement mechanism and/or the contract monitoring. This
means that, according to the trust level of the considered Enabler, each NS decides whether to apply the
contract monitoring or the enforcement mechanism or both. We have developed a prototype of the SxCxT
mechanism. Another research direction we investigated during Y2 is about access control policy negotia-
tion. We presented a trust negotiation framework for quantitative notions of trust based on soft-constraints,
which will be the basis for subsequent work on automated trust negotiation among NSs.
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1.6 This Deliverable
This deliverable is structured as follows: in the next chapter we give an excerpt of the Terrorist Alert
scenario, fully developed in Deliverable D6.2 [35], on which we demonstrate all WP5 approaches. In
Chapter 3, we describe the Property Meta-Model and instantiate a set of considered properties from it.
Then, in Chapter 4 we present the architecture and the functioning of the Dependability&Performance
analysis enabler, and in Chapter 5 its two ramifications at runtime, namely incremental verification and
monitoring. The document proceeds in Chapter 6 with the proposal of a generic trust model, to support
interoperability among NSs using different models, and then in Chapter 7 we finally illustrate advances of
the Security-by-contract-with-trust paradigm, and a novel approach for access control policy negotiation.
Conclusions are finally drawn in Chapter 8.
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2 WP5 Scenario
In this chapter we develop the scenario that will be used throughout this deliverable for demonstration
of the WP5 developed approaches. WP5 scenario extracts one situation from the CONNECT Terrorist Alert
scenario (which is described in detail in Deliverable D6.2 [35]), and extends this excerpt concerning some
aspects of specific interest to WP5. In Section 2.1 we briefly describe it, and then in 2.2 we define the
synthesized CONNECTor. In Section 2.3 we introduce the relevant fragments of that scenario which we
will refer to for dependability, performance, security and trust assessment.
2.1 The Terrorist Alert Scenario
With reference to D6.2, the Terrorist Alert scenario considers the case that during the show the stadium
control center spots one suspect terrorist moving around. The alarm is immediately sent to the Police.
Figure 2.1: Terrorist Alert Scenario: Photo of a Suspect is Distributed to Policemen
Policemen are equipped with ad hoc handheld devices which are connected to the Police control
center to receive command and documents. Precisely, the policemen can share documents with the
Police control center and with other policemen through a SecuredFileSharing application, for example a
picture of a suspect terrorist.
Unfortunately, the suspect is put on alert from the police movements and tries to escape, evading the
Stadium.
In such an emergency situation, there may be various cases in which CONNECT can be of help. As
described in D6.2, the police could for example be directly put in connection with various surveillance
systems in the zone to receive videos or pictures in their devices. We focus on the case that a policeman
that sees the suspect running away can dynamically seek assistance to capture him from civilians serving
as private security guards in the zone of interest. To get help in following the moves of the escaping
terrorist and capturing him, the policeman sends to the civilian guards an alert message in which one
picture of the suspect is distributed.
On their side, to perform their service, the guards are equipped with smart radio transmitters which run
an EmergencyCall application. This transmission follows a two steps protocol. We assume in fact that the
guards that control a zone are CONNECTed in groups, and that for each group there is a Commander on
duty. The protocol followed in the EmergencyCall application is that a request message is first sent from
the guards control center to the Commander. As soon as the Commander replies with an acknowledge-
ment of receipt, a message with details of the emergency is forwarded to all security guards. On correct
receipt of the alert, each guard’s device automatically sends an ack to the control center.
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The two applications, SecuredFileSharing and EmergencyCall, in this scenario represent the two Net-
worked Systems, which are not a priori compatible; hence a CONNECTor bridging between the policeman
device and the guard device must be deployed.
In the following we show the LTSs modeling the two applications above mentioned.
SecuredFileSharing
• The peer that initiates the communication (hereafter denominated the coordinator) sends a broad-
cast message (selectArea) to selected peers (the Police control center or policemen) operating in
a specified area of interest. In the SecuredFileSharing application, the coordinator can be either the
Police control center or a policeman.
• The selected peers reply with an areaSelected message.
• The coordinator sends an uploadData message to transmit confidential data to the selected peers.
• Each selected peer automatically notifies the coordinator with an uploadSuccess message when
the data have been successfully received.
The application behaviour, in the case the policeman acts as coordinator, is depicted in Figure 2.2.
The LTS is shown in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.2: Sequence Diagram of the SecuredFileSharing Application
EmergencyCall
• The guards control center sends an eReq message to the commanders of the patrolling groups
operating in a given area of interest.
• The commanders reply with an eResp message.
• The guards control center sends an emergencyAlert message to all guards of the patrolling groups;
the message reports the alert details.
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Figure 2.3: LTS of the SecuredFileSharing Application
• Each guard’s device automatically notifies the guards control center with an eACK message when the
data has been successfully received and a timeout is triggered after a time interval if not all guards
sends back the eAck message. The timeout represents the maximum time that the CONNECTor can
wait for the eAck message from the guards.
The application behaviour is depicted in Figure 2.4. The LTS of the commander is shown in Fig-
ure 2.5(a), the LTS of the other guards is shown in Figure 2.5(b).
Figure 2.4: Sequence Diagram of the EmergencyCall Application
2.2 CONNECTing a Policeman and the Guards
As said, in the Terrorist Alert scenario, we need to synthesize on-the-fly a CONNECTor to allow a Policeman
and the guards in the zone where the suspect has escaped to communicate. Precisely, we need to




(a) Commander. (b) Other guards.
Figure 2.5: LTSs of the EmergencyCall Application
• The selectArea message of the policeman is translated into an eReq message directed to the
commander of the patrolling group operating in the area of interest.
• The eResp message of the commander is translated into an areaSelected message for the police-
man.
• The uploadData message of the policeman is translated into a multicast emergencyAlert message.
• The eACK messages automatically sent by the guards’ devices that correctly receive the emergencyAlert
message are collected and then translated into a single uploadSuccess message for the policeman.
The LTS of the CONNECTor in the case of a patrolling group consisting of one commander and two
other guards is shown in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: LTS of the CONNECTor
CONNECTed System
If we consider now the behaviour of the CONNECTed System in the case of one policeman and one
patrolling group with one commander and two other guards, its LTS in our formalism coincides with that
of the CONNECTor, as the communication that can take place between the NSs is only the one allowed
by the synthesized CONNECTor. As the number of CONNECTed guards increase, the LTS also grows.
Table 2.1 reports some statistics on the number of states and transitions generated for different number
of guards.
WP5 approaches aim at investigating solutions able to deal with a varying number of guards, compat-
ibly with the limitations imposed by the employed supporting tools.
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#Commanders #Guards #States #Transitions
1 1 15 22
1 2 33 68
1 4 249 848
1 8 10000 50418
Table 2.1: Number of States and Transitions for Different CONNECTed Systems
2.3 Properties and Metrics of Interest
In the above scenario, there are several non-functional requirements that the CONNECTion between the
policeman and the guards must satisfy. We have selected a set of properties to be considered.
Dependability Belonging to Dependability attributes, we focus on the Delivery ratio, which sets a mini-
mum coverage measure that the CONNECTed system must satisfy: it will be measured by the percentage
of guard devices that are reached by the alert message in a given time interval.
Performance We focus on latency, and set the min/average/max time of reaching a set percentage of
guard devices as the metric to be assessed.
Security We set two properties to be guaranteed, as follows: i) the photo sent to guards must be
signed (for integrity and non-repudiation), and ii) the photo can only be received by authorized devices
(for privacy). Both are qualitative properties. The first is mostly related to the possibility of the CONNECTor
of performing cryptographic primitive and also depends of the synthesis strategy (as we discuss in WP3).
The second one is a property of the CONNECTed system. In this deliverable we focus on this second
security property.
Trust As an example, we may want to assess the reputation of security guards, and ensure that only
guards above a set threshold will receive the alert. The trust enabler is still under development and will
be released in the third year deliverable. Note that this trust property might interfere with the Delivery
ratio metrics above defined, because it impacts the number of guard devices on which coverage has to
be measured. We will consider the interesting issue of interaction between CONNECTability properties in
the next year.
2.4 Conclusions and Further Research Directions
In this chapter we have briefly outlined a fragment of the Terrorist Alert scenario (fully described in Deliv-
erable D6.2 [35]), as a common reference case study on which examples of applications of the following
approaches will be developed. In the third year we will expand the demonstrations and validation of
approaches to wider parts of the CONNECT scenarios.
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3 The CONNECT Property Meta-Model
In this chapter we describe the structure of the meta-model we devised to specify properties in CON-
NECT, which we refer to as the CONNECT Property Meta-Model, or CPMM. In particular, the meta-model
defines elements and types to specify prescriptive (required) and descriptive (owned) quantitative and
qualitative properties that CONNECT actors may expose or must provide.
The reason of the definition of such a meta-model has to be retrieved in the dynamic nature of the
CONNECT project. CONNECT aims at synthesizing automatically the CONNECTors through which Net-
worked Systems communicate to reach a (common) goal. In order to achieve non-functional properties in
the synthesis process and to feed the analysis process, prescriptive and descriptive properties must be
expressed in a machine-processable language. The properties specified from this language might refer
to:
• the CONNECTed system: the properties are part of a connection request and represent requirements
for the CONNECTed system;
• the Networked Systems: NS properties could be exposed by the NSs themselves, or inferred by the
Learning Enabler as a result of the learning phase.
• the CONNECTor: the specified properties can model requirements for the CONNECTor synthesis or
can be observed by the monitoring Enabler during CONNECTor execution.
• the Enablers: the specified properties can also describe the characteristics owned by the Enablers.
Mainly, the descriptive properties for the Enablers are related to trust and security. The former
contains the trust models the Enabler is aware and is able to manage. The second ones instead
refer to security mechanisms/policy the Enabler implements or can enforce. Such models can be
incremental, since the Enabler can embed new models/mechanisms as required by the NSs.
The models conforming to such meta-model can be used: i) as input for the synthesis Enabler to guide
the synthesis of a new CONNECTor or the selection process in case suitable CONNECTors are already
available; ii) as input for the dependability Enabler to verify specified CONNECTability properties, and iii)
as instrumentation for the monitoring Enabler that generates suitable probes to monitor useful properties
on the CONNECTors.
As an example of using the CPMM, then we model the properties of interest for the Terrorist Alert
Scenario outlined in the previous chapter. We recall that among several non-functional requirements
that the CONNECTion between the policeman and the guards must satisfy, in Section 2.3 we focused on
four properties (and, for quantitative ones, their related metrics) relative to Dependability, Performance,
Security and Trust.
However, at the time of writing, the meta-model only partially deals with Trust since the Trust model
definition is still under refinement (its current status is reported in Chapter 6). For this reason in the
following we provide only the models for the coverage, latency and privacy, while concerning trust-related
properties the meta-model will be completed in the next year.
The currently released version of the CPMM eCore model can be retrieved from the URL provided
in the Appendix-Prototype associated with this report. We also make available an editor as an Eclipse
Plugin, for deriving from CPMM instances of property models.
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.1 we introduce the new term of CONNECTability
to clarify and disambiguate our meaning of “Dependability” in CONNECT; in Section 3.2 we present the
description of the devised meta-model and some related implementation details, and in Section 3.3 we
overview related work; in Section 3.4 we outline the relationship between the presented meta-model and
the CONNECT Metrics Framework introduced in Deliverable D5.1 [32]. From Section 3.5 to Section 3.7 we
show the models of the performance, dependability and security properties we deal with for demonstration
purposes. Finally, Section 3.8 draws conclusions and plans future works.
3.1 CONNECTability
One challenge WP5 is facing in CONNECT is that of addressing in unified way non-functional properties of
CONNECTed Systems which belong to different attributes, namely Dependability, Performance, Security
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and Trust. In making an attempt to deal with all such concerns altogether, a terminology issue arises,
which has been also noticed at the Y1 review. WP5 is titled “Dependability assurance”, whereas in this title
the term dependability was meant to include a broader consideration of relevant attributes for CONNECT
than dependability in the stricter original Laprie’s definition [67], recently revised in [8].
Figure 3.1: Introducing the Term CONNECTability
In Deliverable D5.1, we tried to use the term “dependability” with both senses, using capital D for the
broader meaning. Following the reviewers concerns about confusion descending from this usage of a
same term for two meanings, we resolved to introduce a new, ad hoc term, that is CONNECTability. As
shown in Figure 3.1, CONNECTability includes all fours attributes of concern for CONNECT. Paraphrasing
dependability, which is defined as the ability of a system to provide its intended services in a justifiable way,
this term is meant to refer to the ability of CONNECT to enable the intended (i.e., dependable, efficient,
secure and trustful) CONNECTion between Networked Systems in a justifiable way. This is our ultimate
goal, although we still have much work ahead of us to provide this!
3.2 CPMM Overview
The CPMM meta-model has been conceived as partitioned into six parts. In particular, we distinguished
the Property meta-model, the MetricsTemplate meta-model, the Metrics meta-model, the EventSet and
EventType meta-model and the ApplicationDomain meta-model.
Figure 3.2 reports the key concepts of the whole meta-model (framing within dashed lines the sub
meta-model they belong to) and how they relate with each other. Note that the figure has been generated
as an excerpt of the complete meta-model by visualizing the main concepts of it and removing several
technical details.
As the figure shows, such main concepts are the Property, which can be Quantitative or Qualitative,
the MetricsTemplate modeling a generic metric (e.g., latency as the duration of an event/operation e1),
the concrete Metrics that refers to a MetricsTemplate and specifies the (actual) metricParameter for the
(formal) templateParameter in the particular application domain the metric has been defined. The specifi-
cation of the concrete event in the metric is done via the concept the EventType the metric refers to. Such
EventType refers to observable operations or events belonging to the ontology of the Application Domain
for which the Property is relevant or it needs to be verified/guaranteed (by means of the EventTypeSpeci-
fifcation).
We want to highlight that CONNECT metrics could be very complex since they can be defined by
combining several (classical) metrics. An additional issue to be addressed is that the terminology on
which the metrics have to be defined comes from the application domain of the NSs that, in general,
may change over time. Indeed, a connection request can possibly refer to different application domains.
Taking inspiration from Monperrus et al. work [77], we separate the property definition from the application
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Figure 3.2: Key Concepts of the CONNECT Property Meta-Model
domain, and this is formalized in the meta-model by including the application domain meta-model derived
from the ontology defined within the WP1 workpackage [33]. In the next year, the ontology will be linked in
the Property meta-model via the EventTypeSpecification meta-class that will be refined to model a generic
term in the ontology.
The concept of the MetricsTemplate instead models a general metric (simple or complex). Indepen-
dently from the application domain, the definition of a metric is always the same, and precisely defines
a template. For example the response time of a system is defined by the time needed by the system to
execute a given task. This definition does not change over time. The variability stays in the object of the
metric, that can be a (simple or complex) observable behavior of the application the property refers to.
Such observable behavior is modelled by means of EventType. A metric fixes this variability pointing to
the suitable MetricsTemplate model and specifying the application operation by associating the parametric
operation defined in the template to the concrete operation in the application domain model.
In the following sections we complete the description of the proposed meta-model by giving details on
the property meta-model (in Section 3.2.1); on the metrics and metric template meta-model (in Section
3.2.2); and finally on the events set and event type definition meta-model (in Section 3.2.3).
3.2.1 Property Definition
Figure 3.3 reports the portion of the meta-model describing a Property. A PropertyModel is composed by
zero (modeling the empty model) or more properties.
A Property is a NamedElement having two required/mandatory attributes and three optional ones.
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Figure 3.3: Property
The required attributes are: nature and PropertyClass. The former refers to the nature of the property
that can be ABSTRACT, DESCRIPTIVE, or PRESCRIPTIVE. The latter can have the following values:
PERFORMANCE, SECURITY, TRUST, and DEPENDABILITY.
An ABSTRACT property indicates a generic property (generic in that it does not specify a required or
guaranteed value for an observable or measurable feature of a system).
A DESCRIPTIVE property represents a guaranteed/owned property of the system while a PRESCRIP-
TIVE one indicates a system requirement, then a required property in the system. In both cases, the
property is defined taking into account a relational operator with a specified value.
The optional attributes of Property are value, unit and operator. These attributes are not specified in
case of an ABSTRACT property because as described above an ABSTRACT property does not specify
a relation with a specific value. They are specified only for the DESCRIPTIVE and PRESCRIPTIVE
properties. The value attribute indicates a value associated to the property, the unit attribute indicates
its unit measure, and the operator one models a relational operator (one of the operators listed in the
operatorType enumeration).
A property can be qualitative (QualitativeProperty ) or quantitative (QuantitativeProperty ). The former
models properties about the event occurrences of an EventSet that are observed and can generally not
be measured. They in general refer to the behavioral description of the system (e.g., deadlock freeness or
liveness). The quantitative properties are quantifiable/measurable and they have an associated Metrics.
The QuantitativeProperty has two optional attributes that are workload and intervalTime. The former
must be specified for a property (DESCRIPTIVE or PRESCRIPTIVE) having a PERFORMANCE class while
the latter must be specified for a property (DESCRIPTIVE or PRESCRIPTIVE) having a DEPENDABILITY
class. Both are not specified for an ABSTRACT property.
To clarify the above concepts we report below some Property examples:
Property1: Ability to provide a service according to given time requirements (this property
has been presented in D5.1 Figure 2.3 [32]). This is an ABSTRACT property since it does not deal
with a claimed or guaranteed specified time feature. This property is also a QuantitativeProperty
having a PERFORMANCE class because it is about a measurable performance dimension (time). In this
case, the value, unit and operator attributes of Property and the workload and intervalTime ones of
QuantitativeProperty are not specified.
Property2: The system S in average responds in 3 ms in executing the e1 operation with a
workload of 10 concurrent e2 operations. This is a DESCRIPTIVE property asserting that
the system S guarantees in average a time response having a value of 3 ms in executing the e1
operation, with a workload of 10 e2 concurrent operations. As Property1, this one is also a Quantita-
tiveProperty having a PERFORMANCE class because it is about a measurable performance dimension
(time). In this case, the value attribute is equal to 3, the unit measure is ms and the specified
operator is EQUAL. The workload attribute is equal to 10 while intervalTime is not specified.
Property3: The system S in average must respond in 3 ms in executing the e1 operation with
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a workload of 10 e2 operations. This is a PRESCRIPTIVE property because it specifies a re-
quired time response with a value of 3 ms in executing the e1 operation, as above with a workload of
10 e2 concurrent operations. As Property1 and Property2, this is also a QuantitativeProperty having
a PERFORMANCE class. The value attribute, the unit measure, the specified operator, the workload
and intervalTime attributes are equal to those of Property2.
In the above examples, operations S, e1 and e2 are application-dependent and their semantics can be
given once the application domain has been fixed.
3.2.2 Metrics Meta-Model
The Metrics meta-model describes among the others two main concepts: the MetricsTemplate and the
Metrics.
To understand the differences between them, let us make an example considering the response time
metric. The response time of a system, for a given operation, is the time interval between submitting
an operation request and receiving a response from the system. It can be defined as the duration of a
complex operation or the difference between two time stamps of different simple atomic actions without
duration. The previous definition provides two different ways to specify the response time. We call such
specification MetricsTemplate. Hence a metric (response time) can refer to one or more (hopefully equiv-
alent) specifications (MetricsTemplates). Moreover, the MetricsTemplate is defined upon a generic set of
actions/events/operations, that is not coupled with a particular application domain. This general part of
the definition is specialized by the metric that instantiates those general concepts (templateParameters)
with application-based actions/events/operations (metricsParameters).
For example, with reference to the above mentioned two ways for measuring a response time, we have
the two following MetricsTemplates:
• response time of the E operation = DURATION(E) where E is the operation of which we want to
measure/determine the response time, and it is the templateParameter.
• response time of the E operation = timestamp(E2)-timestamp(E1) where E1 and E2 represents the
starting and the ending action of E, respectively. E, E1 and E2 are templateParameters.
E, E1 and E2 are instantiated by the Metrics upon with the Property is specified for a specific (software)
system.
Let us discuss, as an example, the Metrics in the Terrorist Alert Scenario presented in Chapter 3. Let
us suppose that we want the response time of the system for the area selection task. This task starts
with the selectArea action and ends with the selectedArea action, both executed by the ControlCenter. In
this case, we define a new metric that would use the second MetricsTemplate definition and referring to
selectArea and selectedArea to actualize the E1 and E2, respectively.
Figure 3.4 reports the meta-model portion describing the MetricsTemplate concept. A MetricsTem-
plateModel defines one or more MetricsTemplates, each having a dimension indicating the type of the
value defined by the metrics template (e.g., a TIMEd value, a PERCENTAGE, and so on). A Metric-
sTemplate is a NamedElement containing the Expression describing the mathematical definition of the
template.
The Expression could be:
• a MathExpression, this meta-class allows the definition of a complex mathematical expression by
nesting one or more operands that are in turn others Expression. The MathExpression has an
attribute, operator, that specifies the MathOperatorType. At the moment we define as possible
operator the ones in the MathOperatorType enumeration. This enumeration can be extended if
necessary.
• a QuantitativeProperty, in this case the Expression can be a QuantitativeProperty already described.
In this case to be used as operand of an expression, it must have a DESCRIPTIVE nature as set by
the OCL constraint indicated in the note.






• a NamedExpression. This element can represent:
- a canonical Variable.
- an ActionBasedExpression, that represents a simple action or a sequence of actions that,
whenever has been executed, reports a value. An example could be a sort of get methods that
report some information managed by some piece of software in the CONNECTed system or in
the CONNECT infrastructure. The specification of an action based expression is contained in
the specification attribute. At the moment this attribute is a simple string, but in future we aim
at refine it by providing a suitable specification language that can be used in specifying action
based expression.1
- an EventBasedExpression, that represents expressions based on events or observational be-
havior. In this case the name represents the observable, simple or complex, event/behavior
the operator applies. As first set of EventOperatorType we define DURATION for a complex
event indicated in the name attribute, TIMESTAMP for a simple one, and CARDINALITY for
the type of event indicated in name attribute. Whereas for the first and second operators they
are applied to single occurrences of event type indicated, for the third one, instead, it is applied
to the whole set of event occurrences observed in a given instant of time.
The MetricsTemplate finally contains zero or more TemplateParameters. These template parameters
are EString keys exposed by the template and linked to NamedExpression by mean of the EStringToN-
amedEspressionObjectMAp concept.
Figure 3.5 reports the meta-model portion describing the Metrics concept. A MetricsModel defines
zero or more Metrics. A metric is a NamedElement that refers to a MetricsTemplate, actualizes the tem-
plateParameters by means of the MetricsParameters (if the MetricsTemplate has no formal parameters,
metric exposes zero MetricsParameters), and contains zero or more Constraint.
EventBasedMetricsParameter is a MetricsParameter actualizing the EventBasedExpression based
templateParameters. To this goal, it refers to the eventSet describing the application based event definition
1This element has been required to express some operand of the Trust model. This part will be refined in the future, as soon as
the Trust model is stable and validated.
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Figure 3.6: EventType
and the relative occurrences. VariableMetricsParameters instead is a MetricsParameter actualizing the
Variable templateParameters indicating the corresponding value.
Finally, Constraint defines some condition (stored in the specification attribute) on the EventSet in-
volved in the Metrics that must be satisfied. Such constraints in general allow to make a correspondence
among event occurrences belonging to different types of EventSet in case the EventTypes in the EventSets
have some EventTypeParameters. This type of constraint is needed to support the monitoring of the prop-
erty. For example, a constraint could specify that in the derivation of a specified metric the identifier in an
event must be the same as the identifier in another event.
3.2.3 Events Meta-Model
In the Event Specification meta-model we distinguished the EventType and the EventSet concepts. Fig-
ure 3.6 shows the portion of the meta-model describing the EventTypeModel. The EventTypeModel is
composed by zero or more EventType elements, each one modeling the type of an event. The EventType
models an observable system behavior that can be a primitive/simple event or operation representing the
lowest observable system activity or a composite/complex event that is a combination of primitive and
other composite events. An EventType has a specification identifying the type or class of the observable
events. Such EventTypeSpecification belongs to the ontology of a specific application domain. In the
current version of the meta-model this specification is simply defined by means of a label or string. How-
ever, in the future we plan to provide a more formal specification for complex event definition, according
to an existing or a new defined event specification language. In [42, 73] some examples of complex event
specification languages are presented. An EventType has one or more parameters and one or more
constraints.
We present below some EventType examples including two generic primitive EventType and a com-
posite EventType that is relating to their sequence:
• The primitive EventType named SendRequest indicating a generic request sending event with one
parameter named RequestID that is the event identifier.
• The primitive EventType named SendReplay indicating a generic replay sending event with ReplayID
event identifier parameter.
• The composite EventType named SendRequestReplay that represents the ordered sequence of
the SendRequest event and the SendReplay one, both having the same identifier. This EventType
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Figure 3.7: EventSet
represents a request event followed by a replay event to that request. This can be modeled by setting
a specification indicating that RequestID and ReplayID parameters must have the same value. This
EventType has a RequestReplayID parameter identifying the event type and a time constraint that
can be for example of 5 s, meaning that the composite SendRequestReplay event is observable if it
happens within a window of 5 seconds.
The specification of all above EventType examples is application-dependent and has to be consistent
with the specific application domain.
Figure 3.7 reports the portion of the meta-model describing the EventSetModel. The EventSetModel
has zero or more EventSet. An EventSet represents a set of event instances that refer to an EventType.
The property of an EventSet identifies all observable events that have to be included in the EventSet.
An EventSet has zero or more EventOccurrence representing the observable events that the EventSet
contains. In the CONNECTed system this EventOccurrence can be generated at runtime by the CONNECT
monitoring infrastructure when the probes observe the event of the EventType the EventSet refers to.
An EventOccurrence refers to an Interval that represents the time range in which the observable event
occurs. Each Interval has two associated Timestamps indicating its starting and ending date respectively.
These Timestamps are equal in case of atomic/instantaneous event occurrences.
An example of EventSet is that containing all occurrences of the composite event with SendRequestRe-
play EventType defined above, detected in the last hour. The property of this EventSet specifies that it
collects only the event occurrences with SendRequestReplay EventType generated at runtime in the last
hour, then the starting and ending Timestamps of the time Interval that the EventOccurrence refer to are
lower than the current time and this time difference is no longer than one hour.
The event occurrences collected into an EventSet define observable system behaviors modeled by
qualitative properties or represent the parameters upon which the metrics are defined for measuring
quantitative properties.
3.2.4 Meta-model Implementation Details
We used Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF) [46, 68] for defining the meta-model sketched in Figure 3.2.
With EMF it is possible to distinguish the meta-model from the actual model. The former describes the
structure of the model, namely elements and types that can be defined, the latter is an instance of the
meta-model, that contains specific attributes of the application scenario.
EMF is based on two meta-models: eCore and Genmodel. The eCore meta-model allows to mainly
define: a class with zero or more attributes and zero or more operations, an attribute with a name and a
type, a reference representing an association between two classes, and the type of an attribute, e.g., int,
float, boolean. After specifying a meta-model, it is possible to generate the corresponding Java code that
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Figure 3.8: Property eCore Definition
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can be safely extended by hand. The Genmodel contains additional information such as the path and file
information and the control parameters for the code generation.
The domain of CPMM deals with the prescriptive and descriptive properties that the CONNECT actors
expose or must provide. This meta-model has been generated as an eCore model into the Eclipse EMF
framework, using facilities provided by the EMF visual editor. In particular, this meta-model has been
partitioned in the following eCore models: Core.ecore representing a generic named element, Event-
Type.ecore and EventSet.ecore modeling the event and the eventSet respectively, Metrics.ecore and Met-
ricsTemplate.ecore for specifying the metrics and metricsTemplate concepts and finally the Property.ecore
representing the Property meta-model.
All information about the classes defined into each eCore model are included into the correspond-
ing modelname.ecore document. Figures 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 show the eCore models of the Property,
Metrics, and MetricsTemplate respectively, while Figure 3.11 reports the EventType and EventSet eCore
definitions. As shown in these figures, the root object of each eCore model represents the whole model
containing the defined packages whose children represent the classes, while the children of the classes
represent their attributes.
From the above defined eCore models, by means of the EMF Generator model, a Genmodel model
has been created and starting from it the Java code for that model has been generated. Starting from the
Genmodel model, a tree-view based editor has been obtained as an Eclipse Plugin. This editor contains
the information of the defined eCore models and allows to create new model instances of the Property,
Metrics, MetricsTemplate, EventType and EventSet meta-models. This editor has been used for deriving,
from the meta-model of Figure 3.2, the models of latency, coverage and privacy properties for the Terrorist
Alert scenario.
3.3 Related Work
Meta-modeling is used in software engineering for specifying the abstract syntax of a language. The
works more related to our proposal are those addressing the specification of meta-models and ontologies
for defining software metrics and non functional properties of a system.
The main concept behind our proposal of specifying a metric as an instance of a metric specification
meta-model is common to Monperrus et al.‘s work [77], in which a generative model driven definition
of software metrics is proposed. This work concerns the definition of a domain-independent metrics
meta-model, that allows modelers to automatically add measurement capabilities to a domain specific
modeling language. This applies to kind of models devised during a model-driven development process.
Hence, the domain here is related to development phases (such as software architecture, requirements or
implementation). Taking inspiration from Monperrus et al.‘s work, CPMM separates the property definition
from the application domain, and this is formalized in the meta-model by including the application domain
meta-model derived from the ontology defined within the WP1 work [33]. Instead, differently from [77],
the CPMM meta-model addresses specifically non-functional property and metrics. Indeed, it introduces
additional concepts concerning the qualitative and quantitative properties definition, the events modeling
and the distinction between a generic metric (represented by a MetricsTemplate) and the concrete metric
(i.e., the Metrics concept) instantiated to a specific application domain, represented by the domain of the
software system the CPMM is used for.
In literature many works can be found concerning meta-modeling that focus on domain-specific met-
rics or specifically on dependability properties. Hence, for different reasons, these approaches propose
partially what CPMM proposes as a whole. Examples of the former set, [91] and [12] report two attempts
of using more specific meta-models for defining object-oriented design metrics and database design met-
rics have been respectively presented. Other works, such as the ones described in [85, 44, 64, 57], focus
on modeling only dependability properties. The authors of [85] propose a functional and non functional
modeling and analysis framework that extends UML meta-models, conceived for specifying functional
properties, checked by existing modeling tools, to cover non functional properties including dependability
attributes.The main idea is to complete the UML meta-model with additional meta-model elements for the
description of fault effects and the mapping of the UML system models to a mathematical analysis domain,
allowing an automated derivation of the transformation rules. Another attempt towards the definition of a
formal meta-model, structuring the notation for dependability cases (assuring that a system is acceptably
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Figure 3.9: Metrics eCore Definition
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Figure 3.10: MetricsTemplate eCore Definition
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Figure 3.11: EventSet and EventType eCore Definition
CONNECT 231167 44/123
dependable is a given context), is that of [44]. It proposes the definition of a domain specific meta-model-
based language, along the lines of OMG’s SMM (Software Metrics Metamodel), and the formalization of a
framework implemented through state-of-the-art model-driven tools (KM3, EMF). This proposal outlines,
as main advantages of defining such meta-model: the clear view of the domain, the model management,
transformation and validation and, the interpretability between different tools by means of a uniform XML-
based format. The same advantages are proper to the CPMM meta-model. The notation for dependability
cases, presented in [44] and better defined in [64] can be extended by an UML profile and OCL constraints
presented in [57], aiming to assess syntactic completeness and consistency of arguments structures in
dependability cases. Differently from the above approaches, the CPMM meta-model addresses not only
dependability properties but more general descriptive and prescriptive properties that allow the specifica-
tion, among the others, of performance, security and trust property and of relative metrics.
Another related research area focuses on the definition of generic models and languages, for specify-
ing non functional (QoS) properties. There are specific QoS modeling approaches for QoS-aware service
compositions in ubiquitous environments. Some of them use syntactic QoS models (QuAMobile [7] can
be an example) whereas other propose semantic ones (COCOA [13] for example is based on the OWL-S
semantic language [99]). The OASIS standard Web Service Quality Model (WSQM) [81] represents a
standardization effort for the specification of QoS in Web Services. It provides a model for web services
quality management, defining common criteria to evaluate quality levels for interoperability and security
of services. A more general Quality of Service Modeling Language (QML) is proposed in [50] for describ-
ing QoS specifications for software components in distributed object systems. It is an extension of UML,
allowing a fine grained specification level of attributes and operations and a dynamic and runtime check
of QoS components requirements and dependencies. Similarly, the UML profile for MARTE (Modeling
and Analysis of Real-Time and Embedded Systems) [82] provides a common way for modeling hardware
and software aspects of a real time embedded system in order to improve interoperability between de-
velopment tools. It provides facilities to annotate models with information required to perform quantitative
predictions and performance analysis. Differently from the approaches presented above, our proposal fo-
cuses on a more general and complete framework, with the goal of enable the specification of CONNECT
qualitative and quantitative properties into a machine-processable language.
A promising research direction, addressing QoS modeling, focuses on ontologies that allow for the
definition of QoS with rich semantic information [71]. In particular, a semantic QoS model is presented
addressing the main elements of dynamic service environments (networks, devices, application services
and end-users). It makes use of Web Service Quality Model (WSQM) [81] standard to define QoS at the
service level, and comprehends four ontologies specifying respectively: the core QoS concepts, the envi-
ronment and underlying network and hardware infrastructure QoS properties, the application server and
user-level QoS properties. As the authors claim in [71], ”Our model concentrates on QoS knowledge rep-
resentation rather than a language to specify QoS. To this extent, our approach has been to decouple QoS
knowledge from QoS specification by providing separate and reusable ontologies. Thus any appropriate
QoS specification language can be used on top of our QoS model.” Differently from this approach, CPMM
allows the specification of non functional properties. In the future the integration of the two approaches
can be investigated and provided.
Finally,a Quality of Service Modeling Ontology (QoS-MO) is presented in [97] allowing for the semantic
specification of QoS constraints of Semantic Web Services. The goal is to extend the existing OWL-S [99]
description of the functional characteristic of the Web Services with well defined QoS constraints. As our
proposed CPMM meta-model, it allows to define general or domain specific quantitative properties of a
service. Moreover, the QoS-MO ontology presents a tight correspondence with the OMG UML Profile [83]
that extends UML 2.0 with QoS specification capabilities.
3.4 Relationship between CPMM and Y1 Metrics Framework
In this section we discuss the relationship among the presented meta-model and the CONNECT Metrics
Framework presented in [32].
The framework we proposed in the first year revisits the classical dependability and QoS-related met-
rics to account for evolution and dynamic interactions in open, evolutionary networks. Indeed, it refines
classical dependability metrics along a CONNECT-dependent dimension and a context-dependent dimen-
CONNECT 231167 45/123
(a) CONNECT-dependent refinement (b) Context-dependent refinement
Figure 3.12: Dimensions to Derive CONNECT Metrics.
sion:
• CONNECT-dependent dimension - This dimension refines generic metrics according to the struc-
tural roles of the CONNECT architecture. The rationale behind this dimension is that different def-
initions of classical dependability metrics may be given for the different actors of the CONNECT
architecture, namely the Networked Systems, the Enablers, the CONNECTors and the CONNECTed
System. With reference to the above actors, the CONNECT-dependent dimension includes three
disjoint classes: NetworkedSystem-specific, Enabler-specific, CONNECTor-specific, plus a fourth
partially overlapping class, CONNECTedSystem-specific (see Figure 3.12(a)). The Enabler-specific
and CONNECTor-specific classes can be used to obtain “internal” CONNECT metrics, i.e., metrics
suitable to assess the dependability level of the CONNECT service.
• Context-dependent dimension - This dimension refines and classifies generic metrics according
to the application context. The rationale behind the choice of this dimension is that CONNECT metrics
can be linked to a particular application scenario and / or to heterogeneous and evolutionary aspects
of the different actors of the CONNECT architecture. According to the CONNECT vision, the context-
dependent dimension includes two partially overlapping classes (see Figure 3.12(b)): application-
specific, which refines generic metrics on the basis of the application domain, e.g., safety-critical,
delay-tolerant, real-time; infrastructure-specific, which refines generic metrics according to hetero-
geneity and evolution capabilities of the different actors of the CONNECT architecture, e.g., timeouts
adopted by communication protocols, number of operational phases.
CPMM complies with the CONNECT Metrics Framework (CMF) since it allows the definition of the
metrics according the two dimensions defined above.
For what concern the CONNECT-dependent dimension, this is implemented in the meta-model by re-
ferring to several Application Domains. When the EventTypeSpecification element in the meta-model
uses terms in the ontology the Learning Enabler constructs for the Networked Systems, the metric
(and more in general the property) is NetworkedSystem-specific. If the EventTypeSpecification ele-
ment refers to CONNECTed Systems application domain, the metric (and more in general the property)
is CONNECTedSystem-specific. Again when the EventTypeSpecification element links to terms relative
to Enablers (CONNECTors) domain, the metric (and more in general the property) is Enabler-specific
(CONNECTors-specific).
For what concerns the context-dependent dimension, this is not explicitly modeled in the CPMM. To
make more explicit this definition, it is required that the subject of the metrics (i.e., the concepts in the
application-domain model) is semantically classified as application-specific and/or infrastructure-specific
referring to specific capabilities of the application or to heterogeneity and evolution capabilities of the
different actors of the CONNECT architecture. We plan to refine this aspect in future, if necessary.
3.5 Latency Property for the Terrorist Alert Scenario
In this section we show how to model the following required latency property: average time needed by the
CONNECTed system to reach k% guard devices must be at maximum equal to 10 seconds when in the
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Figure 3.13: Latency Property for the Terrorist Alert Scenario
system there are 10 alerts.
For ”time needed by the CONNECTed system to reach a set percentage of guard devices” we mean the
average latency experienced in the system from the incoming EmergencyAlert message to the reception
of a percentage of eAck coming back from the reached guards’ devices. The models for the latency met-
rics template and its actualization metrics (called LatencyReachingGuard) are showed in Section 3.5.1,
whereas the models of the events delimiting the measure (EmergencyAlert and eAck) are described in
Section 3.5.2
The model for this PRESCRIPTIVE property is shown in Figure 3.13. The property is a PERFOR-
MANCE requirement requiring that the metrics LatencyReachingGuard is LESS EQUAL to 10 s when
the system has a workload of 10 alerts.
3.5.1 Latency MetricsTemplate and Metrics
In this section we present the models for the latency AVG MetricsTemplate (in Figure 3.14) and the Laten-
cyReachingGuard metrics (in Figure 3.15). We recall that the template is generic and the same model can
be used in other scenarios. The average latency represents a TIME measure defined as average of the
differences of the time stamps of two related generic event instances, in the model x and y, respectively as
the latest event occurrence and the former one. Finally, the template exposes two templateParameters,
e1 linked to y, and e2 linked to x.
The Metrics instead actualizes the template for a specific scenario. Hence it is specific to the ap-
plication domain it is defined for. This characteristics is modelled by the metrics actual parameters that
substitute the template parameters by linking the general description in the template to the specific on-
tology and hence to the application the metrics refers to. In Figure 3.15, LatencyReachingGuard metrics
actualizes the latency AVG metrics template by linking the EventSet e1 to the templateParameter e1 and
the metricsParameter EventSet e2 to templateParameter e2. Finally, to fully define the metrics, the two
event sets modeling the metricsParameters must satisfy the MetricsConstraint c1 that establishes that the
two event sets must be related to each other, that is refer to the same EmergencyAlert.
Finally, Figure 3.16 reports the event sets needed for the LatencyReachingGuard specification. The
e1 Event Set only refers to emergencyAlert Event Type. The e2 EventSet instead refers to SeqOfAck
EventType by introducing an additional condition. As we will see below, the SeqOfAck EventType is a
sequence of eAck observed in the CONNECTed system. To be of interest of the LatencyReachingGuard
metrics, the occurrences of SeqOfAck must contains at least k eAck occurrences related to each other,
that means they refer to the same emergencyAlert message (in formulas in the e2Defintion.property,
different occurrences of eAck in the sequence must have the same emergencyAlert ID, i.e. the same
IDe).
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Figure 3.14: Average Latency Metrics Template
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Figure 3.15: Average Latency Metrics for the Terrorist Alert Scenario
Figure 3.16: Actual Parameters in the Metrics Model
In the EventSet models presented, the EventOccurrences are missing. These model the observed
events the EventSet contains, that is the observed events of the specified EventType satisfying the
EventSetDefinition.property. Since the presented models represent part of the connection request in-
coming to the CONNECT infrastructure, at that time the mediator is not already synthesized, and the
CONNECTed system is not running. The EventOccurrences will be generated by the monitors at run-
time when the CONNECTed system is running, once the probes observe the event of the EventType the
EventSet refers to.
3.5.2 Application Domain Concepts: EmergencyAlert and eAck Event Types
In this section we describe how the EventType required by the LatencyReachingGuard metrics are de-
fined. In particular, we have two types of event to define: the emergencyAlert and the SeqOfAck event
types. The former has a simple event definition since it corresponds to a message directly observable
from the CONNECTed system, namely interface operation. The signature of the interface operation is
emergencyAlert(IDe) as specified in the EventTypeSpecification element. This comes from the ontology
created for the scenario. The EventType has a parameter that id the formal parameter of the interface
operation.
SeqOfAck is a complex EventType since it is defined as a sequence of eAck simple EventType. It has
two parameters, that is the emergencyAlert ID (namely IDe) the sequence refers to, and the list of guards
messages acknowledging the alert reception (namely, IDgList). At the moment, the meta-model does not
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Figure 3.17: Emergency Alert
Figure 3.18: Sequence of Ack for an Alert
allow a more formal specification of complex events. We plan to refine it for this purpose in the next year.
3.6 Coverage Property in the Terrorist Alert Scenario
In this section we show how to model the following required coverage property: the average percentage
of guard devices that are reached in 10 seconds by the alert message must be greater than 70%.
This means that, after 10 seconds from the emergencyAlert, at least 70% of guard devices reply with an
eAck. The models for the coverage metrics template and its actualization metrics are showed in Section
3.6.1. The models of the events delimiting the measure (eAck) are the same ones of the latency and
they have been described in Section 3.5.2. Hence, in Section 3.6.2 we model only the deviceRegistration
event.
The model for this PRESCRIPTIVE property is shown in Figure 3.19. The property is a DEPEND-
ABILITY requirement requiring that the metrics CoverageReachingGuard is GREATER than 70% after
an intervalTime of 10 seconds.
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Figure 3.19: Coverage Property for the Terrorist Alert Scenario
3.6.1 Coverage MetricsTemplate and Metrics
In this section we present the models for the coverage AVG MetricsTemplate (in Figure 3.20) and the
CoverageReachingGuard metrics (in Figure 3.21). The average coverage represents a PERCENTAGE
measure defined as average of the division among the CARDINALITY of two set of instances of two types
of events, in the model x and y. Finally, the template exposes two templateParameters, e2 linked to x, and
e3 linked to y.
The CoverageReachingGuard metrics, in Figure 3.21, actualizes the presented template for the Ter-
rorist Alert Scenario by linking the EventSet e2 to the templateParameter e2 and the metricsParameter
EventSet e3 to templateParameter e3. Differently from the latency, the CoverageReachingGuard metrics
does not define any constraint.
Finally, Figure 3.22 reports the model for the e3 event set, while for the definition of the e2 event set,
please refer to Section 3.5.1, since the coverage metrics makes use of the same event set used for
the latency. The e3 EventSet instead refers to deviceRegistration EventType by introducing the following
condition: there are no duplication in the occurrences of the deviceRegistration event, that is there are not
two different occurrences of the deviceRegistration coming from the same device (i.e., event having the
same IDg value).
As for latency, for the same reasons, the EventSet models do not present the EventOccurrence ele-
ments.
3.6.2 Application Domain Concepts: EmergencyAlert, eAck and deviceRegistra-
tion Event Types
In this section we describe the deviceRegistration EventType presented in Figure 3.23. It has a sim-
ple event definition since it corresponds to a message directly observable from the CONNECTed system,
namely interface operation. The signature of the interface operation is deviceRegistration(IDg) as speci-
fied in the EventTypeSpecification element. This comes from the ontology created for the scenario. The
EventType has a parameter that id the formal parameter of the interface operation.
3.7 Privacy Property in the Terrorist Alert Scenario
The privacy policy required in the Terrorist Alert Scenario is the photo can only be received by authorized
devices. This means that: i) they have a certain level of trust; ii) they have to send an ACK; iii) they expose
a certificate for proving who and where they are.
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Figure 3.20: Average Coverage Metrics Template
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Figure 3.21: Average Coverage Metrics for the Terrorist Alert Scenario
Figure 3.22: e3 Actual Parameter in the CoverageReachingGuards Metrics Model
Figure 3.23: Guard Device Registration
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Figure 3.24: Privacy Property for the Terrorist Alert Scenario
Figure 3.25: The Contract EventSet
The model for this PRESCRIPTIVE property is shown in Figure 3.24. The property is a SECURITY
requirement that must be true. Its definition (PrivacyDefinition) sets that the contract must satisfy sendAck
AND certification that are specification of the points i) to iii) above.
Figure 3.25 shows the definition of the contract EventSet that is very simple since it specifies the
corresponding EventType and NULL property. We here do not report sendAck and certification EventSets
since they have a specification similar to contract.
3.7.1 Application Domain Concepts: Contract, sendAck and Certification Event
Types
In this section we describe the EventTypes necessary to the PrivacyProperty. They are: i) the con-
tractEventType, in Figure 3.26, describing the contract (that is in the contractSpec element) and the
parameters needed to distinguish the sender of messages (IDs and IDc EventTypePArameter); ii) the
sendAckEventType, in Figure 3.27, describing in the sendAckSpec element the required notification of
the data uploading. This EventType does not have any parameters; iii) the certificationEventType, in Fig-
ure 3.28, describing in the certificationSpec element the required certificate the uploading device must
have, and the parameter needed to pass the certificate(i.e., the C EventTypeParameter);
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Figure 3.26: Contract Definition
Figure 3.27: sendAck Definition
Figure 3.28: Certification Definition
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3.8 Conclusions and Further Research Directions
In this chapter we presented the CONNECT Property Meta-Model we devised to express properties in a
machine-processable way. The properties that can be specified are of three natures: abstract, prescrip-
tive and descriptive. An abstract property indicates a generic property definition, a descriptive property
represents a guaranteed/owned property of the system, and a prescriptive one indicates a system require-
ment, then a required property in the system. Moreover, the CPMM allows the definition of qualitative and
quantitative properties. Differently from the qualitative one, the quantitative property, to be fully described,
must indicate the metrics definition needed to quantify it.
We implemented CPMM by the Eclipse Modeling Framework and we generated the corresponding
editor that can be used to specify property models. These are released in the Appendix-Prototypes
associated with this document.
There are various directions for future work. First, since the models that conform to such a meta-model
are machine-processable, we plan to define automated procedures (in form of ModelToModel or Model-
ToText transformations) that, from such models, instrument the monitoring Enabler to monitor properties
of interest and produce suitable input for the analysis tools.
Moreover, some meta-model parts need to be refined. In particular:
• the QualitativePropertyDefinition meta-class should be refined by defining a suitable language (meta-
model) that allows the specification of complex property;
• the Constraint meta-class (in the Metrics meta-model) requires a specification of a language to
properly describe conditions the metric requires;
• the EventTypeSpecification meta-class should be refined by an event-based language that enables
the specification of complex EventType.
• the whole definition of the ActionBaseExpression introduced to model trust at the moment is not
completely defined. It will be refined as soon as the trust model will be defined and validated.
At the moment, the meta-model only allows the specification of the transition (or action)-based prop-
erties. We did not consider state-based properties, since CONNECT assumes that it can use only the
information the Learning Enabler is able to observe during the Networked System execution. However, if
the Networked Systems expose some additional information (specification of internal behaviors, interac-
tion protocols), it can happen that they can provide some information on their internal state, and hence
state-based properties could become of interest. To address also this last case, we plan to extend the
meta-model with concepts that allow the specification of state-based properties.
As other possible future work it could be the integration of the CPMM with ontologies for non-functional
requirements to introduce semantics to CPMM. Examples of suitable and interesting ontology we can refer
have been discussed in Section 3.3.
We have then shown how the CONNECT Property Meta-Model can be used to instantiate a set of
relevant properties for a given application scenario. We have referred to the Terrorist Alert scenario. In
addition to more extensive usage of the meta-model (itself undergoing further refinements), our future
research work will include the specification of Model-to-Model and Model-to-Code transformations for
automatically translating the instantiated property models towards the specific notations adopted by the
Enablers, e.g. the Dependability&Performance analysis or the Monitoring Enablers.
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4 Dependability&Performance Analysis Enabler
In CONNECT we are interested in quantitative, probabilistic dependability and performance evalua-
tion. To this purpose, a model-based approach is adopted, which in general terms is composed of two
phases: (i) building a model from the elementary stochastic processes that represent the behaviour of the
components of the system and their interactions (mainly, these elementary stochastic processes relate to
failures, to repair and to service restoration); (ii) processing the model to obtain the expressions and the
values of the dependability measures of the system.
Research in dependability and performance analysis has developed a variety of model-based tech-
niques, each focusing on particular levels of abstraction and/or system characteristics. As already moti-
vated in [32], in CONNECT we consider as evaluation techniques:
• Stochastic model checking, which is a formal verification technique for the analysis of stochastic
systems. It is based on the construction of a probabilistic model from a precise, high-level description
of a system’s behaviour.
• State-based stochastic methods, which use state-space mathematical models expressed with prob-
abilistic assumptions about time durations and transition behaviours. They allow explicit modeling of
complex relationships (e.g., concerning failure and repair processes), and their transition structure
encodes important sequencing information.
During the first year of the project, dependability and performance analysis has been applied to assess
to some extent dependability and performance metrics of Networked Systems. Specifically, the activity fo-
cused on gossip protocols in presence of heterogeneity at level of node communication and computation,
which is typically neglected in already existing analyses. In a gossip, each node periodically exchanges
messages with randomly selected nodes in order to disseminate data, exchange membership informa-
tion, or build distributed state (http://gossiplib.gforge.inria.fr/). Such kind of protocols are expected to be of
interest in CONNECT as they may be considered as basic building blocks for many distributed services. In
fact, gossip based protocols have been applied in a wide range of situations such as data dissemination,
overlay maintenance, and, more recently, also in peer-to-peer streaming applications. We experimented
both stochastic model checking and state-based stochastic methods and the two studies have shown the
complementarity of the two approaches: while the former is very accurate in determining best and worst
case behaviour but for small numbers of involved nodes, the latter is able to provide average values for
large-scale networks.
During this second year, focus has been shifted on the dependability and performance analysis of the
CONNECTed system, and specifically to assess, before deployment, if the dependability and performance
requirements requested by the NSs can be satisfied by the CONNECTor being synthesised. To this pur-
pose, we have defined the architecture of a Dependability&Performance Analysis Enabler, called DePer,
that supports both stochastic model checking and state-based stochastic methods evaluation techniques.
Preliminary prototypes for the two approaches, based on PRISM and Möbius assessment tools respec-
tively, have been also developed (a first release for the latter is included in the Appendix-Prototypes).
The complementarity of the two approaches has been also shown through the analysis of the CONNECT
“Terrorist Alert” scenario.
The rest of this chapter describes in details progress achieved on dependability and performance anal-
ysis during this second year. Precisely, the architectural structure of the DePer is described in Section 4.1.
Then, Sections 4.2 and 4.3 detail the functioning of the Möbius-based and Prism-based implementations,
respectively. Finally, in Section 4.4, we demonstrate both analysis methods on the Terrorist Alert scenario.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.5.
4.1 DePer Architecture
The DePer provides support to the definition of a CONNECTor that allows NSs to interact with a given level
of dependability and performance properties.
Before presenting the architecture of this Enabler, we briefly discuss its relations with other Enablers
of the CONNECT architecture. In Deliverable D1.2 [33], the complete overview of Enablers is provided.
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Figure 4.1: Input-Output Relations between DePer and the Other Enablers
Adopting a DePer-centric view, here we restrict to those having input-output relations with the DePer, as
shown in Figure 4.1.
The role of these Enablers is synthetically recalled in the following.
Discovery. This Enabler gathers information on the NSs. Specifically, the Enabler discovers mutually
interested NSs, and retrieves information on the specification of their interfaces. The unit assumes that
NSs are discovery enabled, i.e., they provide a minimal description of their intent and functionalities.
Learning. This Enabler completes the specification through a learning procedure (e.g., via model-based
testing) when NSs do not provide a sufficient description of their behaviour.
Synthesis. This Enabler performs the dynamic synthesis of mediating CONNECTors to enable interop-
eration among NSs willing to interact. The Enabler uses the behavioural models built by Discovery and
Learning to identify mismatches between the communication protocols employed by the NSs, generates
a CONNECTor that resolves the incompatibilities between the communication protocols, and deploys the
CONNECTor.
Monitoring. This Enabler becomes operational when the CONNECTor is deployed. The Enabler continu-
ously monitors the deployed CONNECTor to update the functional and non-functional specification of the
CONNECTor with run-time data.
According to the CONNECT vision, a Networked System broadcasts a connect request whenever a new
connection to a service is needed. The connect request contains a description of the requested service
together with a specification of the required dependability level for the service. When Discovery detects a
connect request, it looks for available Networked Systems that can provide the requested service. If such
systems are found and operate a communication protocol different from that of the Networked System
that made the connect request, Discovery triggers the process of creating a suitable CONNECTor that
enables interoperation. The Synthesis Enabler, on the basis of the specification of the communication
protocols, produces a mediating CONNECTor. Before CONNECTor deployment, Synthesis activates the
DePer to evaluate if the CONNECTed system that will be obtained satisfies the non-functional requirements
expressed by the Networked Systems. If the non-functional requirements are satisfied, the CONNECTor
is deployed; otherwise, Synthesis is supported by the DePer in the definition of possible enhancements
that can be applied. Once the CONNECTor is deployed, the Monitoring Enabler continuously updates
the functional and non-functional specification of the CONNECTor with run-time data to allow the other
Enablers to take into account dynamic system changes.
Therefore, as shown in Figure 4.1, the joint activity of Discovery and Learning provides the dependabil-
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Figure 4.2: Architecture of the Dependability&Performance Analysis Enabler
ity requirements; Synthesis provides the specification of the CONNECTed system, and possibly requests
a dependability enhancement; Monitoring provides run-time data on the execution of the deployed CON-
NECTor. The dependability and performance assessment and the enhancements produced by the DePer
are used by Synthesis.
4.1.1 Architecture
The architecture of the DePer is shown in Figure 4.2 and also described in [75]. Currently, this Enabler ac-
commodates dependability and performance analysis performed through both the stochastic state-based
and the stochastic model-checking approaches. Actually, the architecture is general and other analysis
methods could be easily included by specifying and implementing an appropriate Analysis Engine module.
The Selector and Aggregator modules, at the entrance and exit of the architecture, allow the selection of
the analysis method and the aggregation of the analyses results (in case more than one method is ap-
plied), respectively. More details on each module are provided in the following.
4.1.2 Selector
The Selector module activates, depending on the characteristics of the specification of the CONNECTed
system and of the requirements, the most suitable analysis engine among those available to the Enabler.
In fact, the employed engines implement different approaches to analyse dependability and performance
properties of a CONNECTed system. Each approach has its own advantages regarding modeling capabil-
ity, specification of properties, and scalability; hence, besides using the different engines to cross validate
the results and to improve the confidence in the correctness of the models,they actually complement each
other. In the study conducted during the first year [32], the characteristics of the stochastic model check-
ing and state-based stochastic methods evaluation approaches have been already pointed out; other
considerations will be provided when addressing the two implementations of the DePer in Sections 4.2
and 4.3.
4.1.3 Dependability&Performance Analysis Engine
The Dependability&Performance Analysis Engine is logically split into four main functional modules (see
Figure 4.3): Builder, Analyser, Evaluator and Enhancer. The Builder module derives the dependability or
performance model of the CONNECTed system from the specification provided by Synthesis. The Anal-
yser uses the generated dependability and performance model to perform a quantitative assessment of the
non-functional requirements reported by Discovery/Learning. The Evaluator checks the analysis results
to determine if the non-functional requirements are met. If the requirements are satisfied, the Evaluator
reports to Synthesis that the CONNECTor can be successfully deployed. If, on the other hand, the require-
ments are not satisfied, the Evaluator reports a warning message to Synthesis. The Synthesis unit, in turn,
may reply with a request to improve the dependability and performance level of the CONNECTed system.
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Figure 4.3: Architecture of the Dependability&Performance Analysis Engine
Upon receiving such enhancement request, the Evaluator module activates a loop in the Dependabil-
ity&Performance Analysis Engine to determine solutions to improve the dependability and performance
level of the CONNECTed system, e.g., use an updated specification that takes into account an alternative
CONNECTor deployment or enhance the CONNECTor specification with ad hoc mechanisms. In the fol-
lowing, we provide more details on the functionalities of the modules of the Dependability&Performance
Analysis Engine.
Builder
The Builder module takes in input the specification of the CONNECTed system from Synthesis, and the
dependability and performance requirements from Discovery/Learning. The specification includes both
the nominal behaviour of the CONNECTed system, i.e., in fault-free situations, and the exceptional condi-
tions, i.e., the failure modes. The module produces in output a dependability and performance model of
the CONNECTed system that contains enough details to assess the given dependability and performance
requirements.
Specification of the CONNECTed system. With reference to recent works on synthesis of mediating
CONNECTors [94] and automata discovery/learning [89], the specification of the CONNECTed system is
given with Labelled Transition Systems (LTSs) annotated with non-functional information necessary to
build the dependability and performance model of the CONNECTed system. An LTS is an abstract machine
that represents the sequence of actions performed by the system. Formally, an LTS is a tuple (S,S0,L, T ),
where S is a set of states, S0 ⊆ S is a set of initial states, L is a set of labels, and T ⊆ S × L × S is a
transition relation. Annotations include, for each labelled transition, the following fields: time to complete,
firing probability, failure mode, and failure probability.
Dependability and performance requirements. In our architecture, the dependability and performance
requirements provided by the Networked Systems are translated by Discovery/Learning into metrics and
guarantees. Metrics are arithmetic expressions that describe how to obtain a quantitative assessment
of the properties of interest of the CONNECTed system. In this context, metrics are expressed in terms
of transitions and states of the LTS specification of the Networked Systems. Guarantees are boolean
expressions that are required to be satisfied on the metrics under a set of constraints.
Dependability and performance model. The dependability and performance model of the CONNECTed
system is specified with a formalism that allows to describe complex systems that have probabilistic be-
haviour, e.g., stochastic processes.
CONNECT 231167 60/123
Analyser
The Analyser module takes in input the dependability and performance model from the Builder module and
the dependability and performance requirements from Discovery/Learning. The module builds a reward
model, i.e., a model that enables a quantitative assessment of the metrics of interest, and makes use of a
solver engine to obtain a quantitative assessment of the dependability and performance metrics.
Reward model. The reward model is the dependability and performance model extended with reward
functions. Reward functions allow to specify properties of interest: they return a value depending on the
system state, and can be evaluated either at an instant of time or accumulated over a time frame.
Solver. The solver evaluates the reward functions defined in the reward model. The evaluation can be
performed either through analytical approaches or through simulation. Analytical approaches are based
on state space analysis, and they are applicable when the model does not face state space explosion and
when timing information follow deterministic or exponential distributions. Simulation, on the other hand, is
always applicable (unless extremely rare events have to be evaluated), and is expected to be particularly
useful when a tradeoff between accuracy and time to perform the assessment is needed.
Evaluator
The Evaluator reports to Synthesis if the CONNECTed system satisfies the dependability and performance
requirements provided by Discovery/Learning. In the case of requirements mismatch, the Evaluator sends
a warning message to Synthesis, and may receive back a request to evaluate if enhancements can be
applied to improve the dependability (and/or performance, depending on the received request) level of
the CONNECTed system.
Requirements mismatch. If the requirements are not satisfied, the Evaluator may receive a request to
explore one of the following three directions for improvements:
1. Update the specification of the CONNECTor to take into account an alternative CONNECTor deploy-
ment (e.g., a deployment that uses a communication channel with lower failure rate). Upon receiving
this request, the Evaluator triggers a new analysis that considers the updated specification of the
CONNECTor.
2. Enhance the specification of the CONNECTor by including dependability mechanisms, which are
counter-measures that can be adopted to contrast failure modes affecting performance and/or de-
pendability metrics (e.g., a message retransmission technique). Upon receiving this request, the
Evaluator triggers a sensitivity analysis whose objective is to understand which failure modes of the
CONNECTed system have highest impact on the dependability or performance metrics. Such failure
modes will be the first ones to be considered for devising appropriate counter-measures capable
of limiting their effects. To this end, the Evaluator builds a sensitivity analysis campaign to instruct
the Builder module on the creation of dependability and performance model variants, each of which
considers a specific subset of failure modes, among those foreseen. Whenever a variant is gener-
ated, the Analyser module performs the assessment of the metrics on the generated model. The
Evaluator collects the analysis results and, after all variants have been analysed, produces a rank-
ing of the failure modes. This ranking is used by the Evaluator to iteratively activate the Enhancer
module as long as one of the following conditions is not met: the guarantees are satisfied, or the
Enhancer signals that all possible dependability mechanisms have been explored.
3. Apply a combination of the previously mentioned enhancements.
Enhancer
The Enhancer is activated by the Evaluator when the guarantees are not satisfied and Synthesis makes
a request to enhance the CONNECTor with dependability mechanisms. The Enhancer is instructed by the
Evaluator module on the requirements mismatch and the failure mode that needs to be tackled. Specif-
ically, the Enhancer performs the following actions: (i) selects a dependability mechanism that can be
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employed, among those available, to contrast the failure mode indicated by the Evaluator module; (ii) if all
possible applications of dependability mechanisms have already been explored without success, the En-
hancer sends a warning message to the Evaluator module; otherwise, the Enhancer instructs the Builder
module on the application of the selected dependability mechanism in the CONNECTed system model and
triggers a new analysis.
Dependability mechanisms. Typically, dependability mechanisms are based on the application of redun-
dancy, e.g., duplication of system channels, or retry of message transmissions over system channels. The
dependability mechanism, in this context, will be embedded in the synthesised CONNECTor, because Net-
worked Systems are not under the control of the framework. Nevertheless, the dependability mechanisms
embedded in the CONNECTor can be employed to improve, to some extent, the dependability and per-
formance level of the Networked Systems. For example, the reliability level of a transmission performed
by a Networked System can be improved through timeouts or message retransmissions applied at the
CONNECTor level.
4.1.4 Aggregator
The Aggregator module is in charge of selecting the analysis results to be provided in output to the
Synthesis Enabler, in case more than one Analysis Engines have been activated for a CONNECTed system
specification. Therefore, when only one kind of analysis is performed, based on the choice made by the
Selector module, the Aggregator just conveys the analysis results to the output interface of the DePer.
Instead, when more analysis methods are activated, their results are collected by the Aggregator and
elaborated according to some criteria to derive the output results. The definition of this module is still in
progress.
The first step to be performed is a comparison among the values provided by the different methods to
check whether they are in agreement (within a certain tolerance degree, to cope with natural dissimilarities
inherent to the use of different methods). In the case of a matching comparison, the reliance in each
of the employed approaches is increased (cross-validation) and all the analysis results can be equally
considered valid, so anyone of them can be output as final analysis values. Alternatively, some form of
mediation could be made on the obtained multiple results (e.g., the average), to balance the effects of
single method’s approximations. A mismatch, instead, would be the symptom of erroneous/too inaccurate
analysis by at least one of the applied methods. Let us recall that the DePer in CONNECT is based
on an automated procedure, starting from given specifications of the CONNECTed system and of the
dependability and performance requirements, partially implemented at the current stage. Therefore, once
fully automated, we expect that the case of mismatch would be removed by construction; however more
investigations are necessary on this issue.
4.1.5 Some Remarks
The architectural structure and implementation described in this chapter constitute an important step
towards the definition of an automated procedure to provide dependability and performance analysis as
a support to the synthesis of dependable CONNECTors. There are several aspects that still need to be
investigated to fully reach the ambitious goal of automated dependability and performance analysis, and
a discussion on the main points that need to be addressed is proposed in the following.
Possible constraints on the time allowed for the dependability and/or performance analysis to complete
have not been accounted for so far. At the moment, the envisaged applications of the framework assume
that Networked Systems do not suspend their activity while waiting the CONNECTor to be ready. Indeed,
at the moment, timing constraints are considered only on the operations performed after CONNECTor
deployment. Performing dependability and performance analysis in a complete on-line setting is a very
challenging problem and techniques are needed to balance between time to produce results and their
accuracy. For instance, in the automatic generation of the dependability and performance model from the
specification of the CONNECTed system, a technique needs to be developed to optimise the dependability
and performance model on the basis of the specific metrics that needs to be assessment.
Compositional solution methods for the dependability and performance model would be desirable, pos-
sibly reusing partly solved model, e.g., when the synthesised CONNECTor is derived as specialisation of
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an already existing CONNECTor that has already been analysed, or when already analysed dependability
mechanisms are introduced in the dependability and performance model. Indeed, although the addressed
context is dynamic and evolving, we assume that the pace at which evolution occurs is in general consid-
erably slower that the requested rate of an already available CONNECTor. Hence, the Networked Systems
are expected to remain stable for a significant portion of their lifetime and to request services for which
the same synthesised CONNECTor can be reused to satisfy interoperability.
The ontology to support enhancement of the CONNECTor model with dependability mechanisms cop-
ing with failure patterns needs to be extended over time with new mechanisms, to enhance the handling
of failure modes or to contrast new failure modes. We should also take into account that the identifica-
tion of the dependability mechanisms may depend on the CONNECTor deployment, i.e., the CONNECTor
may share resources with some of the bridged Networked System, or the CONNECTor may have its own
resources separate from those of the Networked Systems.
4.2 Möbius-based Prototype Implementation
Möbius [27] is a popular software tool that provides a comprehensive framework for model-based depend-
ability and performance evaluation of systems. The main features of the tool include: (i) multiple high-level
modeling formalisms, including, among others, Stochastic Activity Networks (SANs) [93] and PEPA fault
trees [53]; (ii) a hierarchical modeling paradigm, allowing one to build complex models by first specifying
the behaviour of individual components and then by combining the components to create a model of the
complete system; (iii) customised measures of system properties; (iv) distributed discrete-event simu-
lation, to evaluate measures using efficient simulation algorithms to repeatedly execute the system and
gather statistical results of the measures; (v) numerical solution techniques, to obtain exact solutions for
Markov models.
Modeling formalism. We model the system through Stochastic Activity Networks (SANs). SANs are
stochastic extensions of Petri Nets introduced in [78] and formally defined in [93]. They have a graphical
representation and consist of four primitive objects: places, activities, input gates and output gates. Places
in SANs have the same interpretation as in Petri Nets, i.e., they hold tokens. The number of tokens in a
place is referred to as the marking of that place, and the marking of the SAN is the set of all place markings.
There are two types of activities: instantaneous and timed. Timed activities represent actions that have a
duration that impacts the performance of the modelled system, e.g., message transmission time, recovery
time, time to fail. The duration of each timed activity is expressed via a time distribution function. Both
instantaneous and timed activities may have case probabilities. Each case probability stands for a possible
outcome of the activity, and can be used to model probabilistic aspects of the system, e.g., probability for
a component to fail. Input gates control the enabling of activities, and output gates define the state change
that will occur when an activity completes.
SAN models can be composed with Join and Rep operators. Join is used to compose two or more
SANs. Rep is a special case of Join, and is used to construct a model consisting of a number of replicas
of a SAN. Models in a composed system interact via Place Sharing. Place Sharing is a composition
formalism based on the notion of sharing places via an equivalence relation.
Properties of interest. Properties of interest are specified with reward functions. Each reward function
is a C++ function that specifies how to measure a property on the basis of the marking of the SAN. There
are two kinds of reward functions: rate reward and impulse reward. Rate rewards can be evaluated at
any time instant. Impulse rewards are associated with specific activities and they can be evaluated only
when the associated activity completes. Measurements can be conducted at specific time instants, over
periods of time, or when the system reaches the steady state.
4.2.1 Builder Module
The prototype implementation of the Builder module takes in input the LTS of the CONNECTed system
described with Finite State Processes (FSP) [72]. LTS annotations are expressed as C++ functions. The
dependability and performance model of the system, specified through SANs, is obtained from the LTS
model by using the theory of regions [47]. A region identifies a set of states in the LTS such that all
transitions with the same label either enter, exit, or never cross the boundary of the region. Each region
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Function Description
timeFrame(s) : S → R+ returns the interval of time when the system is in state s
minT imeStamp(tr) : T → R+ returns the first instant of time when transition tr fires
avgT imeStamp(tr) : T → R+ returns the average instant of time when transition tr fires
maxTimeStamp(tr) : T → R+ returns the last instant of time when transition tr fires
#(tr, t1, t2) : T × R+ × R+ → N returns number of times transition tr fires in the interval [t1, t2]
#(l, t1, t2) : L × R+ × R+ → N returns number of times transitions with label l fire in the interval [t1, t2]
Table 4.1: Examples of Predefined Functions that Can Be Used in the Metric Expression
in the LTS corresponds to a place in the derived SAN model, and each labelled transition in the LTS
corresponds to an activity in the SAN model. A similar approach has already been used in other works
to translate LTSs into Petri Nets (see, for instance, [36], [21] and [23]). In our approach, in order to have
a well-defined probabilistic model, non-deterministic choices among k transitions outgoing from an LTS
state are mapped in the SAN model into instantaneous activities with k case probabilities.
The metric is an arithmetic expression that may contain a predefined set of functions (see Table 4.1 for
some examples). The guarantee is given by a boolean expression on the metric and a set of constraints
on the CONNECTed system model (e.g., constraints on the time frame of evaluation of the metric and
constraints on the behaviour of the Networked Systems). Statistical operators (e.g., mean and variance),
comparison and logical operators can be used in the expression. In order to uniquely identify states
and transitions of the metric expression that appear in the generated SAN model, renaming is used to
constrain the definition of the LTS regions.
4.2.2 Analyser Module
The prototype implementation of the Analyser is based on Möbius.
As already mentioned, in Möbius, each reward function is a C++ function that returns a value depend-
ing on the marking of the SAN.
The reward functions are automatically derived from the metrics expression as follows: the metric is
mapped into its syntax tree to decompose the metric into a combination of basic functions; the basic
functions are translated into C++ functions by using a predefined repository of function templates. For
instance, with reference to the functions shown in Table 4.1, a rate reward template is used to translate
timeFrame(s), while an impulse reward template is used to translate #(tr, t1, t2). A repository of function
templates is planned for the next year; however, some details will be provided when presenting the case
study in Section 4.4.
The Solver evaluates the reward functions via simulation. The quantitative assessment of the metric is
obtained from the assessment of the reward functions by merging the results according to the arithmetic
operations specified in the syntax tree of the metric expression.
4.2.3 Evaluator Module
The Evaluator compares the analysis results against the guarantees specified in the requirements, and
reports a message containing a boolean value to Synthesis. The Evaluator may receive from Synthesis
the following three types of enhancement requests:
• alternative deployment: upon receiving this request, the Evaluator triggers a new analysis that con-
siders the updated annotated LTS specification of the CONNECTor contained in the request in the
SAN model.
• dependability mechanism: upon receiving this request, the Evaluator triggers a sensitivity analysis
that considers the impact of one failure mode at a time. Specifically, for each failure mode, a variant
of the SAN models is generated such that the considered failure mode is the only one considered in
the model. The ranking of the failure modes is obtained by assessing the metrics on the generated
variants: the higher the impact on the guarantees dissatisfaction, the higher the ranking of the failure
mode.
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(a) Original model. (b) Enhanced model with message retransmissions.
Figure 4.4: Example of Dependability Mechanism and Application Rule
• combined enhancement: a request that allows a combined use of the previously mentioned en-
hancements. The combined enhancement request contains the annotated LTS specification of the
CONNECTor for the alternative deployment, and an indication that the Evaluator module should also
enable the evaluation of dependability mechanisms to improve the CONNECTor. They are reflected
on the SAN model as indicated at the previous points. A field in the request is used to specify if the
enhancements should be evaluated individually and/or in combination. When evaluated individually,
an evaluation ordering is also provided.
4.2.4 Enhancer Module
The dependability mechanism suitable to contrast a given failure mode is determined through an ontology
of dependability mechanisms, such as that reported in [4]. The definition of the content of this ontology is
part of the work planned for the next year.
We developed ad hoc dependability and performance models for a set of relevant dependability mech-
anisms, and a set of rules to automate the application of the mechanisms in the SAN model of the CON-
NECTed system. The ad hoc models can be parametric; for instance, a retransmission mechanism is
parametric with respect to the maximum number of allowed retransmissions. As an example of mech-
anism and application rule, in Figure 4.4 we graphically show a retransmission mechanism and how to
modify the original model in order to apply message retransmissions to a send operation. Specifically, the
original model contains a timed activity send that models the send operation, an input gate send cond that
specifies the enabling condition of the activity, and two output gates, send success and send fail, that
specify the output functions in the case of correct and faulty behaviour. The enhanced model is obtained
from the original model by adding the following elements: a place send count, with initial marking the max-
imum allowed number of retransmissions; an output gate send count reset, which resets the marking of
send count to its initial value when the send succeeds; an output gate send retry, which reactivates
send as long as send count contains tokens, and resets the marking of send count after performing all
retransmission attempts.
4.2.5 Selector Module
With reference to the Selector module included in the the architecture of the DePer (see Figure 4.2),
some basic criteria that can be used to select the Möbius engine on the basis of the CONNECTed system
specification and of the requirements follow.
• Requirement expressed on CONNECTed systems with large number of actors. This information can
be obtained by inspecting the constraint reported in the guarantee expression (a boolean expression
that is required to be satisfied on the metrics under a set of constraints. This concept is better
described later when dealing with the Builder module of the Dependability&Performance Analysis
Engine).
• Specification includes distributions different from exponential. This information can be obtained by
inspecting the distribution reported for each transitions in the non-functional part of the specification.
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• Specification mixes discrete probabilities and continuous time distributions. This information can be
obtained by inspecting the failure probability reported in the non-functional part of the specification.
4.3 PRISM-based Prototype Implementation
PRISM [56] is a popular probabilistic model checker, which can handle discrete and continuous time
Markov chain models (DTMCs and CTMCs), as well as Markov decision processes (MDPs). DTMC
and MDP models may be verified against probabilistic temporal logic formulae given in terms of PCTL
(Probabilistic Computational Tree Logic) [54, 17], as well as cost/reward-based properties, and LTL (Linear
Temporal Logic) formulae [86]. CTMCs may be verified against CSL (Continuous Stochastic Logic) [9, 10]
formulae. Both states and transitions in a system can be associated with rewards, which allow for the
checking of both instantaneous and cumulative properties.
So far PRISM has been applied to numerous probabilistic models, such as network protocols, security
protocols, randomised distributed algorithms, biological processes, etc.
Modeling formalism. As CONNECTed systems evolve in a manner where a system stays in a state
for a certain period of time and then moves to a successor state, we model such systems using CTMCs
because they preserve the memoryless property. For CTMCs, the memoryless property not only requires
that the probability of firing a transition totally depends on the current state, but also asks the probability
to be independent of the elapsed time so far. The only continuous probability distribution exhibiting this
property is the exponential distribution, which associates a rate to each transition in CTMCs. The rate
can be understood as the average number of times we can execute the transition per unit of time. The
probability of executing a transition from the current state within t time units is 1 − e−λ·t. The rates
associated with all transitions in a CTMC can be stored in a transition rate matrix R, where each entry
represents a rate between a pair of states. A transition can only occur from state s to state s′ if R(s, s′) > 0.
If more than one transition can be executed in state s, the successor state is determined by the first
transition being taken. Let S be the set of states in a CTMC. The amount of time for which the system






′). The probability of going to successor state s′ from state s is calculated as follows.
P(s, s′) =
 R(s, s
′)/E(s) if E(s) 6= 0,
1 if E(s) = 0 and s = s′,
0 otherwise.
(4.1)
Properties of interest. Using formula (4.1), we can compute the probability of reaching a set of target
states through all paths. Steady-state behaviour is another interesting property for CTMC models. The
steady-state probability for a state s is the probability of being in s in the long run, which can be used to
infer the percentage of time that the model spends in s in the long run.
In addition to path and steady-state probabilities, we consider two additional types of reward for instan-
taneous and cumulative rewards separately. Every transition is associated with an instantaneous reward
and every state has a cumulative reward. The former is the actual reward obtained when the system
executes a transition, and the latter is the coefficient, at which the reward is computed in a state, for the
amount of time spent in that state. We can define the expected reward of reaching a set of target states F
through paths. The reward for a path that does not pass any target state is set to∞. Thus, the expected
reward of reaching a state in F from state s is finite if all non-zero probability paths starting from s pass a
state in F .
4.3.1 Builder Module
This module translates the LTS of the CONNECTed system into a CTMC model in the format recognised by
PRISM. The translation is straightforward, as a CTMC model is an LTS whose transitions are associated




This module augments the CTMC model with rewards according to the metrics and generates tempo-
ral logic formulae to specify the properties. The verification of the properties is done by PRISM using
probabilistic model checking techniques. Currently, only the dependability and performance properties
defined in Section 2.3, i.e., coverage and latency, can be dealt with. Process of general properties will be
investigated next year.
4.3.3 Evaluator Module
In addition to reporting analysis results to Synthesis Enabler, this module can only respond to requests
of alternative deployment, as CTMC models do not allow the mixture of continuous and deterministic
probability.
4.3.4 Enhancer Module
Due to the same reason as above, we do not enhance CTMC models to add failure mode supported in
Möbious. However, as shown in Section 5.1, a CTMC model can be converted into an MDP model, it is
possible to provide support to failure mode on MDPs, which will be studied next year.
4.3.5 Selector Module
With reference to the Selector module included in the the architecture of the DePer (see Figure 4.2),
some basic criteria that can be used to select the PRISM engine on the basis of the CONNECTed system
specification and of the requirements follow.
• Requirement using next / bounded until operators. This information can be obtained by inspecting
the dependability and performance properties in the specification.
• Requirement on the steady state of the CONNECTed system. This information can be obtained by
inspecting the dependability and performance properties in the specification.
• Specification enables assume-guarantee reasoning. Currently the assume-guarantee reasoning
method is still under development in WP2. How to select this verification technique will be under-
stood better in the future deliverable.
4.4 Application to the Terrorist Alert Scenario
In this section, we model the scenario described in Chapter 2 using PRISM and Möbius respectively, and
perform various dependability and performance analysis on the models, thus showing their complemen-
tarity in assessing dependability and performance properties. A similar analysis, documented in [45], has
been also previously developed during the second year with reference to a distributed market place sce-
nario, another CONNECT scenario defined during the first year. First, both approaches are used to validate
two basic dependability and performance properties. Next, extra properties are checked by the appropri-
ate approach, selected according with its ability to cope with the specific type of analysis. Indeed, the
different formalisms and tools implied by the two methods allow: (i) on the one hand, to complement the
analysis from the point of view of a number of aspects, such as level of abstraction/scalability/accuracy,
for which the two approaches may show different abilities to cope with; and (ii) on the other hand, through
the inner diversity, provide cross-validation to enhance confidence in the correctness of the analysis itself.
4.4.1 PRISM Approach
In this section, first we show the PRISM models of the case study under analysis, then we show the
stochastic verification results obtained for dependability and performance properties.
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Models
The LTSs for the case study in Chapter 2 can be translated into the PRISM CTMC model in a straight-
forward manner. In detail, each component LTS in Figure 2.3, 2.5, and 2.6 is translated into a PRISM
module in the following way. We define a variable in each module, whose domain is the set of states in the
corresponding LTS and whose initial value is the initial state of the LTS. Each transition in the module has
the same label as the corresponding one in the LTS. Since the LTSs do not contain information for rates,
we deliberately assign rate R1 = 1 to all transitions between the control center and the CONNECTor, and
assign R2 (which may vary) to those between the CONNECTor and the guards.
In order to check the dependability and performance properties specified in Section 2.3, we need to
add the timeout mechanism to the model. A timeout T is introduced to model the maximum time that
the CONNECTor can wait for the eAck message from the guards. After the CONNECTor broadcasts the
emergencyAlert message, a timeout will be triggered after T units of time if not all guards sends back
the eAck message. When the timeout occurs, the CONNECTor does not wait for pending responses from
guards, and returns uploadSuccess immediately to the control center. However, the deterministic delay
in timeout breaks the basic rule of CTMCs: all delays in a CTMC model respect exponential distributions,
and this makes the model difficult to verify. Therefore, we use an Erlang distribution to approximate a
deterministic delay T by a sequence of transitions, each of which has an exponential distribution of rate
k/T , where k is the number of transitions in the sequence. The accuracy of the approximation, as well as
the verification time, increases as k increases. In the experiments, we choose k to be T × 10, i.e., the rate
in the Erlang distribution is 10, which is a reasonable trade-off between speed and accuracy.
Stochastic Verification
Now we show the verification results for the dependability (coverage) and performance (latency) prop-
erties. For each property, we construct a set of experiments by choosing different values for timeout T ,
and letting R2 range over values 0.1, 0.5 and 1.0 respectively. This way, we can illustrate the trend as T
increases.
Coverage. This property is specified by the following CSL reward formula on the reward structure Cover-
age:
R{“Coverage”}=?[S], (4.2)
where S represents the reward in steady states. The structure Coverage associates the real value m/n to
states where, among the total number n of commanders and guards, m of them send back their response
to the connector within T time units after they receive the request emergencyAlert. The verification re-
sults are presented in Figure 4.5, which shows that as the length of waiting time T for the eAck messages
increases, the percentage of eAck messages received increases and eventually approaches 100% in all
cases, i.e., R2 = 0.1, 0.5 and 1.0. But R2 = 1.0 sees the fastest increase, while R2 = 0.1 the slowest. In
other words, the transmission speed for R2 = 1.0 is the fastest and that for R2 = 0.1 is the slowest.
Latency. To verify this property, we use formula (4.3) on the reward structure Latency,
R{“Latency”}=?[Fp], (4.3)
which assigns 1/(k/T ) = 1/10 to each transition used to approximate the timeout. The latency is mea-
sured from the moment when the control center starts to send the initial request selectArea to the time
it receives uploadSuccess. The results are depicted in Figure 4.6. As T increases, the latency increases
and becomes constant in the end. It is in conformance with Figure 4.5 and shows that R2 = 1.0 is the
fastest, and hence has the shortest delay, while R2 = 0.1 is the slowest and has the longest delay.
It is also useful to know the trend of the amount of time spent on waiting for eAck, given different values
of T . The formula used to check this is identical to formula 4.3 except that it is based on a different reward
structure Latency2. The results are illustrated in Figure 4.7, which shows the same trend as in Figure 4.6
except it also takes into account in the former the time before the CONNECTor starts to wait for eAck.
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Figure 4.5: Verification Results for Coverage
Figure 4.6: Verification Results for Latency (1)
4.4.2 Möbius Approach
In this section, first we show the SAN models of the case study under analysis, then the results of the
analysis obtained through Möbius.
SAN Models
The SAN models of guard, commander, CONNECTor, and SecuredFileSharing are shown in Figure 4.8.
The model of the CONNECTed system is obtained by composing, via place sharing, the SAN models
of SecuredFileSharing, commander, CONNECTor and guards (the SAN model of the guards is obtained
by replicating a guard with the Rep operator). There is a shared place for each pair of activities that
represent send/receive actions: send activities add tokens in the shared place, while receive activities
remove tokens from the shared place and use the marking of the shared place as enabling condition.
Note that, in general, a send activity may control n > 1 receive activities (e.g., in the case of a message
with multicast/broadcast addresses); in this case, the send activity will add n tokens to the shared place
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Figure 4.7: Verification Results for Latency (2)
to allow the simultaneous enabling of the receive activity of n receivers.
Timing aspects for send/receive actions are taken into account in the SAN models as follows: when
n receive activities complete simultaneously after a send action completes, the receive activities are in-
stantaneous and the send activity is timed; when n receive activities complete independently after a send
action completes, the receive activities are timed and the send activity is instantaneous. Timeouts are
modeled with timed activities that force the enabling of other activities.
In the following we describe in detail the behaviour of the model of CONNECTed system. In the de-
scription, we will use the prefixes C, G, CON, and S to disambiguate the names of local places, activities and
gates of commander, guards, CONNECTor, and SecuredFileSharing.
Initially, all places in the models have zero tokens, except p0, which contains one token in all models.
The SecuredFileSharing starts the communication, because S.selectArea is the only enabled activity.
When S.selectArea completes, one token is placed in S.p1 and one token in SharedCT0. At this point,
S.selectArea is enabled. When S.selectArea completes, one token is placed in S.p1 and the number
of tokens in SharedCT0 is increased. The activity CON.selectArea is now enabled, when it completes one
token is moved from SharedCT0 to CON.p1, and CON.eReq becomes enabled. When CON.eReq completes,
the marking changes as follows: commNum tokens are placed in SharedCM0, because commNum com-
manders must be involved in the communication; commNum tokens are placed in CON.p2, because the
CONNECTor must wait for one eResp from each commander. When the CONNECTor receive a response
from each commanders, (i) for each response received one token is placed in CON.p3; (ii) when each
commanders has sent a response CON.areaSelected is enabled, one token is placed in CON.p4 and the
number of tokens in SharedCT1 is increased. At this point S.areaSelected is enabled, when it completes
one token is moved from SharedCT1 to S.p2, and S.uploadData becomes enabled. A token is placed in
S.p3 and the number of token in SharedCT2 is increased. Activity CON.uploadData is now enabled, when
it completes one token is moved from SharedCT2 to CON.p5, which enables the activity emergencyAlert.
When emergencyAlert completes commNum + guardNum tokens are placed both in SharedGD0 and
CON.p6, and the number of tokens in CON.start1 is increased. At this point activities CON.timeOut1 and
G.emergencyAlert are both enabled. The first one represents the CONNECTor’s timeout on the maximum
waiting time; while the second one enables the activity G.eACK which increases the number of tokens in
SharedGD1. At this point activity CON.eACK is enabled and the number of tokens in CON.p7 and CON.Nresps
is increased, until the timed activity CON.timeOut1 completes. The activity uploadSuccess becomes en-
abled when commNum + guardNum tokens are placed in CON.p7, this means that the CONNECTor has
received all responses, or when the number of tokens in CON.stop1 is greater than zero, this means that
the time associated to the activity timeOut1 has elapsed, CON.timeOut1 completes. The number of to-




(c) EmergencyCall, commander (d) EmergencyCall, guard
Figure 4.8: SAN Models
sent back the eACK before the timeout.
State-based Stochastic Analysis.
The analysis performed through Möbius consists in: i) cross-validation of the results obtained by PRISM
for coverage, latency, and latency2; ii) scale up to large systems with hundreds of guards; iii) coverage in
case of failure, not accounted for in the previous analysis with PRISM.
Cross validation. The reward functions are expressed as follows.
Coverage. This property is specified by accumulating over time the following impulse reward on CON.uploadSuccess
(guardNum and commNum are two parameters of the composed model, and hold the number of guards and
commanders respectively):
double coverage() {
return ( (double) connector->Nresps->Mark() ) / ( guardNum + commNum );
}
Latency. This property is specified by accumulating over time the following rate reward function:
double latency() {
if ( SecuredFileSharing->p1->Mark() > 0 || SecuredFileSharing->p2->Mark() > 0
|| SecuredFileSharing->p3->Mark() > 0 ) { return 1; }
}
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(a) Latency for different number of guards (b) Latency for different traffic patterns
Figure 4.9: Latency for Different System Size and Different Traffic Patterns
Latency2. This property is specified by accumulating over time the following rate reward function:
double latency2() {
if ( connector->start1->Mark() > 0 && connector->p6->Mark() > 0 ) { return 1; }
}
We were able to successfully reproduce through Möbius the verification results of PRISM. We used
simulation, and the relative difference between the average results was always below 2%.
Scalability of the models. CONNECTed systems may include an arbitrary large number of Networked
Systems. Therefore, we investigated the scalability of the SAN model of the CONNECTed system by
analysing large networks. The developed SAN model of the CONNECTed system is parametric with re-
spect to the number of guards and commanders.
We successfully assessed coverage and latency for scenarios with hundreds of guards and two com-
manders. Figure 4.9(a) shows the analysis results for latency in scenarios with at most 100 guards. The
number of batches needed to reach a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of 10% for the
considered models was always below 10K, because the models are relatively simple.
Latency for different traffic patterns. CONNECTed systems are expected to be a mix of heteroge-
neous user applications, each of which may have different characteristics and requirements. Currently,
there is no single traffic distribution that can efficiently capture the traffic characteristics of all types of
networks under every possible situation. A large number of empirical studies have shown that network
traffic is self-similar and that it generally exhibits multiple time-scale behaviour [69]. These aspects can
be modeled with subexponential distributions, such as Weibull and Lognormal.
We investigated the effect of different subexponential distributions on latency by changing the prob-
ability distribution function of the timed activities. For a fair comparison, we have chosen distribution
parameters that allow the same mean value in all cases. The analysis results are shown in Figure 4.9(b).
We can notice that different traffic patterns lead to different latency profiles.
Coverage in the case of failures. Communication in the real-world can be subject to failures. Therefore,
failure modes need to be accounted for when setting up the system model. Failure modes can pertain
the value domain (e.g., wrong output), and/or the time domain (e.g., omission). In this section, we as-
sess coverage in the case of omission failure of the messages sent and received in the EmergencyCall
application. Figure 4.10 shows the coverage profiles for different probability P(ECallFailure) of failures of
EmergencyCall communications. The analysis is performed with two commanders and two guards.
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Figure 4.10: Coverage for Different P(ECallFailure) of Failures of EmergencyCall Communications
4.5 Conclusions and Further Research Directions
During this second year, the work on dependability and performance analysis concentrated on the defini-
tion and partial implementation of the DePer Enabler, which employs the two approaches of state-based
stochastic model and stochastic model-checking to provide probabilistic quantitative assessment of non-
functional metrics of CONNECTed systems. Initial prototypes based on PRISM and Möbius have been
developed and practically applied to the analysis of a few metrics for the “Terrorist Alert” scenario, through
which the complementarity of the two approaches has been shown (refer to the Appendix-Prototypes for
the URL from which a first release of DePer is made available).
The enhancements/extensions planned for the third year mainly consist in: i) progressing in the imple-
mentation of the Enhancer module of DePer, by taking into account in the analysis basic fault-tolerance
mechanisms/patterns, among an available set, to react to selected failure modes experienced by the
CONNECTed system. This is a very important feedback to the Synthesis Enabler towards the synthesis of
a dependable CONNECTor; ii) progressing in completing the loop between the DePer and the Synthesis
Enabler according to Figure 4.1, so that the Synthesis can profitably embed in the synthesis of the CON-
NECTor the indications coming from the analysis; iii) progressing in the interactions between the DePer
and the Monitoring Enabler (presented in the next chapter), to refine the analysis along time using real
data/events observed at run-time.
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5 Incremental and Runtime V&V
The analysis at the early stage of the CONNECT synthesis process, as described in Chapter 4, is of
paramount importance to achieve the required functional and non-functional properties. Nevertheless, the
incomplete a priori knowledge about the middleware and environment, as well as the continuous evolution
of the context and the services with which a NS interacts, unavoidably undermine the accuracy of the
considered parameters and information and, hence, may invalidate the analysis results.
Model-based analysis, such as the one supported by the approaches described in the previous chap-
ter, is a well-established method to assess the dependability of a system before deployment. However,
it is well known that, in highly dynamic contexts, such as the one we operate in CONNECT, the accuracy
of the analysis results can be limited or become obsolete, because unpredictable phenomena may affect
the system during its operation. Therefore, the analysis typically needs to be refined with data obtained
from real system executions.
In this chapter, we report on two directions currently undertaken for the progressive and continuous
refinement of dependability analysis. More precisely, we present first in Section 5.1 an approach for incre-
mental verification in order to improve the performance of verification at run time by reusing results from
previous verifications to obtain fast accurate results during the evolution of a CONNECTed system. The
main contribution is that (1) we improve the efficiency of SCC-based probabilistic model checking [26],
and (2) we minimise the computation cross multiple verifications using the improved SCC-based prob-
abilistic model checking technique. Then, in Section 5.2 we show how –through the interplay between
DePer Enabler and the GLIMPSE Monitor (introduced in [34])– we can refine model-based dependability
analysis in CONNECT. We focus on the synergic use of an automated approach to perform model-based
dependability analysis with runtime monitoring of CONNECTor executions. We have released prototypes
for both incremental verification and GLIMPSE; their respective URLs and related info can be found in the
Appendix-Prototypes.
Finally, for both incremental verification and runtime analysis, examples of application are shown for
the Terrorist Alert scenario (see Sections 5.1.4 and 5.2.3, respectively). Chapter conclusions are drawn
in Section 5.3.
5.1 Incremental Verification of CONNECTed Systems
In the previous chapter, we have applied stochastic model checking to the analysis of CONNECTed sys-
tems for the verification of dependability properties. As a CONNECTed system may evolve, the analysis
has to be repeated in order to incorporate changes in the system provided by the monitor Enabler (see
Section 5.2.2 for more detail). If the analysis is always started from scratch for an evolved system, i.e.,
using offline verification techniques summarised in the deliverable D2.1 [29], the significant time over-
head makes the analysis less usable, particularly when subsequent changes occur before the verification
terminates.
In this section, we propose an incremental verification technique that can reuse the existing verification
results when the verification needs to be done again due to the changes in the system. This technique
is based on the offline verification techniques, but reduces the computation time for unchanged part of a
system during evolution. Therefore, it is more suitable than the latter for run-time analysis. In the rest of
the section, we focus on Markov decision processes (MDPs), a common modeling formalism for systems
that exhibit both probabilistic and nondeterministic behaviour, and formulate incremental stochastic veri-
fication techniques. Our methods at present target CONNECTed systems which are subject to changes
in probability values at run time. This technique also applies to CTMC models, which are used in the
previous chapter, as the verification of a CTMC is performed by converting the CTMC into a MDP first and
then model checking the MDP. The detail can be seen in Deliverable D2.1 [29].
Offline stochastic verification techniques typically require a combination of graph-based analysis tech-
niques and iterative numerical solution methods. Our method also improves their efficiency, and conse-
quently, makes the run-time analysis even faster. In [26], improvements to efficiency have been proposed
based on a decomposition of the model into strongly connected components (SCCs). We improve on the
work of [26] by showing that SCC decomposition can be used to optimise the verification of an MDP in two
ways: (i) by reducing the amount of graph-based analysis required; and (ii) by parallelising the analysis
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of separate SCCs. Note that the technique applies to both probability and reward properties, but we only
present the detail for the former for simplicity. The results reported in the section for experiments are
produced using the reward formula presented in Section 4.4.1.
5.1.1 Preliminaries
We let Dist(S) be the set of all discrete probability distributions over S, i.e., the set of functions µ : S →
[0, 1] such that
∑
s∈S µ(s) = 1.
Markov Decision Processes
Markov decision processes (MDPs) capture both probabilistic and nondeterministic behaviour. They can
be very useful to model concurrency, e.g., several probabilistic processes operating in parallel, or when
the exact probability distribution of some behaviour is not known or is not relevant. An MDP is formally
defined as follows.
Definition 1 (MDP) An MDP is a tupleM = (S, s,Act, Steps, L) where
• S is a finite set of states,
• s ∈ S is the initial state,
• Act is a set of actions,
• Steps : S → 2Act×Dist(S) is the probabilistic transition function.
• L : S → 2AP is a labelling function,
The transition probability function Steps maps each state s ∈ S to a finite non-empty set Steps(s) of
action-distribution pairs.1 There are two steps to determine the successor of a state s in the MDP: first, an
action-distribution pair (a, µ) is chosen non-deterministically from the set Steps(s); second, the next state
s′ is chosen randomly according to µ, i.e. the probability of moving to each state s′ is given by µ(s′).





−−−−→ s2 . . .
where si ∈ S, (ai, µi) ∈ Steps(si) and µi(si+1) > 0 for all i ≥ 0. We use ω(i) to denote the ith state in
the path ω, and step(ω, i) for the ith action in ω. For a finite path ωfin, we denote the last state in ωfin as
last(ωfin). Pathfins (Paths) are the sets of all finite (infinite) paths starting in state s.
An end component [43]M′ ofM is an MDPM′ = (S′, s′, Act′, Steps′, L′) where S′ ⊆ S, Act′ ⊆ Act,
and for each s ∈ S′, we have L′(s) = L(s), Steps′(s) ⊆ Steps(s), satisfying the following two conditions:
1. for each (a, µ) ∈ Steps′(s), ∀s′ ∈ S . (µ(s′) > 0→ s′ ∈ S′).
2. for each s′ ∈ S′, there exists a path inM′ from s to s′.
Note that we do not care about s′ inM′.
To resolve the non-deterministic choices when we execute an MDP, we employ an adversary to select
an action-distribution pair based on the history of choices made so far.
Definition 2 (Adversary) An adversary A of an MDPM is a function mapping every finite path ωfin onto
an element A(ωfin) of the set Steps(last(ωfin)). Let AdvM denote the set of all possible adversaries of
the MDP and, for any adversary A, let PathAs denote the subset of Paths which corresponds to A.
Model checking MDPs
Usually, properties to be verified against MDPs are expressed in temporal logics, such as PCTL [54, 17]
and LTL [86, 41]. The most important task for model checking such logics is to compute the minimum or
1In some presentations, it is assumed that each element of Steps(s) has a unique action. In this setting, this distinction is not
important.
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maximum reachability probabilities, i.e. the minimum or maximum probability that a path through the MDP
eventually reaches a state in some target set F ⊆ S, quantified over all possible adversaries:
pmins = infA∈AdvM
(
ProbAs ({ω ∈ Path
A




ProbAs ({ω ∈ Path
A
s | ω(i) ∈ F for some i})
)
We use pmax to denote the vector of probabilities pmaxs for all states s ∈ S.
In the remainder of Section 5.1, we will focus on the case of maximum probabilities, pmaxs , but our
techniques can easily be adapted to the case of minimum probabilities, Reachability probabilities can be
computed using a variety of standard techniques, including value iteration, linear programming and policy
iteration (see e.g. [87] for details.)
In practice, value iteration techniques have been adopted most widely since they scale better to large
MDPs. In this method, the transition relation is encoded by a matrix and the probabilities for states are
stored in a vector. The vector is iteratively updated by multiplying the matrix and vector, and applying the
maximum function to decide the maximum probability value for states.
Definition 3 (Value iteration) LetM = (S, s,Act, Steps, L) be an MDP and F ⊆ S a set of target states.
The sequence of vectors 〈pmax,n〉n∈N, given below, converges to the vector pmax(F ) of maximum reacha-
bility probabilities for F inM. We define, for any state s ∈ S:
pmax,ns =

1 if s ∈ F





′) · pmax,n−1s′ otherwise.
In practice, value iteration is carried out by computing the vector of required values for increasing values of
n, until a pre-specified convergence criterion is met. One common approach is to check that the maximum
difference between the corresponding elements of successive vectors is below some fixed threshold (also
known as maximum absolute difference) δ. Another is to use the maximum relative difference of vector
elements.
It is also common in practice to use precomputation techniques, which partition S into sets Sno, Syes
and S?, containing states for which the probability is 0, 1 or in (0, 1), respectively. Subsequently, value




S? = S\(Syes ∪ Sno).
Algorithm Prob0A [17] first computes the set of states, each of which can reach a state in Sat(φ) with
probability greater than zero. Then it returns the complement of this set under S as Sno. For each state
s ∈ Sno, no path in PathAs satisfies the formula F φ with non-zero probability under any adversary A.
Algorithm 1: Prob0A(Sat(φ))
1: R := Sat(φ); done := false
2: while done = false do
3: R′ := R ∪ {s ∈ S | ∃(a, µ) ∈ Steps(s) . ∃s′ ∈ R . µ(s′) > 0}
4: if R′ = R then done := true end if
5: R := R′
6: end while
7: return S\R
Algorithm Prob1E [43] computes a double fixpoint to return the set Syes of states, each of which has
pAs (F φ) = 1 for some adversary A. The outer loop identifies states from which no adversary can make
pAs (F φ) = 1, and remove those states from S. The inner loop collects states from which one cannot reach
a state in Sat(φ) without passing through a state already removed from S.
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Algorithm 2: Prob1E(Sat(φ))
1: R := S; done := false
2: while done = false do
3: R′ := Sat(φ); done′ := false
4: while done′ = false do
5: R′′ := R′ ∪ {s ∈ S | ∃(a, µ) ∈ Steps(s) . (∀s′ ∈ S . µ(s′) > 0→ s′ ∈ R) ∧ (∃s′ ∈ R′ . µ(s′) > 0)}
6: if R′′ = R′ then done′ := true end if
7: R′ := R′′
8: end while
9: if R′ = R then done := true end if




In this section, we introduce an optimisation presented in [26] for value iteration. The first step is to
compress maximal end components (MECs) in the model in question. An MEC M′ with the set S′ of
states is an EC that is not contained in any larger EC M′′ with the set S′′ of states such that S′ ⊂ S′′.
It has been proved in [26] that all states in an MEC have the same probability value when value iteration
terminates. Therefore, we can replace each MEC by a single state. A self-loop is an action that, with
probability one, reaches the state where it is enabled. In the rest of Section 5.1, we assume there are no
MECs nor self-loops in an MDP. However, there might still be strongly connected components (SCCs) in
the model. An SCC is a set of states such that there exists a path between any two states in the SCC.
From now on, we assume each SCC is maximal.
SCCs are particularly important in value iteration. Let SCC be an SCC, and SCC ⊆ S\SCC be the set
of states that can reach SCC. Any change of a state’s probability value in SCC affects probability values
of all other states in SCC, as well as those of states in SCC. Furthermore, until the probability values of
the states in SCC converge, the probability values of states in SCC cannot be stabilised. Therefore, the
computation of probability value for states in SCC can be postponed until the probability values in SCC
converge.
The set S of states in M is partitioned into SCCs. Let SSCC = {SCC1, . . ., SCCm} be the partition.
The successor set Succ(SCCi) of SCCi is a maximal set of states such that Succ(SCCi)∩SCCi = ∅, and,
for each state s ∈ Succ(SCCi), there exists a state s′ ∈ SCCi such that ∃(a, µ) ∈ Steps(s′) . µ(s) > 0. We
say that SCCi depends on SCCj if Succ(SCCi) ∩ SCCj 6= ∅. As there is no cyclic dependence among
SCCs, we generate a reversed topological order SSCC among SCCs such that SCCj will appear before
SCCi in SSCC if and only if SCCi depends on SCCj .
The SCC-based value iteration starts to process SCCs along the order SSCC and terminates when it
reaches the end of the order. For each state s ∈ SCCi, let pmax,ks be the maximum probability after the
k-th iteration, pmaxs the final value after the iteration on SCCi terminates, and pmax,0s the initial value, which
is one if s ∈ F , or zero otherwise. The value iteration on SCCi is split into two steps: the first iteration and







′) · p′s′ if pmax,0s < 1 and Steps′(s) 6= ∅
pmax,0s otherwise,
where Steps ′(s) = {(a, µ) ∈ Steps(s) | ∃s′ ∈ Succ(SCCi) .
(
µ(s′) > 0 ∧ pmaxs′ > 0
)
} and p′s′ is pmaxs′ if
s′ ∈ Succ(SCCi), or pmax,0s′ otherwise.
In the remaining iterations, we only update probabilities for those states that are affected by the pre-
vious iteration. Other states simply keep their probability from the previous iteration. The k-th (k > 1)
iteration is described in Algorithm 3.
In the above algorithm, p′s′ = p
max
s′ if s
′ ∈ Succ(SCCi); else p′s′ = p
max,k−1
s′ . The iteration on SCCi
terminates at the k-th iteration when X in Algorithm 3 is empty. Note that Algorithm 3 also works when
we use δ as maximum relative difference, e.g., the condition pmax,k−1x − pmax,k−2x ≥ δ in Algorithm 3 can
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Algorithm 3: The k-th Iteration
1: X ⇐ {x ∈ SCCi | pmax,k−1x − pmax,k−2x ≥ δ}
2: for all x ∈ X do
3: Y ⇐ {y ∈ SCCi | pmax,k−1y < 1 and ∃(a, µ) ∈ Steps(y) . µ(x) > 0}
4: for all y ∈ Y do
5: Steps ′(y)⇐ {(a, µ) ∈ Steps(y) | µ(x) > 0}




















| < δ used in PRISM. But the impact on the probability is negligible as the
experiments in Section 5.1.4 show.
5.1.2 Acceleration on SCC-based Matrix Iteration
The experimental results in [26] have demonstrated the efficiency of SCC-based value iteration. We
propose further improvements for it in this section.
Eliminating precomputations
The precomputation step presented in Section 5.1.1 can speed up value iteration in many cases, and,
most importantly, it reduces the approximation error of the computation. However, it requires fixpoint
computation over the set of states, and, therefore, is time-consuming. Here we show that this step can
be eliminated for SCC-based value iteration. By Lemma 1, we can safely remove Prob0A without losing
accuracy.
Lemma 1 A state in an SCC has maximum probability zero iff all states in the successor set Succ(SCC)
of SCC have maximum probability zero.
Proof 1 ⇐. This is trivial.
⇒. Suppose s ∈ SCC has maximum probability zero and σ ∈ Succ(SCC) has a non-zero maximum
probability. There exists a state s′ ∈ SCC such that ∃(a, µ) ∈ Step(s′) . µ(σ) > 0. Apparently, s′ has non-
zero maximum probability. By definition of SCC, there exists a path ω = s1 . . . sn in SCC such that s1 = s
and sn = s′. We can deduce backwards the path that pmaxsn−1 > 0, p
max




s > 0. ut
According to Lemma 1, we do not need to perform any special computation to enforce prob0A, as for
such an SCC the iteration process terminates after the first iteration.
Lemma 2 Given an SCC and its successor set Succ(SCC), let suc0 = {x ∈ Succ(SCC) | pmaxx < 1.0}. If
either
1. suc0 is empty and Succ(SCC) is not, or
2. suc0 is non-empty and there does not exist a state s ∈ SCC such that ∀(a, µ) ∈ Step(s) . ∃s′ ∈
suc0 . µ(s′) > 0,
then all states in SCC have maximum probability one.
Proof 2 First recall that there is no MEC nor self-loop in SCC. By removing every action from states
in SCC such that it has a transition reaching suc0 with probability greater than zero, we obtain a parti-
tion of SCC where each block forms a connected graph and no connection is among blocks. In each
block B ⊆ SCC, each state only has transitions either leading to states in the same block or in suc1 =
Succ(SCC)\suc0. For all state states s ∈ B, if the maximum probability of reaching suc1 is less than
one, there exists an infinite path ω starting at s and only passing states in B. Let inft(ω) be the set of
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state-action pairs that occurs infinitely often in ω. Then according to [43, Theorem 3.2, page 46], inft(ω)
is an end component, which contradicts to the premise.
ut
By Lemma 2, Prob1E can be removed by inserting a check before the first iteration of each SCC.
This check is simpler than Prob1E because it does not require double fixpoint computation. However,
Lemma 2 only gives a sufficient condition to detect states with maximum probability one, which means
that, in some cases, it is not possible to identify the whole set Syes. However, for the experiments we
performed, Lemma 2 returns the same set of states as Prob1E does, and more importantly, runs much
faster.
Remark. The precomputation for minimum probability can be eliminated by Lemma 3 and 4, which
are the dual of Lemma 1 and 2 respectively.
Lemma 3 A state in an SCC has minimum probability one iff all states in the successor set Succ(SCC)
of SCC, i.e., , have minimum probability one.
Lemma 4 Given an SCC and its successor set Succ(SCC), let suc1 = {x ∈ Succ(SCC) | pmaxx > 0}. If
either
1. suc1 is empty, or
2. suc1 is non-empty and there does not exist a state s ∈ SCC such that ∀(a, µ) ∈ Step(s) . ∃s′ ∈
suc1 . µ(s′) > 0,
then all states in SCC have minimum probability zero.
Parallel computation
As multi-core architectures become the mainstream of CPU design, it is very interesting to utilise the
power of parallel computation to accelerate value iterations. The topological order among SCCs provides a
natural structure for parallel computation. At any step, all SCCs whose successor set has been processed
completely can be processed independently, and thus, in parallel. To achieve this, we need a queue to
store SCCs that are ready to be processed. Initially, all SCCs that have an empty successor set are put
in the queue. Each computation thread takes one SCC from the queue to process, and when it is done,
it puts SCCs that newly become ready into the queue. The whole process terminates when the queue
is empty. Let Succ(SCC) be a copy of the successor set Succ(SCC) of an SCC in SSCC . Algorithm 4
shows the procedure for parallel computation. Note that in the while loop, only line 4 can be executed in
parallel.
Algorithm 4: The Parallel Computation
1: Queue⇐ {SCCi ∈ SSCC | Succ(SCCi) = ∅}; SSCC ⇐ SSCC\Queue
2: while Queue 6= ∅ do
3: scc⇐ the head of Queue
4: compute maximum probabilities for states in scc
5: for all SCC ∈ SSCC . Succ(SCC) ∩ scc 6= ∅ do
6: Succ(SCC)⇐ Succ(SCC)\scc
7: if Succ(SCC) = ∅ then




In addition, finding all MECs can be done using multi-cores. The idea is that to partition a model into
SCCs first, and secondly, searching for MECs in each SCC in parallel.
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5.1.3 Incremental Value Iteration
Incremental verification is very useful when verification has to be repeated for a model which has under-
gone minor changes, as it allows to reuse the results from previous rounds of verification in a later round.
Incremental verification is particularly vital for online monitoring or run-time analysis due to the speed
requirement of the latter. For example, [22] proposed a self-adaption framework to monitor IT systems
modelled as CTMCs/DTMCs, which takes a snapshot of a system regularly and automatically adjusts sys-
tem parameters according to the quantitative verification result of each snapshot. In [22], the verification
tasks for the snapshots were not performed incrementally, resulting in slow performance.
In this section, we target MDPs and explore the cases where some probability distributions in a model
can change as time passes, while the transition structure of the model remains untouched. This means
that transitions with probability one or zero cannot be changed; otherwise, some transitions with non-zero
probability would be added or deleted from the model.
When some probabilities in Steps are changed, it might be not necessary to recompute probability
values for all states. Let Steps′ be the updated transition relation in the model. We first identify the set
S
′
SCC of SCCs that have been affected by the changes. It can be generated using Algorithm 5.
At the beginning, S
′
SCC is initialised to an empty set. Then we scan the SCC partition in the reversed
topological order and add SCCi to S
′
SCC if SCCi satisfies one of two conditions:
1. There exists a state s ∈ SCCi that one action enabled in s is involved in the changes;
2. There exists an SCC ∈ S′SCC that SCCi depends on.






2: for all i ∈ 1, . . . ,m do
3: if ∃s ∈ SCCi . Steps(s) 6= Steps′(s) or ∃SCC ∈ S
′








Let pmaxs be the probability computed for state s initially and p
max
s the one we need to compute after
the changes occur. The SCC-based value iteration can be adapted to handle changes in probabilities by
replacing SSCC by S
′





1 if s ∈ F
pmaxs if ∃SCC ∈ SSCC\S
′
SCC . s ∈ SCC
0 otherwise
In addition, before we recompute the probability for an SCC in S
′
SCC , we perform a test on its successor
set Succ(SCC). This test checks the following conditions:
1. for every state s ∈ Succ(SCC), its probability is not affected by the changes, i.e.,
∀s ∈ Succ(SCC) . pmaxs = pmaxs , (5.1)
2. all actions enabled in a state in SCC are not affected by the changes, i.e.,
∀s ∈ SCC . Steps′(s) = Steps(s).
If both conditions hold, there is no need to perform recomputation in this SCC, i.e.,
∀s ∈ SCC . pmaxs = pmaxs .
Though the above test can eliminate unnecessary recomputation for SCCs that might be affected by
the changes, condition (5.1) is quite restrictive, as it requires all states in the successor set have the
same probability as before the changes occurred. Recomputation is executed even if, for all states in
Succ(SCC), there are only tiny changes between pmaxs and pmaxs , e.g.,
pmaxs 6= pmaxs ∧ |pmaxs − pmaxs | < ε.
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In this case, the change of the probability for a state in SCC is bounded by ε with respect to its original
value. If ε is less than the required accuracy, we can use pmaxs as p
max
s for state s in SCC, which speeds
up the recomputation by introducing a small approximation error. Lemma 5 formalises this idea.
Lemma 5 1. If the condition pmaxs = pmaxs in condition (5.1) is replaced by |pmaxs − pmaxs | < ε and the
test succeeds, then
∀x ∈ SCC . |pmaxx − pmaxx | < ε. (5.2)





| < ε and the above test succeeds, then




| < ε. (5.3)
Proof 3 Consider the base case where s0
a,p→ s1 and s0
a,1−p−→ s2. Let v0, v1 and v2 be the probability
values in state s0, s1 and s2 respectively. Note that v = p · v1 + (1 − p) · v2. Let v′0, v′1 and v′2 be the new
probability value for s0, s1 and s2 respectively after some probabilities in the model are changed (but p is
not changed). Here we discard the absolute value in formulae (5.2) and (5.3) and consider v′1 ≥ v1 and
v′2 ≥ v2 only.
Maximum absolute difference. If v′1 − v1 < ε and v′2 − v2 < ε, we have
v′0 − v0 =
(




p · v1 + (1− p) · v2
)
= p · (v′1 − v1) + (1− p) · (v′2 − v2)
< p · ε+ (1− p) · ε
= ε.








< ε. We rearrange the inequalities to
obtain
v′1 < (1 + ε) · v1 and v′2 < (1 + ε) · v2.
Then we have
v′0 − v0 =
(




p · v1 + (1− p) · v2
)
p · v1 + (1− p) · v2
=
p · (v′1 − v1) + (1− p) · (v′2 − v2)




(1 + ε) · v1 − v1
)
+ (1− p) ·
(
(1 + ε) · v2 − v2
)
p · v1 + (1− p) · v2
=
p · ε · v1 + (1− p) · ε · v2




p · v1 + (1− p) · v2
)
p · v1 + (1− p) · v2
= ε.
Note that if s1 = s or s2 = s, the above reasoning still holds. For example, let s1 = s. We have






Lemma 5 is proved by generalisation of the base case. ut
In practice, we can use δ, the maximum absolute difference or maximum relative difference, as ε, or a
smaller value than δ to increase the accuracy with possible longer computation time.
5.1.4 Experiments
We have implemented the incremental verification technique in an extension of PRISM, using explicit-
state data structures, and investigated performance for the coverage on the Terrorist Alert scenario2. In
2To apply the technique, we converted the CTMC model into an MDP model.
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Table 5.1: Incremental Verification Results
N,M States Original SCC-based Incremental
Total SCC comp Sequential Parallel Sequential Parallel
time (s) time (s) time (s) time (s) time (s) time (s)
2, 2 8370 3.241 0.184 0.488 0.421 0.022 0.032
2, 3 24894 12.921 0.322 0.947 0.629 0.108 0.093
2, 4 74466 49.781 0.951 1.856 1.232 0.055 0.432
2, 5 223182 186.505 2.928 6.984 5.222 0.212 2.503
2, 6 669330 671.963 12.465 27.564 27.675 0.368 18.281
the experiment, we fixed the number N of commanders to be two, and choose different numbers M of
other guards. We also set the time out deadline to be 10 and R2, the exponential distribution rate for the
communication between the CONNECTor and guards, to be 0.1.
The experiment was performed on an AMD Phenom(tm) 9600B Quad-Core Processor with 8GB mem-
ory running Fedora 12 x86 64 Linux. Our experimental results are presented in two parts. The first covers
the optimisations to accelerate SCC-based value iteration from Section 5.1.2; the second one focuses on
the incremental quantitative verification techniques of Section 5.1.3.
Accelerating SCC-based value iteration.
In the first part, we compare running times of three verification approaches:
1. the original version of value iteration,
2. SCC-based value iteration, without precomputation
3. parallel SCC-based value iteration, without precomputation (using 4 threads, one per core).
The times are shown under the columns ‘Original’ and ‘SCC-based’ in Table 5.1. For the former, we
report the total time spent on the verification. For the two SCC-based approaches, i.e. sequential and
parallel, we give the time spent computing SCCs (including identification and compression of maximal end
components), which is required for both approaches, as well as for SCC-based value iteration.
In this scenario, the SCC-based value iteration is much faster than the original one. The parallel
version also shows improvement with respect to the sequential one: in the best case, the speed up is
about 1.5. Although this is lower than the number of threads, numerical computations such as value
iteration are known to be hard to parallelise so this remains a very encouraging result. There are several
factors preventing further speed-ups for the parallel version. The major ones are: (1) at some point in the
process, there are fewer independent SCCs than threads; (2) the synchronisation overhead is comparably
heavy for SCCs that contain only one state; In addition, the implementation could be further tuned to
alleviate memory contention among threads.
Incremental value iteration. To demonstrate the incremental verification algorithm without bias, we
randomly choose three states that are not in any MEC, and have a distribution with probabilistic choices.
For each state s, we pick such a distribution µ ∈ Steps(s) and modify the probability distribution as follows.
Assume there exist m (m > 1) states s1, . . . , sm ∈ S such that µ(si) > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The new
distribution µ′ in a is such that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, we keep half of the value, i.e., µ′(si) = µ(s)/2; for i = m,
we increase the value such that µ′(sm) = µ(sm) +
∑m−1
i=1 µ(si)/2.
Times for the incremental value iteration algorithm, described in Section 5.1.3, are reported in the final
two columns of Table 5.1. This includes both the sequential and parallel versions. We do not consider the
time for SCC computation, since this does not need to repeated. Even when ignoring this, we see that
the times for incremental value iteration represent significant speed-ups compared to the non-incremental
(SCC-based) version: they always faster, up to 50 times faster in some cases. The sequential version
works particularly well; for models where a small number of SCCs need to be updated, the gains for the
parallel version are less impressive due to the synchronisation overhead.
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5.2 Runtime Analysis via Monitoring
A key concern of CONNECT is to ensure CONNECTability, in spite of the continuous evolution of the
Networked Systems, which modify their behaviour at run time to tackle the continuous changes in the
unpredictable open-world settings [11]. In such partially unknown and evolving context, also depend-
ability&performance analysis calls for on-line support to enhance the accuracy of preliminary estimates
performed at design time.
The DePer presented in the previous chapter (see Section 4.1.3) is in charge of performing model-
based dependability and performance analysis to assess, before deployment, if the dependability and
performance requirements requested by the NSs can be satisfied by the synthesised CONNECTor. In this
section we present a preliminary study on how DePer can interact with the CONNECT Monitoring Enabler
to dynamically refine its assessment at runtime, after a CONNECTor is deployed and running.
5.2.1 Monitoring Enabler
The Monitoring Enabler is in charge of performing complex event recognition, as well as observing and
notifying specific events occurrences.
The architecture of the CONNECT Monitoring Enabler, called GLIMPSE3, has been presented in Deliv-
erable D4.2 [34]. To make presentation self-contained, we outline a brief summary of its components and
report its illustration in Figure 5.1. GLIMPSE has been conceived with a highly flexible architecture [15]
decoupling high-level event specification from the underlying observation and analysis mechanisms, so to
yield the greatest generality and facility of use.
The Monitoring Enabler is driven by the Manager component (see Figure 5.1). The collection of raw
data coming on the Monitoring Bus from the observed components is provided by Probes. The essential
characteristic of this model is that producers (Probes) do not need to know any information about who
are the event consumers (Dependability & Performance Enabler for instance). They send information
about their own state only, precluding any assumptions on consumer functionality. The information sent
by Probes is structured on a ConnectBaseEvent object whose interface is shown in Figure 5.2. Probes
may be realized either by injecting code into an existing software, or by using proxies that intercept events
to be analysed and send them to the Monitoring Bus. The communication backbone of the Monitoring
Enabler is the Monitoring Bus, to which all the information (events, requests, responses) are sent on by:
Probes, CONNECT Enablers, Complex Event Processor (CEP) and by any other services joining GLIMPSE.
The Complex Event Processor, instructed with the information provided by the Dependability & Perfor-
mance Enabler, is implemented using JBoss Drools Fusion [2], a rule engine based on Charles Forgy’s
Rete Algorithm [49], able to perform the analysis of the events streaming on the Monitoring Bus. All the
messages exchanged between units are JMS Messages. The latter is implemented using ServiceMix4 [3]
and ActiveMQ [1] technologies.
5.2.2 Enablers Interactions
The event-based mode of interaction is also known as implicit invocation. The interactions between De-
pendability & Performance and Monitoring Enablers start after the Dependability & Performance Enabler
determines that the synthesised CONNECTor satisfies the required dependability level. Specifically, after
the analysis phase, Dependability & Performance Enabler informs the Monitoring Enabler on which are
the parameters (among those used in the dependability analysis) relative to CONNECTor and NSs, that
must be kept under observation at run-time. The Monitoring Enabler, upon receiving the request, properly
instructs the probes embedded in the CONNECTor.
Once the CONNECTor is deployed, the data derived from evaluation of real executions are sent from
Monitoring Enabler to Dependability & Performance Enabler. In this way, DePer can perform statistical
analyses based on the real data coming from the monitored observations and can use such information
to continuously check the accuracy of the analysed model. If the model parameters are found to be
inaccurate, Dependability & Performance updates the model with the new values, and performs a new
3Generic fLexIble Monitoring based on a Publish-Subscribe infrastructurE, http://labse.isti.cnr.it/tools/glimpse
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Figure 5.1: Monitoring Enabler Architecture
Figure 5.2: CONNECT Base Event Interface
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Figure 5.3: Sequence Diagram of the Basic Interaction Pattern between DePer and Monitoring
analysis. If the new analysis evidences that the deployed CONNECTor needs adjustments, in cooperation
with the Synthesis Enabler a new synthesis–analysis cycle is started.
With more details, Dependability & Performance Enabler and Monitoring Enabler interact by using a
Publish/Subscribe protocol. The interaction pattern is shown as a sequence diagram in Figure 5.3 where
we intentionally left out system start-up operations (for a more detailed sequence diagram, see Deliver-
able D4.2 [34]). Whenever Monitoring Enabler receives a request message on the service channel (see
message 2 on Figure 5.3), a new channel dedicated to the requesting Enabler is set up to communicate
the monitored values.
GLIMPSE sends response messages to Dependability & Performance Enabler as soon as the aspect
of interest is available (see message 8 on Figure 5.3).
The two Enablers exchange JMS messages whose payload is expressed in XML language. The pay-
load of the XML, contains a ComplexEventRuleActionList xml object, which determines a lists of possible
actions to execute on the Monitoring Enabler knowledge base. The schema of ComplexEventRuleAction-
List is shown in Listing 5.1
The Complex EventRule ActionList specification supports the use of heterogeneous rule languages,
as it is natively unbound to any. In our example, into the field RuleBody, the Dependability & Performance
Enabler, will set the Drools rule for the requested evaluation. In a basic interaction between Monitoring
and Dependability & Performance Enabler, another Enabler is involved, the Deployment Enabler. The
information about the CONNECTor: identity, instance, execution, are stored into the Deployment Enabler
that can be prompted by the Monitoring Enabler to retrieve such information.
5.2.3 Application Example
In the following, we focus on the Enablers interactions only, leaving out of scope the actions taken by
Dependability & Performance Enabler once it obtains the values observed at runtime from the Monitoring
Enabler. To show a basic interaction between Dependability & Performance Enabler and Monitoring En-
ablers, we refer to the Terrorist Alert Scenario [35]. As summarised in Section 2.1, the scenario considers
the interactions between police and patrolling civil guards. It is assumed that policemen and guards are
both equipped with mobile devices, but they use different communication protocols. Hence, we intend to
use the CONNECT infrastructure to enable the direct interoperation between a policeman and guards in
the zone.
Following CONNECT work on synthesis of mediating CONNECTors [94] and automata discovery/learn-
ing [89], the specification of the CONNECTed system is given with Labelled Transition Systems (LTSs) [63].
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1 <?xml vers ion= ” 1.0 ” encoding= ”UTF−8”?>
2 <schema xmlns= ” h t t p : / / www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema” targetNamespace= ” h t t p : / / labse .
i s t i . cnr . i t / gl impse / xml / ComplexEventRule ” xmlns : tns= ” h t t p : / / labse . i s t i . cnr . i t /
gl impse / xml / ComplexEventRule ” elementFormDefault= ” q u a l i f i e d ”>
3
4
5 <element name= ” ComplexEventRuleAct ionList ” type= ” tns :
ComplexEventRuleActionType ”></element>
6
7 <complexType name= ” ComplexEventRuleActionType ”>
8 <sequence>
9 <element name= ” I n s e r t ” type= ” tns : ComplexEventRuleType ”
10 maxOccurs= ” unbounded ” minOccurs= ” 0 ”>
11 </element>
12 <element name= ” Delete ” type= ” tns : ComplexEventRuleType ”
13 maxOccurs= ” unbounded ” minOccurs= ” 0 ”>
14 </element>
15 <element name= ” S t a r t ” type= ” tns : ComplexEventRuleType ”
16 maxOccurs= ” unbounded ” minOccurs= ” 0 ”>
17 </element>
18 <element name= ” Stop ” type= ” tns : ComplexEventRuleType ”
19 maxOccurs= ” unbounded ” minOccurs= ” 0 ”>
20 </element>
21 <element name= ” Restar t ” type= ” tns : ComplexEventRuleType ”





27 <complexType name= ” ComplexEventRuleType ”>
28 <sequence>
29 <element name= ” RuleName ” type= ” s t r i n g ” maxOccurs= ” 1 ” minOccurs= ” 1 ”></
element>
30 <element name= ” RuleBody ” type= ” s t r i n g ” maxOccurs= ” 1 ” minOccurs= ” 0 ”></
element>
31 </sequence>
32 <a t t r i b u t e name= ” RuleType ” type= ” s t r i n g ”></ a t t r i b u t e>
33 </complexType>
34 </schema>
Listing 5.1: ComplexEventRuleActionList Schema
CONNECT 231167 87/123
Figure 5.4: The selectArea Event Sent from Peer Probe
What we want to monitor at runtime is the latency between two states of the LTS. Specifically, we want to
monitor latency of two transitions from the LTS shown in Figure 2.3 (Chapter 2).
The parameters under monitoring are the duration of the transitions executed by the NS requesting the
communication, on which time-outs have been setup in the CONNECTor specification to limit the waiting
periods. Therefore, having feedbacks on real executions is useful to improve the time-out calibration.
From Figure 2.3, the events to be monitored are the consumer transitions selectArea and areaSelected.
The request messages sent by Dependability & Performance Enabler to Monitoring are shown in Listing
5.2.
The Monitoring infrastructure, more specifically, the Manager component, receives the Dependability
& Performance requests and sets up the ComplexEventProcessor with the provided rule.
The events flowing in from Probes are structured on a ConnectBaseEvent object (see Figure 5.2), that
provides all the necessary informations for an accurate pattern recognition.
According to the scenario, the peer that initiates the communication sends a broadcast message
selectArea to selected peers (the Police control center or policemen) operating in a specified area of
interest.
The event generated from the Probe instrumented into the peer software component is shown in
Figure 5.4 and flows in into the Monitoring infrastructure stream of events.
When the selected peer replies (Police control center or policemen), another event is fired and sent on
the Monitoring Bus, the areaSelected event.
Using the timestamp contained into the two different events, checking and matching connectorID,
sequenceID, ConnectorInstanceID, ConnectorInstanceExecutionID between the two events, the CEP is
able to calculate the latency between the two events and provide it to the Dependability & Performance
Enabler.
With those results, the Dependability & Performance Enabler, is able now to evaluate the behaviour of
the CONNECTor and if this is not compliant to the expected values, it may contact the Syntesis Enabler
requiring a new synthesis process.
5.3 Conclusions and Further Research Directions
In this chapter, we have presented two approaches for evolving dependability analysis at runtime. They
include first a technique for optimising stochastic verification of the MDP model for CONNECTed systems,
based on a decomposition into strongly CONNECTed components. This technique reduces the amount
of graph-based computation required and provide opportunities for parallelisation. In particular, we also
focused on the applicability of this to incremental verification: re-analysing an MDP after small changes
in its probability values, by re-using existing verification results. In the future, we plan to develop these
techniques further, for example, considering also the case where the structure of the model changes.
Second, this chapter has also shown work in-progress on the synergic use of stochastic model-based
dependability & performance analysis, conducted at system design-time, with run-time monitoring to im-
prove the accuracy of property estimates. The basic interplay between Dependability & Performance
and Monitoring Enablers has been discussed, highlighting the benefits of the monitoring feedbacks on the
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1 <?xml vers ion= ” 1.0 ” encoding= ”UTF−8”?>
2 <ComplexEventRuleAct ionList xmlns= ” h t t p : / / labse . i s t i . cnr . i t / gl impse / xml /
ComplexEventRule ”
3 xmlns : x s i = ” h t t p : / / www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema−i ns tance ”
4 x s i : schemaLocation= ” h t t p : / / labse . i s t i . cnr . i t / gl impse / xml / ComplexEventRule . /
ComplexEventRule . xsd ”>
5 < I n s e r t RuleType= ” d roo ls ”>
6 <RuleName>t r ans i t i onDu ra t i onRu le </RuleName>
7 <RuleBody>
8 impor t i t . cnr . i s t i . labse . gl impse . event . SimpleEvent ;
9 impor t i t . cnr . i s t i . labse . gl impse . manager . ResponseDispatcher ;
10 impor t i t . cnr . i s t i . labse . gl impse . s e t t i n g s . D r o o l s U t i l s ;
11
12 rule ” t r a n s i t i o n D u r a t i o n ”
13 no−loop
14 salience 999
15 dia lec t ” java ”
16 when
17 $aEvent : SimpleEvent ( th is . data == ” se lec tArea ” ,
18 th is . getConsumed == f a l s e ) ;
19
20 $bEvent : SimpleEvent ( th is . data == ” areaSelected ” ,
21 th is . getConsumed == fa lse ,
22 th is . getConnectorID == $aEvent . getConnectorID ,
23 th is . getConnector InstanceID == $aEvent . getConnectorInstanceID ,
24 th is . getConnector InstanceExecut ionID == $aEvent .
getConnector InstanceExecut ionID ,
25 th is a f te r $aEvent ) ;
26 then
27 $aEvent . setConsumed ( t rue ) ;
28 $bEvent . setConsumed ( t rue ) ;
29 update ( $aEvent ) ;
30 update ( $bEvent ) ;
31 r e t r a c t ( $aEvent ) ;
32 r e t r a c t ( $bEvent ) ;
33 ResponseDispatcher . Noti fyMe ( droo ls . getRule ( ) . getName ( ) , ”
Dependab i l i t yAna l isysEnab ler1 ” , D r o o l s U t i l s . l a tency ( $aEvent . getTimestamp ( ) ,
$bEvent . getTimestamp ( ) ) ) ;
34 end
35 </RuleBody>
36 </ I n se r t>
37 </ComplexEventRuleAct ionList>
Listing 5.2: Sample Request from Dependability & Performance Enabler
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model-based analysis. A simple application example has been also presented, which shows the operative
steps of the Enablers interactions. This activity is also documented in [14]. As already mentioned, this
is work in progress and further developments are needed, including: (i) to finalise the implementation of
statistical analysis on observed data, (ii) to set-up an appropriate data model to store the monitored data,
(iii) to possibly extend monitoring to the analysed dependability and performance properties, to validate
the correctness of the specification of CONNECTor and NSs used by the Dependability & Performance
Enabler, and (iv) to integrate the CPMM model presented in Chapter 3 with the Monitor infrastructure
creating a self-contained suite that will provide metrics rule templates for all the Enablers that need to
evaluate non-functional properties at runtime.
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6 Trust Management Interoperability
The general CONNECT Trust model introduced in Deliverable D5.1 [32] highlighted three categories
of trust relations, for assessing the trustworthiness of: CONNECTors, Enablers, and Networked Systems,
respectively.
However, as a first step to supporting trust management in the CONNECT architecture, we assume
that CONNECTors and Enablers are trusted and thereby focus on interoperable trust management among
heterogeneous Networked Systems through the CONNECT Trust Enabler. Specifically, we define a trust
meta-model that allows the rigorous specification of trust models as well as their composition. The result-
ing composite trust models enable heterogeneous trust management systems to interoperate transpar-
ently through mediators.
In effect, with people getting increasingly connected virtually, trust management is becoming a central
element of today’s open distributed digital environment. However, existing trust management systems are
customized according to specific application domains, hence implementing different trust models. As a
result, it is nearly impossible to exploit established trust relations across systems. However, while a trust
relation holding in one system does not systematically translate into a similar relation in another system,
it is still a valuable knowledge, especially if the systems relate to the same application domains (e.g.,
e-commerce, social network). This is such an issue that we are addressing in our work.
To the best of our knowledge, little work investigates interoperability between heterogeneous trust
models. The closest to our concern is the work of [95], which describes a trust management architecture
that enables dealing with a variety of trust metrics and mapping between them. However, the architecture
deals with the composition at the level of trust values and do not account for the variety of trust models.
In particular, one may want to differentiate between direct trust values and reputation-based ones when
composing them. In general, what is needed is a way to formalize heterogeneous trust models and
their composition. Such a concern is in particular addressed in [61, 98], which introduce trust meta-
models based on state of the art trust management systems. Nevertheless, little detail is given and
the paper does not describe how to exploit the meta-model for composing heterogeneous trust models
and thereby achieving interoperability. Dealing with the heterogeneity of trust models is also investigated
in [51, 96]. However, the study is for the sake of comparison and further concentrates on reputation-
based models. Summarizing, while the literature is increasingly rich of trust models, dealing with their
composition remains a challenge.
This chapter specifically introduces the foundations of the CONNECT Trust Enabler. We recall the key
entities associated with trust management systems (Section 6.1). Then,w we formally define a trust meta-
model that enables the specification of various trust models (Section 6.2). We further describe different
mapping mechanisms and associated algorithms in order to support the composition of heterogeneous
trust models and thus enable a common and systematic trust assessment across models (Section 6.3).
Next step is to integrate the proposed trust modeling and associated model composition in the CON-
NECT architecture, through the concrete development of the Security and Trust (SxT) Enabler and its
integration with the introduced CONNECT Property Meta-Model (see Chapter 3).
6.1 Trust Model Definition
As defined in [52]: A trustor trusts a trustee with regard to its ability to perform a specific action or to
provide a specific service. Hence, any trust model may basically be defined in terms of the three following
elements:
1. Trust roles abstract the representative behaviors of stakeholders from the standpoint of trust man-
agement, in a way similar to role-based access control model [48].
2. Trust relations serve specifying trust relationships holding among stakeholders, and
3. Trust assessment define how to compute the trustworthiness of stakeholders.
We further define trust relations and assessment below.
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6.1.1 Trust relations
We identify two types of trust relationships, i.e., direct and indirect, depending on the number of stake-
holders that are involved to build the trust relationship (see Figure 6.1).
Direct trust: A direct trust relationship represents a trust assertion of a subject (i.e., trustor) about
another subject (i.e., trustee). It is thus a one-to-one trust relation (denoted 1:1) since it defines a direct link
from 1 trustor to 1 trustee. One-to-one trust relations are maintained locally by trustors and represent the
trustors’ personal opinion regarding their trustees [62]. For example, a one-to-one relation may represent
a belonging relationship (e.g., employees trust their company), a social relationship (e.g., trust among































Figure 6.1: Trust Relations
Indirect trust: As opposed to a direct trust relationship, an indirect trust relationship represents a sub-
ject’s trustworthiness based on a third party’s recommendation(s). This can be either (i) transitive-based
or (ii) reputation-based.
Transitive-based trust relations are one-to-many (denoted 1:N). Such a relation enables 1 trustor (e.g.,
Alice in Figure 6.1(B)) to indirectly assess the trustworthiness of an unknown trustee (e.g., Bob in Fig-
ure 6.1(B)) through the recommendations of a group of trustees (N). Hence, the computation of 1:N
relations results from the concatenation and/or aggregation of many 1:1 trust relations (see arrow T in
Figure 6.1). The concatenation of 1:1 trust relations usually represents a transitive trust path, where each
entity can trust unknown entities based on the recommendation of its trustees. Thus, this relationship is
built by composing personal trust relations [5, 92]. Furthermore, in the case where there exist several
trust paths that link the trustor to the recommended trustee, the aggregation can be used to aggregate all
given trust recommendations [59].
Reputation-based trust relations are many-to-one (denoted N:1). These relations result from the ag-
gregation of many personal trust relationships of recommenders having the same trustee (see arrow R
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in Figure 6.1). In other words, the group of recommenders (N ) trust a specific subject (e.g., Alice in Fig-
ure 6.1(C)) to take their personal opinions and to maintain and provide the reputation of trustees (e.g.,
Bob in Figure 6.1(C)). In the literature, reputation systems are divided into two categories depending on
whether they are (i) Centralized or (ii) Distributed. With the former, the reputation of each participant is
collected and made publicly available at a centralized server (e.g., eBay, Amazon, Google, [80]). With the
latter, reputation is spread throughout the network and each networked entity is responsible to manage
the reputation of other entities (e.g., [59, 101]).
Figure 6.2 illustrates roles and relations of a representative trust model associated with the Terrorist
Alert use case. Precisely, we introduce the specification of a centralized (Guard trust model, see Figure
6.2(A)) and fully distributed (Police trust model, see Figure 6.2(B)) trust models. Trust models aim at

















Figure 6.2: Terrorist Alert Trust Models TMC and TMD.
The centralized trust model (see Figure 6.2(A)) shows three roles, namely: the Guard, the Chief,
and the Manager. The Chief and the Guard trust (i.e., 1:1 trust relation between a Chief /Guard and a
Manager ) the Manager to maintain the Guards’ reputation (i.e., N:1 trust relation between a Manager
and a Guard). This Guard reputation is updated according to personal opinion of Chiefs (i.e., 1:1 trust
relation between a Chief and a Guard). Hence, any Chief can assess the trustworthiness of a given
Guard transitively through the Manager (i.e., 1:N trust relation between a Chief and a Guard).
Regarding the distributed model, Policemen have a direct trust relationship with Authorities. Author-
ities also can collaborate and trust each other directly (1:1) or transitively (1:N). Authorities trust their
Policemen, which can be represented by a direct relationship, or transitively if they pertain to a trusted
Authority (1:N). In this way Policemen can check the level of accreditation of each other through their
Authority (1:N).
6.1.2 Trust Management
Trust management, i.e., assigning values to trust relationships, relies on the definition of: (i) trust metrics
characterizing how trust is measured and (ii) operations for assessing and composing trust relations.
Trust metrics: Different metrics have been defined to measure trust. This is due to the fact that one
trust metric may be more or less suitable to a certain context. Thus, there is no widely recognized way to
assign trust values. Some systems assume only binary values. In [102], trust is quantified by qualitative
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labels (e.g., high trust, low trust etc.). Other solutions represent trust by a numerical range. For instance,
this range can be defined by the interval [-1..1] (e.g., [74]), [0..n] (e.g., [5, 92]) or [0..1](e.g., [59]. A trust
value can also be described in many dimensions, such as: (Belief, Disbelief, Uncertainty) [59].
In addition, several definitions exist about the semantics of trust metrics. This is for instance illustrated
by the meaning of zero and negative values. For example, zero may indicate lack of trust (but not distrust),
lack of information, or deep distrust. Negative values, if allowed, usually indicate distrust, but there is a
doubt whether distrust is simply trust with a negative sign, or a phenomenon of its own.
Assessment operations: We define four main operations for the computation of trust values associated
with the trust relations given in Section 6.1.1 (see table 6.1): Setting, aggregation, and concatenation.
Setting Aggregation ConcatenationBootstrapping Updating
One-to-One (1:1) X X
One-to-Many (1:N) X X X
Many-to-One (N:1) X X X
Table 6.1: Trust Assessment Operations
The setting operations are mainly performed by trustors to bootstrap (i.e., initialize) 1:1 and N:1 trust
relationships or to update these relationships after receiving personal feedback or third parties recom-
mendation. The bootstrapping operation initializes the a priori values of 1:1 and N:1 trust relations. Trust
bootstrapping consists of deciding how to initialize trust relations in order to efficiently start the system and
also allow newcomers to join the running system [88]. Most existing solutions simply initialize trust rela-
tion with a fixed value (e.g., 0.5 [55], a uniform Beta probabilistic distribution [60], etc.). Other approaches
include among others: initializing existing trust relations according to given peers recommendations [90];
applying a sorting mechanism instead of assigning fixed values [92]; and assessing trustees into different
contexts (e.g., fixing a car, babysitting, etc.) and then inferring unknown trust values from known ones of
similar or correlate contexts [88, 6].
All the solutions dealing with 1:N trust assessment mainly define the concatenation and the aggrega-
tion operations, in order to concatenate and to aggregate trust recommendations by computing the aver-
age [92], the minimum or the product [5] of all the intermediary trust values. In the case of Web service
composition, some approaches (e.g., [84]) evaluate the recommendation for each service by evaluating
its provider, whereas other approaches (e.g., [65]) evaluate the service itself in terms of its previous invo-
cations, performance, reliability, etc. Then, trust is composed and/or aggregated according to the service
composition flow (sequence, concurrent, conditional and loop). Aggregation operations such as Bayesian
probability (e.g., [79]) are often used for the assessment of N:1 (reputation-based) trust relations. Trust
values are then represented by a beta Probability Density Function [60], which takes binary ratings as
inputs (i.e., positive or negative) from all trustors. Thus, the reputation score is refreshed from the previ-
ous reputation score and the new rating [80]. The advantage of Bayesian systems is that they provide a
theoretically sound basis for computing reputation scores and can also be used to predict future behavior.
6.2 Trust Meta-Model
Following the above, we formally define the trust meta-model as: TM =< R,L,M,O >, where R, L, M
and O are the finite sets of trust roles, relations, metrics and operations, respectively.
In the following, we use the notations:
• Id to characterize an identifier which can be a string or be specified by an ontological concept
although the latter is not longer discussed in this chapter.
• ♦V to characterize a specific value from the the set of values V .
• YV to characterize an exclusive disjunction of values (only one of the values) from the set of values
V , for instance, v1 Y v2 Y v3 where v1, v2, v3 ∈ V .
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• ∧V to characterize a conjunction of: (i) values or (ii) an exclusive disjunction of values (one or more
elements) from the set of values V , for instance, v1 ∧ v2 ∧ (v3 Y v4) where v1, v2, v3, v4 ∈ V .
• e @ v returns true if e is in v, for instance: having v = v1∧v2∧(v3Yv4), we can say that v1 @ v = true.
• If a value v has the type ∧V (i.e., v :: ∧V ), we note v[i] to return the ith element of v and |v| to get
the number of elements of v. For instance, having v = v1 ∧ v2 ∧ (v3 Y v4), we can say that |v| = 3,
v[1] = v2, and v[|v|] = v3 Y v4.
Role set R: The role set defines all the roles r played by the stakeholders of the trust model. A role r of
R is simply denoted by its name:
r =< name::Id > (6.1)
In our meta-model, a stakeholder is represented as a Subject s, playing a number of roles, r1, r2...and rn,
which is denoted as s I r1, r2...rn.
The following tables define of the roles of the Guard and the Police trust models.
Guard Trust Model
Role set R
rC = <name=”Chief ”>
rG = <name=”Guard”>




rA = <name=”Authority ”>
Metric set M: The metric set describes all the trust metrics that can be manipulated by the trust model.
A metric is formally denoted as a pair:
m =< name::Id, type::Id > (6.2)
where: name and type respectively define the name and the type (e.g., probability, rate, etc.) of the metric.




mRep = <name=”Reputation”, type=”Probability”>
mRec = <name=”Recommendation”, type=”Probability”>
mRat = <name=”Rate”, type= ”Labels”>
The metricsmrep andmrec are defined to describe the trust value of a given reputation and recommen-
dation respectively, both metrics define a probability value that falls in the interval [0..1]. Whereas, mrat
defines the trust feedback given by a Chief about the performance of the Guards under his command.
Concerning the police trust model, we identify two metrics that are defined through trust level (see
Table below). These metrics (macc and maut), respectively, describe the level of accreditation of the
Policeman and the level of trust of an Authority.
Police Trust Model
Metric set M
mAcc = <name=”Accreditation”, type=”Levels”>
mAut = <name=”Authority ”, type=”Levels”>
Relation set L: A relation set L contains all the trust relations that are specified by the trust model. We
specifically denote a trust relation as a tuple:
l =< name::Id, ctx::Id, type::♦T l, trustor::YR, trustee::YR, metric::♦M >




• name identifies the relation;
• ctx describes the context of the relationship in terms of the application domain (e.g., security);
• type represents the type of the relation as given by T l;
• trustor and trustee are roles where a trust relation relates a trustor role with a trustee role. Different
trustors can establish the same type of relationship with different trustees. Thus, as a trust relation is
binary and between a trustor role and a trustee, the exclusive combination of roles (e.g., r1 Y r2 Y r3)
is used to describe these elements.
• metric is an element from the metric set and thus reflects the trust measure given by the trustor to
the trustee through this relation.
According to the above, we set the following definitions of the relations of the Guard and the Police
trust models (see Figure 6.2).
Guard Trust Model
Relation set L
ldCM = < name=”ServerRecommendation”, ctx= ”Security”, type=”1:1”, trustor=”(rC Y rG)”, trustee=”rM ”, metric=”mrec” >
ltCG = < name= ”GuardTrustworthiness”, ctx= ”Security”, type=”1:N”, trustor=”rC ”, trustee=”rG”, metric=”mRec” >
ldCG = < name=”ChiefFeedback”, ctx= ”Security”, type=1:1, trustor=rC , trustee=rG, metric=mRat >
lrMG = < name=”GuardReputation”, ctx= ”Security”, type=N:1, trustor=rG, trustee=rM , metric=mRep >
Police Trust Model
Relation set L
ldAA = < name=”TrustAuthority”, ctx= ”Security”, type=”1:1”, trustor=”rA, trustee=rA”, metric=”mAut” >
ldPA = < name=”PoliceAuthority”, ctx= ”Security”, type=”1:1”, trustor=”rP ”, trustee=rA, metric=”mAut” >
ldAP = < name=”PoliceMember”, ctx= ”Security”, type=”1:1”, trustor=”rA”, trustee=”rP ”, metric=”mAcc” >
ltPP = < name=”Colleague”, ctx= ”Security”, type=”1:N”, trustor=”rP ”, trustee=”rP ”, metric=”mAcc” >
ltAP = < name=”RemoteTrustPolice”, ctx= ”Security”, type=”1:N”, trustor=”rA”, trustee=”rP ”, metric=”mAcc” >
Operation set O: The operation set specifies the operations that can be performed over relations by
a subject to assess the trustworthiness of another subject. As defined in Section 6.1, trust assessment
relies on the setting, the aggregation, and the concatenation operations.
An assessment operation is formally denoted as:
o =< name::Id, host::YR, type::♦To, input::∧L, output::♦L, call::∧O >
with To = {”setting”, ”aggregation”, ”concatenation”}
(6.4)
where: (i) name identifies uniquely an operation;
• host specifies the role(s) that executes the operation;
• type defines the type of operation denoted by an element from the set To;
• input gives the trust relations that are required to perform an assessment operation;
• output gives the resulting trust relation;
• call denotes a continuation, i.e., a trust operation possibly triggers (an)other operation(s).
We define certain constraints on the operations as follows:
• A host executes an operation in order to assess its managed relations and only those ones (i.e., the
relation where the host is a trustor), formally: (∀o ∈ O) o.host @ o.output.trustor.
• The concatenation operation is defined to represent the assessment of a path of relations, namely,
(i) each trustor of the output relation has to be a trustor of the first input relation, (ii) each trustee of
an input relation has to be present as a trustor in a next input relation, and finally, (iii) each trustee
from the output relation has to be present as a trustee of the last input relation, formally:
(∀o ∈ O) o.type = concatenation⇒

(i) (∀l @ o.input[1]) l.output.trustor @ l.input.trustor
(ii) (∀i ∈ [1..|o.input|[)(∀lx @ o.input[i])...
...∃ly @ o.input[i+ 1] / lx.trustee @ ly.trustor
(iii) (∀l @ o.input[|o.input|]) l.output.trustee @ l.input.trustee
• The aggregation operation aims at aggregating relationships that have the same trustee, formally:
(∀o ∈ O) o.type = concatenation⇒ (∀l @ o.input) o.output.trustee = l.trustee.
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We give below the operations defined by the Guard and the Police trust models.
Guard Trust Model
Operation set O
osMT = <name=”setManagerTrustworthiness”, host=”rC Y rG”, type=”setting”, in=”ldCM ”,out=”ldCM” >
oaGT = <name=”assessGuardTrustworthiness”, host=”rC ”, type=”concatenation”, in=”(ldCM ∧ lrMG)” , out=”ltCG”, call=”osGT ” >
osGT = <name= ”setGuardTrustworthiness”, host=”rC ”, type=”setting”, in=”ltCG”, out=”ltCG” >
osCF = <name= ”setChiefFeedback”, host=”rC ”, type=”setting”, out=”ldCG”, call=”oaGR” >
oaGR = <name=”assessGuardReputation”, host=”rM ”, type=”aggregation”, in=”ldCG”, out=”lrMG”, call=”osGR” >
osGR = <name=”setGuardReputation”, host=rM , type=setting, in=lrMG, out=lrMG >
Police Trust Model
Operation set O
osTA = <name=”setTrustedAuthority”, host=rA, type=setting, in=ldAA,out=ldAA >
osPA = <name=”setPoliceAuthority”, host=rP , type=setting, in=ldPA, out=ldPA >
osPM = <name=”setPoliceMember”, host=rA, type=setting, in=ldAP , out=ldAP >
ocRP = <name=”concatRemotePolice”, host=rA, type=concatenation, in=ldAA ∧ (ldAP Y ltAP ) out=ltAP , call=oaRP >
oaRP = <name=”aggregateRemotePolice”, host=rA, type=aggregation, in=ltAP out=ltAP >
osRP = <name=”setRemotePolice”, host=rA, type=setting, in=ltAP out=ltAP >
oaPC = <name=”assessPoliceAccreditation ”, host=rP , type=concatenation, in=ldPA ∧ (ldAP Y ltAP ) out=ltPP , call=osPC >
osPC = <name=”setPoliceAccreditation”, host=rP , type=setting, in=ltPP out=ltPP >
Focusing on the Guard trust model, we can see that the operation osCF is performed by the Chief to
set the relation ldCG with its feedback. This operation will then trigger the operation oaGR that is performed
by the Manager to compute (by aggregation) the reputation of the Manager, which then leads to update
the corresponding N:1 relation osGR. In the Police trust model, each Policeman is able to assess the
accreditation of another Policeman through its Authority (oaPC → osPC). An Authority can manage the
accreditation of its Policeman (osPM ) or compute transitively the Policeman accreditation through trustee
Authorities (ocRP → oaRP → osRP ).
Trust graph TG: We associate the definition of a trust graph with any trust model TM for the sake of
graphical representation. Specifically, the trust graph TG(R,E) associated with a given TM is a directed
graph with the vertices representing the set of roles R of TM , and the set of edges E representing the
relationship between roles according to L. Hence, each edge is labeled by the referenced relation l from




















Figure 6.3: Terrorist Alert Trust Graph TGC and TGD.
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6.3 Composing Trust Models
The aim of composing different trust models is to provide roles of a given model (which we call target
model T ) the ability to assess roles that pertains to another trust models (which we call source model
S). For instance, according to the terrorist alert scenario, Guards should help Policemen to find suspects.
This requires that any Policeman should be able to assess the accreditation of Guards. To do so, mapping
of roles from two distinct trust models (TMx and TMy) is explicitly defined through a set of mapping rules
Ψxy, as follows:
Ψxy = {ψkST /ψkST = (rs : TMS)B (rt : TMT )}
Where S, T ∈ {x, y}, S 6= T
(6.5)
Each mapping rule associates a source role with a target role so as to define that the source role rs of
TMS plays the target role rt in TMT . In fact, in order to initiate any relationship across trust models, roles
of different models have to be mapped into local roles, since roles of a given trust model are designed to
communicate only with roles from the same trust model. For instance, in order to enable Policemen to
assess Guards (see Figure 6.4, Step 1), we identify which role in the Policeman trust model corresponds
to the Guard. Intuitively, we can define the rule: (rG : TMC)B (rP : TMD), which means that Guards (i.e.,
rG : TMC) of the centralized trust model are seen by the distributed trust model (TMD) as Policemen
(rP : TMD).
Given the specification of trust models, their composition relies on mapping their respective roles.
Then, the existing trust relations and operations are extended to relate roles from the composed models,
and new assessment operations are required to map trust relations from one model to another. Finally, the
resulting mapping and extensions are implemented through mediation [100] so as to make composition
transparent to existing systems, which leads us to introduce the corresponding mediator role.
Formally, the composition, denoted by
⊙
Ψxy
, of two trust models TMx and TMy, which introduces the










〈 Rxy = Rx ∪ Ry ∪ µRxy
Mxy = Mx ∪My
Lxy = L+x ∪ L+y
Oxy = O+x ∪O+y ∪ µOxy
〉 (6.6)
where:
• Ψxy is the set of mapping rules over roles that enables the composition of TMx and TMy;
• µRxy and µOxy are the new sets of mediator roles and mediation operations, respectively;
• (L+x and L+y ) and (O+x and O+y ) are the extended relations and operations, respectively.
As illustrated in Figure 6.4, the composition process is performed in two steps:
1. Role Mapping: Processes the mapping rules of Ψxy in order to enable the target model to manage
the source roles, for instance: the Guard is perceived as a trustee Policeman into the Police trust
model.
2. Recommendation mediation: If indirect relations are extended, we introduce a mediator to play the
role of a recommender from the target model, which is able to assess the source role from the
source trust model. For instance, the mediator can play the role of an Authority that recommends to
other Authorities, a given Guard, according to its reputation. To do so, the mediator will further play
the role of a Guard to retrieve that reputation.
In the following, we elaborate, role mapping and recommendation mediation to generate the sets of
mediator roles, and mediation operations (i.e., µRxy, and µOxy) and extended relations and operations







Figure 6.4: Composition Process
6.3.1 Role Mapping
The computation of the composition of trust models TMx and TMy is detailed in Algorithm 6. The algo-
rithm iterates on mapping rules (Line 4) for each of which it extends relation sets, L+x and L+y (Lines 6-10).
The aim of extending relations is to enable those relations to handle trustors and trustees from another
trust model. More precisely, for any trust relation: l =< name, ctx, type, trustor, trustee, metric> of Lx
and Ly of the composed models TMx and TMy, its trustee and trustor elements are possibly extended
to account for mapping between roles.
Algorithm 6 details the corresponding extension where, as shown in Lines 6 to 10, the extension of trust
relations relies on each mapping rule. Each rule defines which local trustee (target role rt) corresponds
to the source role (rs). Therefore, all the relations li (from the target trust model) that consider the target
role as a trustee (Line 7) are extended with the source role (Line 8).
For instance, applying Algorithm 6 sto compose the Guard TMC and the Police TMD trust models,
with the mapping rule rG : TMC B rP : TMD leads to extend TMD as follows:
Police Trust Model
ldAA = < name=”TrustAuthority”, ctx= ”Security”, type=”1:1”, trustor=”rA”, trustee=”rA”, metric=”mAut” >
ldPA = < name=”PoliceAuthority”, ctx= ”Security”, type=”1:1”, trustor=”rP ”, trustee=”rA”, metric=”mAut” >
ldAP = < name=”PoliceMember”, ctx= ”Security”, type=”1:1”, trustor=”rA”, trustee=”rP Y rG”, metric=”mAcc” >
ltPP = < name=”Colleague”, ctx= ”Security”, type=”1:N”, trustor=”rP ”, trustee=”rP Y rG”, metric=”mAcc” >
ltAP = < name=”RemoteTrustPolice”, ctx= ”Security”, type=”1:N”, trustor=”rA”, trustee=”rP Y rG”, metric=”mAcc” >
All the relations that are depicted in gray in the table above sink to the Policeman role. Thus, thanks to
the given mapping rule, these relations are extended with the Guard role as a trustee.
As stated earlier, the next composition step processes the extended indirect relations (the set iL -Line
5 and 10-) that go across trust models. The goal is to introduce a mediator as a potential recommender
of each indirect relation in order to help the target model to set (bootstrap and update) the source role
trustworthiness according to the trust knowledge of the source trust model. Algorithm 7 is hence trigged
to process each indirect relation that is extended. However, before that, the set iL is parsed in order to
avoid redundancy, namely, any extended indirect relation that needs another extended indirect relation to
be assessed. In this case, solving the required indirect relation will solve those that needs that relation. To
do so, Algorithm 6 searches for the operations that assess indirect relations (Lines 11-12), and removes
from iL (Line 17-18) all the relations requiring an extended indirect relation as input to be assessed(Lines
13-16).
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Algorithm 6: Trust Models Composition(TMx, TMy,Ψxy)
Input(s) : Trust models TMx =< Rx,Mx,Lx,Ox > and TMy =< Ry,My,Ly,Oy >
The set of Mapping rules Ψxy
Output(s): The trust model composition TMxy =< Rxy,Mxy,Lxy,Oxy >
begin1
// Initialize trust models sets for composition
L+x = Lx ; L+y = Ly2
O+x = Ox ; O+y = Oy3
foreach (ψxyk = (rs : TMS∈{x,y}) B (rt : TMT∈{x,y},S 6=T )) ∈ Ψxy) do4
iL = ∅ /* Set of indirect relations that are extended */5
// Extend target model relation with rs
foreach (li ∈ L+T ) do /* Find relations with the trustee rt */6
if rt @ li.trustee then7
li.trustee = li.trustee Y rs /* Add rs as a trustee */8
if li.type 6= 1:1 then /* the extended relation is indirect */9
iL = iL ∪ {li}10
// Delete redundant extended indirect relations
foreach (oi ∈ O+T ) do /* Find operations that assess indirect relations */11
if oi.output ∈ iL then12
redundant = false13
foreach (lj @ oi.input) do14
if (lj 6= oi.output) and (lj ∈ iL) then15
redundant = true16
if redundant = true then17
iL = iL− {lj}18
µrk = null19







if µrk 6= null) then /* At least one indirect relation was been mediated */21
µRxy = µRxy ∪ {µrk}22
Rxy = Rx ∪ Ry ∪ µRxy23
Mxy = Mx ∪My24
Lxy = L+x ∪ L+y25
Oxy = O+x ∪O+y ∪ µOxy26
end27
6.3.2 Recommendation Mediation
In this section we describe the mediation process over recommendations, which enables a mediator to
recommend the source role to the target trust model, from the trust assessment that is provided by the
source model. This process is performed by Algorithms 7 and 8 in four steps:
• Step 1: Find a target recommender rrect of each extended indirect relation ls that should maintain a
direct relation with the source role lrect (see Figure 6.5(a)(b)). This step is described in Algorithm 7
(Lines 2-6). The operation set of the target model is parsed in order to retrieve for each extended
indirect relation a potential recommender (line 6).
• Step 2: Find a source requestor rreqs that is able to indirectly assess the source role rs (i.e., rreqs has
a 1:N or N:1 trust relation with rs) (see Figure 6.5(c)(d)). We are looking for an indirect trust relation
(lreqs ) because the mediator is passive and it is defined to retrieve (i.e., indirectly) trust values and
not to give its opinion. Moreover, transitive based-trust relations (i.e., 1:N) have more priority than
reputation based-trust relations (Lines 10 and 14), since 1:N relation is the less restrictive in terms
of managing and storing the history of the relation. Another constraint consists to find a relation that
is applied in the same or similar context of the recommended relation lrect (Lines 11-13 and 15-17).
Once, Algorithm 7 finds the most appropriate relation, we can choose one of its trustor as requestor
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Figure 6.5: Relation Mediation
• Step 3: Extend the relations of the source and the target models in order to enable the mediator µr
to play the roles rrect and rreqs . Furthermore, in the source model, if the relation ls is a reputation
based-trust relationship (see Figure 6.5(b)), the mediator has to establish a trust relationship with
the trustor of the source relation in order to be able to send its recommendation (see Algorithm 7,
Lines 27-30). Similarly, in the target model, if the requested relation lreqs is of type 1:N (see Figure
6.5(c)), the mediator has to establish a relationship with at least one recommender of this relation
(see Algorithm 7, Lines 31-34).
• Step 4: Extend the operations of each model with the mediator µr, in order to allow it to perform
translation over new mediation operations. In fact, the mediator will have to perform all the operations
that assess its managed relations (i.e., the relations where the mediator is a trustor). In other words,
each operation o =< name, host, type, input, output, call> of O+x and O+y , that has to be performed
by the mediator (i.e., µr @ output.trustor) will be extended with the mediator role (Algorithm 8
Lines 2-5). Then, in order to link and translate requested relation lreqs to the recommended relation
lrect , we define a new type of operation called Mediation operation (µo). More precisely, consider a
requested and a recommended relations (lreqs and lreqt respectively):
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Input(s) : Role source rs ; Mediator role µr ;
Set of the extended indirect relation iL ; Extended relation sets L+s and L
+
t ;
Extended operation sets O+s and O
+
t ; Mediation operation set µOxy
Output(s): Extended relation sets L+s and L
+
t ;
Extended operation sets O+s and O
+
t and Mediation operation set µOxy
begin1
foreach (oi ∈ O+T / oi.output ∈ iL) do /* Find operations that assess indirect relations */2
lt = oi.output3
if (lt.type=1:N and oi.type=concatenation) or (lt.type=N:1 and oi.type=aggregation) then4
// Select the input relations that sink to rs
foreach (lrect @ oi.input / rs @ lrect .trustee ) do5
rrect = lrect .trustor[1] /* Select the first trustor as a potential recommender */6
// Find similar relation in the source trust model
lreqs = null7
sim0 = TH08
foreach (li ∈ L+S / (li.type 6= 1:1 and rs @ li.trustee)) do /* Parse L+S */9
if (lreqs = null or lreqs .type = li.type) then10
if Sim(li.ctx, lrect .ctx) > sim0 then11
lreqs = li12
sim0 = Sim(li.ctx, lrect .ctx)13
else if (lreqs 6= null and lreqs .type =N:1 and li.type =1:N) then14
// 1:N has higher priority than, N:1
if Sim(li.ctx, lrect .ctx) > TH0 then15
lreqs = li16
sim0 = Sim(li.ctx, lrect .ctx)17
if lreqs 6= null then /* A similar relation is found */18
rreqs = lreqs .trustor[1] /* Select the first trustor as a potential requestor */19
if µr = null then20
µr = new role21
lreqs .trustor = lreqs .trustor Y µr /* Extend requested relation with µr as a trustor */22
lrect .trustor = lrect .trustor Y µr /* Extend recommended relation with µr as a trustor23
*/
// Extend relations to enable µr to play rrect and rreqs
foreach (li ∈ L+T ∪ L
+
S ) / ((rrect Y rreqs) @ li.trustee) do24
if (¬(µr @ li.trustee) then25
li.trustee = li.trustee Y µr /* Add µr as a trustee */26
if lt.type =N:1 then /* Link the mediator to the reputation Manager */27
foreach (li ∈ L+T ) / (li.type =1:1 and li.trustee t lt.trustor 6= ∅)) do28
if (rrect @ li.trustor) and ¬(µr @ li.trustor) then29
li.trustor = li.trustor Y µr /* Add µr as a trustor */30
else if lreqs .type =1:N then /* Link the mediator to the a source recommender */31
foreach (oi ∈ O+S ) do32
foreach (lj ∈ oi.input[1]) do33
lj .trustor = lj .trustor Y µr ; Break34
// Call the mapping operation algorithm








T , µOxy )35
end36
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lreqs =<name=“ns”, ctx=“cs”, type=“1:N” or “N:1”, trustor=“rreqs Y µr”, trustee=“rs”, metric=“ms”>
of TMs where lreqs ∈ L+s , rreqs ∈ Rs, and ms ∈Ms.
lreqt =<name=“nt”, ctx=“ct”, type=“1:1”, trustor=“rrect Y µr”, trustee=“rs”, metric=“mt”> of TMt
where lrect ∈ L+t , rrect ∈ Rt, and mt ∈Mt.
The mediation operation µo (see Algorithm 8 Lines 10-13) will mainly have to translate and normal-
ize the metric value ms of lreqs into the metric value mr of lrect ,
i.e., µo =< name, host= µr, type=Mediation, in=lreqs , out = lrect >.
To do so, we consider that the mediator (µr) embeds a library of mediation functions that translate
and normalize heterogeneous trust metrics, which are invoked by the mediation operation µo.
After that, we create, through the mediator, a continuation from the source model to the target
model. The mediator will call the mediation operation after assessing and setting (osets → µo)
the requested relation lreqs (see Algorithm 8 Line 14). In turn, after performing the translation, the
mediation operation can call the operation osett (µo→ osett ) in order to set the recommended relation
lrect (see Algorithm 8 Line 15).









Input(s) : The mediator role µr;
The recommended relation lrect and the requested relation lreqs ;
Extended relation sets L+s and L
+
t ;
Extended operation sets O+s and O
+
t ;
Mediation operation set µOxy.




// Extend mediator operations
foreach (oi ∈ {O+S ∪O
+
T }) / (µr @ oi.output.trustor) do2
oi.host = oi.host Y µr3
if (oi.output = lrect) and (oi.type = setting) then4
osett = oj5
if (oi.output = lreqs) and (oi.type = setting) then6
osets = oj7




oupdates .call = oupdates .call ∧ µo12
µo.call = µo.call ∧ oupdatet13
µOxy = µOxy ∪ {µo}14
end15
In Figure 6.6, we illustrate the composition of TMC (the centralized Guard Trust Model) and TMD (the
distributed Police Trust Model) resulting from the following mapping rules:
• (rG : TMC)B (rP : TMD) (see Figure 6.6(A))
• (rP : TMD)B (rG : TMC) (see Figure 6.6(B))
As a consequence of applying Algorithm 7 with the first rule, Policemen are able to transitively assess
the accreditation of Guards through the mediator that maintains a direct relationship with a Guard (lrect =
ldAP ). This relation is set according to the reputation of that Guard into TMC . The mediator gets this
value by playing the role of a Chief that assesses the trustworthiness of a Guard transitively through the


















































(rG : TMC) ￿ (rP : TMD)












Figure 6.6: Trust Graph Composition of the Guard and the Police Trust Models
Concerning the second rule, Algorithm 7 enables the Manager to bootstrap and update the reputation
of the Manager through the mediator that plays the role of a Chief that gives it feedback (lrect = ldCG).
To do so, the mediator plays the role of an Authority that assesses transitively the accreditation of an
unknown Policeman (lreqs = ltAP ).
Then, as depicted in the table below, by applying Algorithm 8, all operations highlighted in gray are
extended to handle the extended relations that have to be performed by µr. Moreover, two mediation
operations are defined, namely: µomGP and µomPG in order to respectively convert probability values to
accreditation levels and conversely .
Guard Trust Model
Operation set O
osMT = <name=”setManagerTrustworthiness”, host=”rC Y rG Y µr”, type=”setting”, in=”ldCM ”,out=”ldCM” >
oaGT = <name=”assessGuardTrustworthiness”, host=”rCYµr”, type=”concatenation”, in=”(ldCM∧lrMG)”, out=”ltCG, call=osGT ” >
osGT = <name= ”setGuardTrustworthiness”, host=”rC Y µr”, type=”setting”, in=”ltCG”, out=”ltCG”, call=”µomGP ” >
osCF = <name= ”setChiefFeedback”, host=”rC ”, type=”setting”, out=”ldCG”, call=”oaGR” >
oaGR = <name=”assessGuardReputation”, host=”rM ”, type=”aggregation”, in=”ldCG”, out=”lrMG”, call=”osGR” >
osGR = <name=”setGuardReputation”, host=”rM ”, ”type=setting”, in=”lrMG”, out=”lrMG” >




osTA = <name=”setTrustedAuthority”, host=rA Y µr, type=setting, in=ldAA,out=ldAA >
osPA = <name=”setPoliceAuthority”, host=”rP ”, type=setting, in=”ldPA”, out=”ldPA” >
osPM = <name=”setPoliceMember”, host=”rA”, type=”setting”, in=”ldAP ”, out=”ldAP ” >
ocRP = <name=”concatRemotePolice”, host=rA Y µr, type=concatenation, in=”ldAA ∧ (ldAP Y ltAP )”, out=”ltAP ”, call=”oaRP ” >
oaRP = <name=”aggregateRemotePolice”, host=”rA Y µr”, type=”aggregation”, in=”ltAP ”, out=”ltAP ” >
osRP = <name=”setRemotePolice”, host=”rA”, type=”setting”, in=”ltAPYµr” out=”ltAP ”, call=”µomGP ” >
oaPC = <name=”assessPoliceAccreditation ”, host=”rP ”, type=”concatenation”, in=”ldPA ∧ (ldAP Y ltAP )”, out=”ltPP ”,
call=”osPC” >
osPC = <name=”setPoliceAccreditation”, host=”rP ”, type=”setting”, in=”ltPP ”, out=”ltPP ” >
µomPG = <name=”mediatePoliceGuard”, host=”µr”, type=”mediation”, in=”ldCG”, out=”ltAP ”, call=”osCF ” >
6.4 Conclusions and Further Research Directions
In this chapter, we have introduced a trust meta-model as the basis to express and to compose a wide
range of trust models. We have illustrated the proposed meta-model through a concrete terrorist alert
scenario, where two heterogeneous models (i.e., Guard and Police) are modeled, composed and medi-
ated. Such a composition is specified in terms of mapping rules between roles. Rules are then processed
by a set of mediation algorithms to overcome the heterogeneity between the trust metrics, relations and
operations associated with the composed trust models.
Next chapter tackles CONNECT security requirements, and introduces trust-based access control so-
lutions based on contract and policies. To do so, these security solutions refer to the trust composition
approach (that is provided in this chapter) to overcome heterogeneity of NSs’ trust model.
Currently, we are actively working with the partners that are developing the CPMM meta-model to
extend it with our trust meta-model. We are further designing and implementing the Security and Trust
(SXT) Enabler.
We are also investigating the use of ontologies to specify the semantics of trust model elements and




To study security aspects, we distinguish two levels: the CONNECT infrastructure level, consisting of
the enablers, and the Networked System level, consisting of the entities that ask for communicating.
With an eye at the new assumptions and at the architecture developed in this second year (D1.2) [33],
in the following (Section 7.1) we extend the analysis of threat models of the CONNECT world that we have
preliminarily described in D5.1. Then, while in WP3 we focus on security aspect at CONNECTor synthesis
and deployment time, here, in WP5, we deal with security aspects at run-time. In particular, according to
the security policies that have to be guaranteed and referring to the considered threat model, we describe
the following two frameworks:
• Security-by-Contract-with-Trust (in Section 7.2), and
• Access control negotiation with trust (in Section 7.3).
We have released this year a prototype of the former, please refer to the Appendix-Prototypes for getting
related information.
Note that, both these frameworks deal also with trust. Indeed, during the second year of the project,
some work has been done for integrating the two concepts of security and trust. In particular, the Security-
by-Contract-with-Trust mechanism, as we will show after, is a run-time enforcement mechanism driven by
both security and trust aspects. On the other hand, the access control negotiation with trust framework is
not yet fully integrated with the trust meta-model described in Chapter 6. We plan to integrate these two
approaches as future work within the next year of the project.
As for the other WP5 approaches, we discuss (in Section 7.4) the application of both frameworks to
the case study of The Terrorist Alert and draw conclusions (in Section 7.5).
7.1 Analysis of the Threat Models
Within the second year of the CONNECT project, several hypothesis are made upon the behaviour and
features of CONNECT infrastructure, Networked systems, and CONNECTors. Indeed, according to the
D1.2 [33]:
• Networked Systems are systems that manifest the will to connect to other systems for fulfilling
some intent identified by their users and the applications executing upon them.
• Enablers are networked entities in the environment of networked systems that incorporate all the in-
telligence and logic offered by CONNECT for enabling connection between heterogeneous networked
systems. Enablers constitute the CONNECT enabling architecture.
• CONNECTors are the emergent connectors produced by the action of enablers.
The result of the interaction of these three agents is a CONNECTed systems, that is actually the outcome
of the successful creation and deployment of CONNECTors.
In order to guarantee security in the CONNECT framework, we identify the possible threat models of
the CONNECT scenario (Table 7.1) by investigating all possible relations that may be established among
the listed entities.
To this aim we identify three different security layers:
The CONNECT Infrastructure : The CONNECT infrastructure is composed by several enablers whose
functions are integrated in order to obtain a CONNECTor compliant to the requirements of the Net-
worked Systems that have to communicate. Once a communication request is received by the
CONNECT framework, and processed by the Learning Enabler and the Discovery Enabler, all the
information are elaborated and a CONNECTor is synthesized by the Synthesis Enabler. Sharing in-
formation among different enablers is a security relevant aspects. Indeed, some enabler could be
malicious and could provide wrong information to the other ones in order to prevent the communica-
tion.
Between the CONNECT Infrastructure and the NSs : When two Networked Systems ask to establish
a communication, they have to authenticate themselves to the CONNECT infrastructure in such a
way that CONNECT is able to discover their interface protocols and their communication constraints
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CONNECT Infrastructure Between CONNECT and
NSs
CONNECTed system
Synthesis Time i)All Enablers are safe; i)The NSs are safe;ii)Some Enabler is mali-
cious
ii) At least one NS is ma-
licious
Deployment Time i)The Nss are safe;ii) At least one NSs is
malicious
Execution Time i)All Enablers are safe; i)The Nss are safe; i)Each NS could be a mali-cious agent
ii)Some Enabler could be
malicious
ii) At least one NSs is
malicious
ii) CONNECT does not trust
NSs
Table 7.1: Security in CONNECT According to the CONNECTor Life-cycle
as, e.g., , security policies, dependability requirements, and so on. In this layer we have to fore-
see mechanisms for guaranteeing that this subscribe phase is performed in a secure way. In this
scenario we assume that the CONNECT infrastructure cannot behave as a malicious entity, i.e., it
never tries to damage the Networked Systems security. However, no assumptions are done on the
Networked Systems. The following threat models can be pointed out:
• the NSs behave as expected with respect to the CONNECT infrastructure.
• There is at least one NS that tries to attack the CONNECT infrastructure.
Note that when these threats arise, the CONNECTor has not yet been synthesized.
The CONNECTed System : Once the CONNECTor is synthesized, the communication among the two Net-
worked systems is established. From the security prospective, we have to guarantee that the CON-
NECTed system, i.e., the system composed by the two Networked Systems and the CONNECTor, is
secure. Also in this case we can distinguish different threat models. Starting from the assumption
that the CONNECTor is secure by construction, we have that:
• At least one of the two NSs involved in the communication is malicious with respect to the
CONNECTor.
• The two NSs try to attack each other.
Another meaningful distinction needed for guaranteeing security in CONNECT is the one based on the
CONNECTor life-cycle. Indeed, we can distinguish three phases as follows:
• Synthesis time. At this stage, the CONNECT infrastructure collects all the NSs requests and charac-
teristics (affordance [33])and synthesizes through the Synthesis enabler a CONNECTor that satisfies
both functional and non-functional requirements.
• Deployment time. Referring to [33], the Deployment enabler is in charge of composing the required
functionality to ensure that CONNECTors will communicate with the legacy networked systems and
of deploying and managing the executable code of the CONNECTors in the network, i.e., if it is
distributed to the components that can verify the (fragment of) CONNECTor they received or it is run
in a centralized way.
• Execution time. At this stage, the CONNECTor is executed on each component that can also apply a
run-time enforcement mechanism in order to assure that local security policies are satisfied [40].
In this deliverable, we mainly focus on security at execution time. Security at synthesis and deployment
time is dealt with in WP3. Hence, in the following we will show how and when we are able to guaran-
tee security policy in the CONNECT framework. To do this we investigate separately the two cases of
decentralized and centralized deployment and execution of the CONNECTor.
7.2 Security of the CONNECTed System at Execution Time
Let us suppose that each Networked System sets a local policy that has to be locally satisfied inside the
Networked System itself. Such security policy is the combination of a private policy and a public one. A
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private policy is a security policy that a Networked System does not declare to the external world, e.g.,
a policy that speaks about sensitive data. On the contrary, a public policy is a policy that the Networked
System considers freely deliverable, e.g., a policy that does not involve information that the Networked
System considers private. Clearly two limit cases exist: i) a Networked System has only a private policy
or ii) it sets only a public policy.
This can speak about local security relevant actions (directly enforceable policy ) or also about infor-
mation sent to the external world (delegated enforceable policy ), e.g., to the other Networked System.
Definition 4 A local security policy P1 of the NS NS1 is a policy that can always be locally enforced.
Example of local policies are the sanding-box policies, i.e., do not access to ports different from the
declared ones”, access control policies, and so on.
On the other hand, we refer to global policy whenever we speak about a security policy that involves
both the NSs and the CONNECTor itself, i.e., a global security policy is a security policy of the CONNECTed
system as a whole.
In order to establish a secure communication, each NS sends to the CONNECT infrastructure the
communication request and each possible public security policy. The CONNECT infrastructure receives,
attached to the communication request, the security policies and is in charge to generate, verify, and
deploy the CONNECTor.
As said, here we focus on security aspects at execution time, i.e., we present, whether it is possible,
how certain security policies are guaranteed while two Networked Systems communicate through the
CONNECTor.
In this scenario, assuming that the CONNECTor does not intentionally attack the NSs, the possible
threat models we obtain are the following ones:
• One of the two NSs involved in the communication is malicious with respect to the CONNECTor;
• Both NSs try to attack each other.
We now present different possible solutions to guarantee security under these assumptions, according
to the CONNECTor deployment strategy.
7.2.1 Centralized Deployment of the CONNECTor
Let us now assume that the deployment of the CONNECTor is centralized. This means that the CONNECTor
is run by a deputy enabler (for instance the Security & Trust enabler), i.e., it is run into the CONNECT
infrastructure.
Since we are working under the assumption that the CONNECT infrastructure is secure and trusted, we
provide solution for dealing with security requirements at synthesis time more than at run-time. Indeed,
both the CONNECTor and the platform on which it is deployed and run are assumed to be safe.
By the way, it is important to notice that, some security requirements can not be satisfied under these
assumption. Indeed, let us consider that one of the two NS or both, requires that the communication
is established only on secure channel, from the security point of view, we have to guarantee that the
two NSs are able to encrypt and decrypt the communication messages. If (at leas one of) the two NSs
is not provided of the cryptographic primitive, it is not able to satisfy this request because, even if the
CONNECTor is able to encrypt and decrypt messages, during the communication between the two NSs
some message is sent in plain text because the CONNECTor does not run on the NSs, so can not encrypt
and decrypt messages before the send and receive actions.
7.2.2 Decentralized Deployment of the CONNECTor
Let us suppose that at least one of the two NS is able to run a (piece of ) CONNECTor. Generally,
let us assume that a CONNECTor is made of three part, each of them is deployed on the two NS and
on the security Enabler, i.e., the enabler of the CONNECT infrastructure that it is charge of running the
CONNECTor and, eventually, enforces its behaviour according to the requested security policies.
We assume that each NS does not share with the other NS its local public security policies before the
CONNECTor has been deployed. The public security policies are send only to the CONNECT infrastructure
that is considered secure by both the NSs.
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Security-by-Contract-with-Trust
Each Networked System runs its own part of the CONNECTor. Two possible scenarios arise:
• the NSs are provided of the Security-by-Contract-with-Trust (×C×T for short) mechanism.
• the NSs are not provided of the S×C×T. In this case we are in the same case of the centralized on
that we describe later because we do not have any possibility of controlling the code that run on the
NSs
In the following we consider the first case, i.e., that the NSs are able to run the S×C×T for enforcing
security policies. In particular, the S×C×T paradigm is applied for guaranteeing at run-time that:
• local private policies, that are not shared neither with the CONNECT infrastructure, are satisfied.
Example of local private policies are private policies regarding, for instance the GPS coordinates of
the NS itself, the right for accessing to the private data stored on the device of the NS, and so on.
• none NS tries to attack the other NS by manipulating the part of the CONNECTor running on it.
Indeed, let us suppose that one of the two NS is a malicious agent. When it receives the part of
CONNECTor that it is in charge to run, the NS manipulates it in order to attack the other NS during
the communication.
In both these cases, even if the CONNECTor is synthesized in such a way it is not malicious, once it is
deployed on a possible malicious platform, the CONNECTor becomes a possible malicious agent. Under
this assumption, each NS able to run the S×C×T paradigm can enforce its own private and public security
policies. Here we briefly describe how the S×C×T paradigm works.






































STEP 1 STEP 2
Figure 7.1: The Extended Security-by-Contract Application Workflow
• Step 1-Trust Assessment: Once (part of) the CONNECTor is downloaded on each Networked
System, before executing it, the trust module decides if it trusts or not that the execution of the
CONNECTor satisfies its contract. Since NSs may implement different trust models, we apply the
trust model composition introduced in Chapter 6. So that, both NSs that aim at being connected can
assess the trustworthiness of each other
• Step 2-Contract Driven Deployment: According to this trust measure, the security module decides
if just monitoring the contract (Scenario MC, where MC stands for Monitor of the Contract) or both
enforcing the policy and monitoring1 the contract (Scenario EPMC, where EPMC stands for Enforce
the Policy and Monitor the Contract), thus going into one on the scenarios described in Step 3.
Indeed, we have two cases:
1Note that the the monitoring mechanisms referred here is different from the one described in Chapter 5. Indeed, it is an active
and synchronous run-time monitoring running by the NS itself and it is not run by the monitoring enabler.
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Scenario MC The contract satisfies the policy. In this case our monitoring/enforcement infras-
tructure is required to monitor only the CONNECTor contract. Indeed, under these conditions,
contract adherence also implies policy compliance. If no violation is detected then the CON-
NECTor worked as expected. Otherwise, we discovered that a trusted party provided us with a
fake contract. The CONNECT infrastructure reacts to this event by reducing the level of trust of
the indicted provider and switching to the policy enforcement modality.
Scenario EPMC The contract does not satisfy the policy. Since the contract declares some po-
tentially undesired behaviour, policy enforcement is turned on. Similarly to a pure enforcement
framework, our system guarantees that executions are policy-compliant. However, monitoring
contract during these executions can provide a useful feedback for better tuning the trust vector.
Hence, our framework also allows for a mixed monitoring and enforcement configuration. This
configuration is activated on a statistical base.
Let us notice that, in both the previous scenarios, contract monitoring plays a central role. Indeed, a
contract violation denotes that a trusted provider released a fake contract.
• Step 3-Contract Monitoring vs Policy Enforcement Scenarios: Depending on the chosen sce-
nario the security module is in charge to monitor either the policy or the contract and save the
execution traces (logs).
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STEP 4 STEP 3
Figure 7.3: The Contract Monitoring Configuration in the EPMC Scenario
Trust measures assigned to security assertions can be adjusted as a result of a contract monitoring
strategy. Indeed, trust measures associated with the NS concern on the contract goodness mainly. Up-
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dated trust measures will influence on future interactions of the CONNECT infrastructure with that particular
NS. In other words, our system penalizes the NS more when the contract does not specify CONNECTor’s
behaviour correctly, rather when the CONNECTor itself contradicts user’s security policy. This is because,
since the CONNECTor is secure by construction, if there is an execution of the CONNECTor that violates
its contract, this means that the NS that runs it has modified the CONNECTor behaviour. If it occurs, the
level of trust of the NS is downgraded.
In [39] a monitoring infrastructure consists in a policy decision point (PDP) that holds the actual security
state and is responsible for accepting or refusing new actions and Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs) that
are both in charge of intercepting actions to be dispatched to the PDP and preventing the execution of not
allowed operations.
Starting from this model, we extend it by making the PDP also responsible for the contract monitoring
operations and for the trust vector updating. Following [24, 39], we assume that both contracts and policies
are specified through the same formalism. Hence, the policy enforcement configuration of the PDP keeps
unchanged. The PDP must load application contracts as well as security policies dynamically. Moreover,
it must be able to run under the two different execution scenarios in Figure 7.1.
EPMC Scenario Both the policy enforcement and the contract monitoring are active. During the execu-
tion, contract violations are checked for updating trust levels and policy enforcement is activated in order
to guarantee that the application does not violate the security policy on the device. Indeed, the contract
monitoring receives event signals from the executing code and keeps trace of the execution trace. When
a signal arrives, its consistency with respect to the monitored contract is checked. If the contract is re-
spected then its internal monitoring state is updated and the operation is allowed, and a good behaviour
is logged (i.e., contract respected). Otherwise, if a violation attempt happens, a security error occurs
and a violation feedback is logged for the trust module. The policy enforcer is only in charge of following
the execution of the application and whenever it attempts to violate the security policy of the device, the
enforcement mechanism halts the execution in such a way that the security policy is satisfied.
MC Scenario The contract monitoring is performed. It works according to the following strategy: the
contract monitoring receives event signals from the executing code. The execution trace is kept in memory.
When a signal arrives, its consistency with respect to the monitored contract is checked. As in the previous
case, if the contract is respected then its internal monitoring state is updated and the operation is allowed,
and a good behaviour is logged (i.e., contract respected). Otherwise, if a violation attempt happens, a
security error occurs, and a bad feedback is trigged (i.e., contract violation), and the system switches
from contract monitoring to policy enforcement configuration in order to guarantee that the security policy
is satisfied. Since an instance of the policy is always present, this operation does not imply a serious
computational overhead.
Summing up, both execution scenarios check contract violations through the contract monitoring strat-
egy described above and update providers’ trust level according to the contract monitoring feedback.
A Prototype Implementation A prototype of the S×C×T application is implemented in Java Micro Edi-
tion (J2ME). It follows the architecture depicted in Figure 7.1.
Basically, the prototype consists of a suite of tools. The main components are: the policy/contract
matching verifier, the security checks in-liner, the trust manager system (TMS) and the policy decision
point (PDP).
The system is triggered whenever a new application package is downloaded on the platform before
its actual installation. At this stage, the application package contains the MIDlet resources, i.e., the files
needed to install and execute the application, and its contract, i.e., an XML-based specification of the
MIDlet behaviour. Firstly, the system assigns a trust value to the MIDlet by retrieving from the TMS the
trust measure associated to the MIDlet provider. In particular, the TMS is implemented as a local service
that answers to special, authenticated requests. Then, the S×C×T framework proceeds according to the
MIDlet trust level. If the MIDlet is considered to be untrusted, i.e., the trust value is less than an predefined
acceptance threshold, the MIDlet is instrumented with local checks (in-lining). Otherwise, two tasks run in
parallel: the in-lining procedure and the policy/contract matching. The instrumentation process produces
a modified version of the MIDlet in which security checks have been inserted inside the instructions flow
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in order to wrap potentially dangerous operations. Note that the set of these operations contains (at least)
all the actions the policy and the contract refer to. The second task compares the MIDlet contract with the
platform policy through a simulation process. The result of this computation is a positive flag if the contract
is policy compliant, i.e., if the set of behaviours denoted by the contract is a subclass of those allowed by
the policy. If it is not the case, a negative response is returned.
At this point the modified MIDlet is installed on the mobile device and can be actually executed. At
execution time, the PDP applies the standard policy enforcement strategy to the MIDlets that are untrusted
or have an illegal contract. Instead, it watches the trusted MIDlets having a valid contract, with respect
to the security policy, by verifying that the actual behaviour complies with the declared contract. Well
behaving MIDlets may then be slightly rewarded according to the trust model presented before. On the
contrary, misbehaving MIDlets may receive a drastic trust penalty. If such a contract violation is detected,
the PDP immediately switches to the policy enforcing configuration, eventually stopping the execution.
The mixed PDP strategy, i.e., contract monitoring and policy enforcement, is obtained by composing the
MIDlet contract with the system policy. Since both of them use the same specification formalism, i.e., the
XML-based syntax, the two requirements can be composed provided that the policy is more general than
the contract, i.e., the contract policy matching has been successfully passed.
7.3 Access Control Policy Negotiation with Trust Levels
In the previous chapter (Chapter 6) a generic trust-meta-model is depicted, for dealing with the (possible)
heterogeneity of the trust models adopted by different entities in the communication, e.g., by different
Networked Systems, Enablers, CONNECTors, and so on. Here we present an access control policy nego-
tiation mechanism for allowing two NSs to state and enforce their access control policies to their services.
These access control policies can also be enriched with trust values (for instance calculated through the
accreditation process defined in Chapter 6). For sake of simplicity, in order to develop our negotiation
mechanism, we assume that both the NSs agree on the same access control language and trust model
for the credentials.
Indeed, in this framework we can express that a NS has an access control policy for allowing another
NS to interact with it. In order to access the NS service, one NS has to present a given set of credentials
that must match the access control policies of the other NS.
A policy negotiation phase arises if one NS does not present the appropriate access credentials to
the other NS. In this case, it can start a negotiation phase where credentials are interactively requested,
in a step by step procedure. The interesting part of the work we did in this area is the capability to do
this negotiation strategy in an access control language where credentials stating access control rules and
facts are enriched with trust measures.
We recall that two basic logical services can be used inside authorization systems. One is used to
establish if a NS has presented credentials sufficient to have granted the access, the other is a way to help
the client (the NS requesting the service of the other NS) to understand where are the missing credentials
to gain the access.
The first logical approach useful in access control is represented by deduction [66, 76]: given a policy
and a set of additional facts and events, the service finds out all consequences (actions or obligations) of
the policy and the facts, i.e., whether granting the request can be deduced from the policy and the current
facts.
Current access control policy languages based on credentials (for both expressing facts and access
policy rules) uses several foundational approaches. However, facts and access rules are not so crisp in
the real complex world. For example, each piece of information could have a confidence value associated
with it and representing a reliability estimation, or a fuzzy preference level or a cost to be taken in account.
The feedback final value, obtained by aggregating all the ground facts together, can be then used to
improve the decision support system by basing on this preference level instead of a plain “yes or no” result
(e.g., see [25, 20]).
In this scenario, a credential could state that the referred entity is a “guards” or a “civilian guards ” with
a probability of 80% because her/his identity of guard is based on what an accreditation authority asserts
with a certain trust level/precision.
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Here we are mainly interested to work with a credential-based language enriched with weights for
expressing trust measures. In order to give full semantics to these family of languages, we use a weighted
version of Datalog where the rules are enhanced with values taken from a proper c-semiring structure [18,
19], in order to model the preference/cost system. Datalog is a restricted form of logic programming
with variables, predicates, and constants, but without function symbols. Facts and rules are represented
as Horn clauses. Then, we use it as the basis to give declarative semantics to a Role-based Trust-
management language according to the principles of RT0 [70], and called here RTW0 : the statements
of RTW0 are “soft”, i.e., have a related c-semiring value. A similar improvement can be accomplished
also for RT1 [70], i.e., RT0 extended with parametrized roles. Similar variations for RTML (Role-based
Trust Management Language) family languages were defined and implemented by using different formal
tools. There, an initial comparison (and integration) between rule-based trust management (RTML) and
reputation-based trust systems has been performed and a preliminary (ad hoc) implementation RTML
weighted presented in [28] for GRID systems. However, having a uniform semantics approach, as the
weighted datalog we are advocating here, to model these languages could be very useful to provide a
common understanding as well as a basis for systematic comparison and uniform implementation.
As it has been shown since trust is not necessarily crisp, soft Datalog could be used to give formal
semantics to this languages for soft credentials. We have shown here an approach for RTML. However,
it can be further extended to other credential based languages, whose semantics could be given in terms
of soft Datalog. We thus provide a formal semantics for such languages that could also bring to a uni-
form implementation approach, as well as to a comparison among these languages w.r.t. to others by
using existing results on Datalog and soft constraints. Our systematic approach to give weights to facts
and rules, contributes also towards bridging the gap between “rule-based” trust management (i.e., hard
security mechanisms) and “reputation based” trust management [58] (i.e., soft security mechanisms).
As previously mentioned, access authorization usually needs another reasoning service: abduc-
tion [66, 76]. Loosely speaking, abduction is deduction in reverse: given a policy and a request for
access to (e.g.) NS services, it consists in finding the credentials/events that would grant access, i.e., a
(possibly minimal) set of facts that added to the policy would make the request a logical consequence.
The intuition behind an interactive access control system is the following: i) initially a client (NS in our
case) submits a set of credentials and a service (another NS) request then, ii) the server checks whether
the request is granted by the access policy according to the client’s set of credentials. If the check fails, iii)
by using abductive reasoning the server finds a (minimal) solution set of (disclosable) missing credentials
that unlocks the desired resource and iv) returns them to the client, so that v) he can provide them in the
second round.
This is a single negotiation step. It is useful to establish if the NS needs further information to grant
the access to the services. Clearly, this approach eases cooperation among NSs and it is the basis for
further cooperation.
We manage trust-based access authorization with weighted credentials, i.e. credentials where the
associated level of trust can be used to enrich the authorization process. The proposed framework can be
used to improve logical reasoning processes in autonomic networks of nodes [66], since these services
(i.e. deduction and abduction) help the self-managing characteristics of distributed computing resources:
a node sometimes needs to independently produce the missing information (through an abduction pro-
cess).
This is an initial work focussing on access control policy negotiation in the presence of trust values.
The initial results are promising and we do plan to extend this to the trust models defined in the Chapter
6, where the two NS may present two different trust models (not based on the same credential language
that in our case simplifies the treatment).
7.4 Application to the Terrorist Alert Scenario
Referring to the Terrorist Alert scenario described in Chapter 2 and in Deliverable D6.2, in this section
we show how we apply our approach for dealing with security aspects. In particular we show how the
S×C×T paradigm and the Access control negotiation mechanisms can be applied for guaranteeing secu-
rity requirement in the scenario of the terrorist alert.
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7.4.1 Security-by-Contract-with-Trust
Let us assume that the CONNECTor, once synthesized, is deployed in a decentralized way on both the
NSs. Let us also assume that each NSs doe not trust the other, i.e., the Policemen do not trust civilian
guards and vice versa.
According to the scenario, Policemen ask for establishing a communication with guards in a particular
area of the stadium in order to send them a photo of the terrorist they are looking for.
The security requirement of the CONNECTed system is the following one:
The photo can only be received by authorized devices.
For sake of simplicity, we describe our approach from the point of you of a policeman. Hence, for the
police “authorized” means:
• they have a certain level of trust;
• they have to send an ACK;
• they expose a certificate for proving who and where they are.
The conjunction of these three requirements is the security policy requested by the police to the CONNECT
infrastructure.
We assume that the CONNECTor is the one described in Figure 2.6. The CONNECTor is deployed part
on the device of the policeman and part on the device of a guard. Both of them receive also its contract
that describes its behaviour. Both NSs are provided of the S×C×T mechanism for enforcing policies and
monitoring contract. The CONNECTor is assumed to be safe and trust by construction. By the way, since
it is deployed and run on a possible malicious platform, both the NSs run the S×C×T for controlling that
nobody modifies the CONNECTor making it unsafe.
According to the level of trust of the guards, the CONNECTor is directly executed and we switch in
the MC scenario, or, the contract of the CONNECTor is compared with the security policy set on the
policeman’s device. Referring to our model if some violation occurs, the NS that detects it, sends a
negative feedback to the CONNECT infrastructure, i.e., to the trust Enabler. It is in charge to manage it
and, in this case, it penalizes the NS by decreasing its level of trust.
7.4.2 Access Control Policy Negotiation with Trust
Let us suppose that also the guards, before receiving a message from someone, ask for certain as-
surances. The CONNECTor is in charge to guarantee that these requirements are satisfied. So before
establishing a communication, the two NSs negotiate their access control requirements through the CON-
NECTor.
Indeed, let us suppose that the CONNECTor has sent the eReq message to the civilian guards. Ac-
cording to Figure 2.6, this message is the translation of the selectArea message sent to the Police for
reaching only the civilian guards located in a certain area of the stadium.
When the guards receive this message, they want to be sure that they are speaking with the Police.
The CONNECTor does not establish the communication yet but requires that Police sends as parameter of
the selectArea message also a certificate of its identity.
If the certificate is accepted form the civilian guards, then the communication can be established. Thus,
(part of) the CONNECTor is deployed on each NSs and the communication is established. According to
this access control negotiation, the trust module of each component establishes the level of trust of the
deployed CONNECTor. According to this, the S×C×T configuration is the scenario MC or EPMC.
7.5 Conclusions and Further Research Directions
In this second year of the project we have extended the analysis of our threat models for dealing with
different deployment strategies of a CONNECTor. Furthermore, we proposed an integrated version of
the Security-by-Contract-with-Trust paradigm in which we have integrated a trust model that is in charge
of managing feedbacks obtained as result of a CONNECTor contract monitoring and enforcement policy.
We also shown how and when this approach is able to guarantee security requirements in the proposed
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Terrorist Alert case study. As future directions, we aim to extend our work for covering as far as possible
all the threat models presented here. We also would like to extend our enforcement strategy for dealing
with cryptography.
Moreover, we have taken an additional research direction covering access control policy negotiation.
We presented a trust negotiation framework for quantitative notions of trust based on soft-constraints,
which will be the basis for subsequent work on automated trust negotiation among NSs.
CONNECT 231167 116/123
8 Conclusions and Future Work
This deliverable reports advances achieved in Y2 within WP5. This is a broad scope workpackage
addressing non-functional properties of CONNECTed systems at synthesis time and at runtime.
We coined the term CONNECTability to refer within a unique context concerns for dependability, per-
formance, security and trust. A formal meta-model of CONNECTability properties and of their associated
metrics has been specified, so that metrics for quantitative properties of interest can be automatically in-
stantiated by means of a model-driven editor. In the next year we will work towards: i) further refining this
meta-model in some parts, such as the EventType definition to define a formal way to specify application-
dependent observable behavior by using event operators shared with the algebra defined in WP2. This
will be the ground on which the integration among the functional and non-functional aspects will be built.
We also need to include the Trust meta-model which is now under development; ii) specifying M2M and
M2C transformations that translate the properties models towards the specific analysis methodologies
and the intrumentation performed by the monitoring infrastructure.
We have presented the Dependability&Performance analysis Enabler which cooperates with the Syn-
thesis Enabler to verify whether the prescribed properties would be satisfied by the CONNECTor under
synthesis. We have extensively described the two analysis engines currently used, one based on Möbius
and the other based on Prism. The enhancements/extensions planned for the third year mainly consist
in: i) progressing in the implementation of the Enhancer module of the the Dependability&Performance
Enabler, by taking into account in the analysis basic fault-tolerance mechanisms/patterns, among a set
available to react to selected failure modes experienced by the CONNECTed system. This is a very impor-
tant feedback to the Synthesis Enabler towards the synthesis of a dependable CONNECTor; ii) progress-
ing in completing the loop between the Dependability&Performance Enabler and the Synthesis Enabler
so that Synthesis can profitably embed in the synthesis of the CONNECTor the indications coming from
the analysis; iii) progressing in the interactions between the Dependability&Performance Enabler and the
Monitor Enabler, to refine the analysis along time using real data/events observed at run-time.
We have introduced incremental verification, which allows for refining the analysis after changes to
the system, without having to redo it all from scratch. Currently, this technique only allows the changes
in probability values. In Y3, we will investigate the cases where system structure can evolve, i.e., some
transitions can be removed from the model, and new transitions can be added.
We also showed how, at runtime, the Dependability&Performance analysis Enabler can interact with
the Monitoring Enabler to check that the assumptions on which the analysis is based remain valid. During
Y3, we want also to improve communication and analysis of monitored data. The integration with the
above mentioned metrics meta-model to express monitoring rule will provide a more powerful monitoring
infrastructure. Another research issue will be the enrichment of the architecture with a module dedicated
to model to model and model to code conversion to provide an heterogeneous infrastructure able to
communicate with different rules engines.
We have defined a formal trust meta-model which can generically describe any given trust model, so
that we can ensure trust interoperability among heterogeneous Networked Systems through the CONNECT
Trust Enabler. Given the respective trust models provided by two NSs, we are able to infer composite trust
models for them to be able to interact in a trusted way.
We have then presented a refined version of the Security-by-Contract-with-Trust, based on an accurate
study of the security threat models, and have discussed how it verifies that the security contract and the
required trust levels are satisfied, or otherwise how it enforces them at runtime. We have also introduced
an approach to negotiate credential-based trust access levels. In the third year we will work on extending
the SxCxT system by covering as far as possible all the threat models presented here. We also would like
to extend our enforcement strategy for dealing also with cryptography.
Finally, the illustrated research has been instantiated in several prototype tools, which are also part of
Deliverable D5.2. Namely they include:
• CPMM eCore & Editor for CONNECT properties;
• the DePer Analysis prototype, which instantiates the Dependability&Performance architecture;
• PRISM CONNECT Bundle, which is a prototype of the incremental verification technique;
• the SxCxT infrastructure;
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• the GLIMPSE run-time monitoring infrastructure, which can interoperate with DePer.
In the associated Appendix-Prototypes document, we provide their list, along with essential information
and the URL from which they can be downloaded.
Beyond the specific improvements planned for each approach, the keywords for Y3 activities will be
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